75 ideas
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Everything worth notice is worth recording; and those records should be so made that they can readily be arranged, and particularly so that they can be rearranged. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: Yet another epigraph for my project! Peirce must have had a study piled with labelled notes, and he would have adored this database, at least in its theory. |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy differs from the special sciences in not confining itself to the reality of existence, but also to the reality of potential being. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: One might reply that sciences also concern potential being, if their output is universal generalisations (such as 'laws'). I take disposition and powers to be central to existence, which are hence of interest to sciences. |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as an absolutely detached idea. It would be no idea at all. For an idea is itself a continuous system. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: This is the new anti-epigraph for this database. This idea is part of Peirce's idea that relations are the central feature of our grasp of the world. |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy differs from mathematics in being a search for real truth. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: This is important, coming from the founder of pragmatism, in rejecting the anti-realism which a lot of modern pragmatists seem to like. |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The metaphysician who is not prepared to grapple with the difficulties of modern exact logic had better put up his shutters and go out of the trade. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: This announcement comes before Russell proclaimed mathematical logic to be the heart of metaphysics (though it is contemporary with Frege's work, of which Peirce was unaware). It places Peirce firmly in the analytic tradition. |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the science of being, not merely as given in physical experience, but of being in general, its laws and types. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: I agree with this. The question then is whether such a science is possible. Dogmatic empiricists think not. Explanatory empiricists (me) think it is. |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical reasonings, such as they have hitherto been, have been simple enough for the most part. It is the metaphysical concepts which it is difficult to apprehend. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: Peirce is not, of course, saying that it is just conceptual, because for him science comes first. It is the woolly concepts that alienate some people from metaphysics. Metaphysicians should challenge the concepts they use much, much more! |
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17) | |
A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof). |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is gradually and surely taking on the character of a logic. And finally seems destined to become more and more converted into mathematics. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: Remarkably prescient for 1898. I don't think Peirce knew of Frege (and certainly not when he wrote this). It shows that the revolution of Frege and Russell was in the air. It's there in Dedekind's writings. Peirce doesn't seem to be a logicist. |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30) | |
A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea. |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11) | |
A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes? |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03) | |
A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?) |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18) | |
A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals. |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32) | |
A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible? |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05) | |
A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae. |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17) | |
A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280! |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12) | |
A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation. |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19) | |
A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions. |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24) | |
A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger. |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To set up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is the one unpardonable offence in reasoning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: This is Popper's rather dubious objection to essentialism in science. Yet Popper tried to do the same thing with his account of induction. |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Whether or not 'truth' has two meanings, I think 'holding for true' has two kinds. One is practical holding for true which alone is entitled to the name of Belief; the other is the acceptance of a proposition, which in pure science is always provisional. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: The problem here seems to be that we can act on a proposition without wholly believing it, like walking across thin ice. |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The question of whether a deductive argument is true or not is simply the question whether or not the facts stated in the premises could be true in any sort of universe no matter what be true without the fact stated in the conclusion being true likewise. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: A remarkably modern account, fitting the normal modern view of semantic consequence, and expressing the necessity in the validity in terms of something close to possible worlds. |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Every attempt to understand anything at least hopes that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VIII) | |
A reaction: The idea that external objects might be subject to a logic has become very unfashionable since Frege, but I love the idea. I'm inclined to think that we derive our logic from the world, so I'm a bit more confident that Peirce. |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: In the place of the class ...the logic of relatives considers the system, which is composed of objects brought together by any kind of relations whatsoever. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: Peirce's logic of relations might support the purely structural view of reality defended by Ladyman and Ross. Modern logic standardly expresses its semantics in terms of set theory. Peirce pioneered relations in logic. |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1 | |
A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins. |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line). | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30) | |
A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9 |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It did not become clear to mathematicians before modern times that they study nothing but hypotheses without as pure mathematicians caring at all how the actual facts may be. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: 'Modern' here is 1898. As a logical principle this would seem to qualify as 'if-thenism' (see alphabetical themes). It's modern descendant might be modal structuralism (see Geoffrey Hellman). It take maths to be hypotheses abstracted from experience. |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If there is any reality, then it consists of this: that there is in the being of things something which corresponds to the process of reasoning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: A nice definition of realism, a little different from usual. I belief that the normal logic of daily thought corresponds (in its rules and connectives) to the way the world is. We evaluate success in logic by truth-preservation. |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
Full Idea: What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. It is but a working hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite sure why the hope is 'forlorn'. We have no current reason to doubt that the hypothesis is working out extremely well. Lovely idea, though. |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20) | |
A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters. |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27) | |
A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease! |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07) | |
A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai]. |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates. |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19) | |
A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims. |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai]. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36) | |
A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences? |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18) | |
A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266. |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30) | |
A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered. |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02) | |
A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33) | |
A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result. |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36) | |
A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it. |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction. |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25) | |
A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic? |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Chance, as an objective phenomenon, is a property of a distribution. ...In order to have any meaning, it must refer to some definite arrangement of all the things. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VI) |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: In our ordinary use of language we always understand the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the antecedent shall be true. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Peirce is discussing Diodorus, and proposes the view nowadays defended by Edgington, though in the end Peirce defends the standard material conditional as simpler. I suspect that this discussion by Peirce is not well known. |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: 'Full belief' is willingness to upon a proposition in vital crises, 'opinion' is willingness to act on it in relatively insignificant affairs. But pure science has nothing at all to do with action. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of the pragmatic view of beliefs. It is not much help in distinguishing full belief about the solar system from mere opinion about remote galaxies. Ditto for historical events. |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Allying certain ideas like 'crimson' and 'scarlet' is called 'association by resemblance'. The name is not a good one, since it implies that resemblance causes association, while in point of fact it is the association which constitutes the resemblance. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VII) | |
A reaction: I take it that Hume would have agreed with this. It is an answer to Russell's claim that 'resemblance' must itself be a universal. |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The scientific man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions. He risks nothing upon them. He stands ready to abandon one or all as experience opposes them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: In the age of massive speculative research grants, the idea that 'he risks nothing upon them' is no longer true. Ditto for building aircraft and bridges, which are full of theoretical science. Notoriously, many scientists don't live up to Peirce's idea. |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Were every probable inference less certain than its premises, science, which piles inference upon inference, often quite deeply, would soon be in a bad way. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: This seems to endorse Aristotle's picture of demonstration about scientific and practical things as being a form of precise logic, rather than progressive probabilities. Our generalisations may be more certain than the particulars they rely on. |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I classify the sciences on Comte's general principles, in order of the abstractness of their objects, so that each science may largely rest for its principles upon those above it in the scale, while drawing its data in part from those below it. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: He places mathematics at the peak of abstraction. I assume physics is more abstract than biology. So chemistry draws principles from physics and data from biology. Not sure about this. Probably need to read Comte on it. |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15) | |
A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument. |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The word 'inductio' is Cicero's imitation of Aristotle's term 'epagoge'. It fails to convey the full significance of the Greek word, which implies the examples are arrayed and brought forward in a mass. 'The assault upon the generals by the singulars'. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Interesting, thought I don't think there is enough evidence in Aristotle to get the Greek idea fully clear. |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25) | |
A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers. |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Induction can never afford the slightest reason to think that a law is without an exception. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Part of the general Humean doubts about induction, but very precisely stated, and undeniable. You can then give up on universal laws, or look for deeper reasons to justify your conviction that there are no exceptions. E.g. observe mass, or Higgs Boson. |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The most dangerous fallacy of inductive reasoning consists in examining a sample, finding some recondite property in it, and concluding at once that it belongs to the whole collection. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: The point, I take it, is not that you infer that the whole collection has all the properties of the sample, but that some 'recondite' or unusual property is sufficiently unusual to be treated as general. |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Induction can never make a first suggestion. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: This seems to lead to the general modern problem of the 'theory-laden' nature of observation. You don't see anything at all without some idea of what you are looking for. How do you spot the 'next instance'. Instance of what? Nice. |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Men many times fancy that they act from reason, when the reasons they attribute to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents to satisfy the teasing 'whys' of the ego. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: A strikely modern thought, supported by a lot of modern neuro-science and psychology. It is crucial to realise that we don't have to accept the best explanation we can think of. |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Those whom we are so fond of referring to as the 'lower animals' reason very little. Now I beg you to observe that those beings very rarely commit a mistake, while we ---- ! | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: We might take this as pessimism about reason, but I would take it as inviting a much broader view of rationality. I think nearly all animal behaviour is highly rational. Are animals 'sensible' in what they do? Their rationality is unadventurous. |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The generalising tendency is the great law of mind. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VII) | |
A reaction: How else could a small and compact mind get a grip on a vast and diverse reality? This must even apply to inarticulate higher animals. |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Generalization, the spelling out of continuous systems, in thought, in sentiment, in deed, is the true end of life. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: I take understanding to be the true aim of life, and full grasp of particulars (e.g. of particular people) is as necessary as generalisation. This is still a very nice bold idea. |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
Full Idea: 'Know thyself' does not mean instrospect your soul. It means see yourself as others would see you if they were intimate enough with you. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: When it comes to anger management, I would have thought that introspection had some use. You can see a tantrum coming before even your intimates can. Nice disagreement with Sartre! (Idea 7123) |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I think that what is First is ipso facto sentient. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VIII) | |
A reaction: He doesn't mention Leibniz's monads, but that looks like the ancestor of Peirce's idea. He doesn't make clear (here) how far he would take the idea. I would just say that whatever is 'First' must be active rather than passive. |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mental operations concerning in reasoning are three. The first is Observation; the second is Experimentation; and the third is Habituation. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: I like the breadth of this. Even those who think scientific reasoning has priority over logic (as I do, thinking of it as the evaluation of evidence, with Sherlock Holmes as its role model) will be surprised to finding observation and habituation there. |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The very fact that everybody so ridiculously overrates his own reasoning, is sufficient to show how superficial the faculty is. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: A nice remark. The obvious counter-thought is that the collective reasoning of mankind really has been rather impressive, even though people haven't yet figured out how to live at peace with one another. |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Words like 'this', 'that', 'I', 'you', enable us to convey meanings which words alone are incompetent to express; they stimulate the hearer to look about him. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Peirce was once of the first to notice the interest of indexicals, and this is a very nice comment on them. A word like 'Look!' isn't like the normal flow of verbiage, and may be the key to indexicals. |
7453 | Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Galen ran medicine on the principle of the mean; afflictions must be treated by contraries; hot diseases deserve cold medicine and moist illnesses want drying agents. (Paracelsus rebelled, treating through similarity). | |
From: report of Galen (On Medical Experience [c.169]) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This must be inherited from Aristotle, with the aim of virtue for the body, as Aristotle wanted virtue for the psuché. In some areas Galen is probably right, that natural balance is the aim, as in bodily temperature control. |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36) | |
A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277. |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean. |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03) | |
A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare. |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Each person ought to select some definite duty that clearly lies before him and is well within his power as the special task of his life. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: I like that. Note especially that it should be 'well' within his power. Note also that this is a 'duty', and not just a friendly suggestion. Not sure what the basis of the duty is. |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17) | |
A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen. |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is not the man who thinks he knows it all, that can bring other men to feel their need for learning, and it is only a deep sense that one is miserably ignorant that can spur one on in the toilsome path of learning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The chemist contents himself with a single experiment to establish any qualitative fact, because he knows there is such a uniformity in the behavior of chemical bodies that another experiment would be a mere repetition of the first in every respect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: I take it this endorses my 'Upanishads' view of natural kinds - that for each strict natural kind, if you've seen one you've them all. This seems to fit atoms and molecules, but only roughly fits tigers. |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20) | |
A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable. |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We may suppose that the laws of nature are results of an evolutionary process. ...But this evolution must proceed according to some principle: and this principle will itself be of the nature of a law. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VII) | |
A reaction: Maybe I've missed something, but this seems a rather startling idea that doesn't figure much in modern discussions of laws of nature. Lee Smolin's account of evolving universes comes to mind. |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18) | |
A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days. |