19693
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There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro
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A reaction:
The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea.
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19335
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Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
All reasonings are eminent in God, and they preserve an order among themselves in his understanding as well as in ours; but for him this is just an order and a priority of nature, whereas for us there is a priority of time.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.192), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
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A reaction:
This view is found in Frege, and seems to be the hallmark of rationalist philosophy. There is an apriori assumption that reality has a rational order, so that pure reason is a tool for grasping it. Lewis's 'mosaic' of experiences has no order.
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8200
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Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
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Full Idea:
A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51
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A reaction:
Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'.
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13282
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Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12
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A reaction:
[see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit.
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5991
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For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle
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A reaction:
Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap.
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19367
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Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
As for volition itself, to say that it is the object of free will is incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will, else we should still say we will to have the will to will, and that would go on to infinity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.151), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 4.IV
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A reaction:
This strikes me as an elementary difficulty which most fans of free will appear to evade. Thoughts just arise in us, and some of them are volitions. We can say there is then a 'gap' (Searle) where we choose, but what happens in the gap?
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19351
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Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Insofar as the soul has perfection ...God has accommodated the body to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to execute its orders. Insofar as it is imperfect and confused, God accommodates soul to body, swayed by passions.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.159), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 3.IV
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A reaction:
Perkins says this is the nearest Leibniz gets to the idea of interaction between body and soul. Perfection and confusion are on a continuum for Leibniz. With such speculations I always wonder how these things can be known. How perfect is my mind?
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19346
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Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
I believe there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, were not content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the same amount of good and evil, provided that it were not the same kind.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.130), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
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A reaction:
Nice challenge. People who refuse the offer are not necessarily suicidal. He's probably right, but Leibniz doesn't recognise the factor of boredom. Look up the suicide note of the actor George Sanders! One life may be enough.
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19340
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Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically, and morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil is suffering, and moral evil is sin.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.136), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
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A reaction:
There seem to be plenty of imperfections in the world which don't look like evil. Or do you only declare it to be an imperfection because it seems to be evil (by some other standard)? Human evil comes from ignorance, so metaphysical explains moral.
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24073
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Capitalists use their exceptional power to impose their own rules, and make the state their ally [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Capitalists exploit their unrivalled control over time and space in order to impose their rules on everyone else. …It triumphed late, only becoming dominant in the 19th century, when it had conscripted the state as its ally.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
This so very much makes sense of the modern world. Nowadays capitalists are so wealthy that the state has largely become their pawn, rather than their ally. Populist leaders are their puppets (and are well rewarded).
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24070
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Economies have material, economic and capitalist layers [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Braudel's economic history has three layers. At the bottom is material life of consumption, production, reproduction. Next is economic life of markets, of equals in exchange and competition. Top is capitalism, of opacity, monopoly, power, high profits.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
The point Davies emphasises here is the sharp distinction between the market economy and capitalism.
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24074
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Capitalism must mainly rely either on the labour market, or on the financial markets [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
According to Marxists, the one market capitalism cannot do without is the labour market, which creates saleable things. Others, influenced by Keynes, emphasise financial markets, where pieces of paper change hands on expectation of their value.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
Modern Britain fits the Keynesian account much better, given its low production, and very active (until recently) London financial market.
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24072
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Capitalism is the anti-market, with opacity, monopolies, powers, exceptional profits and wealth [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Braudel sees capitalism as the 'anti-market': a world of opacity, monopoly, concentration of power and wealth, and the exceptional profits that can be achieved only by escaping the norms of 'economic life'.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
Given all the talk about the wonders of the 'free market' from right-wingers, this passage came as a revelation to me. Capitalists all dream of a monopoly, which is precisely the destruction of a market.
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24071
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Markets are transparent, with known prices and activity, and minimal profits [Davies,W]
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Full Idea:
Markets are characterised by transparency. Prices are public, and all relevant activity is visible to everyone. And because of competition, profits are minimal, little more than a 'wage' for the seller.
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From:
William Davies (Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers [2024], 24-04-04)
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A reaction:
This account, from Braudel, is to distinguish markets from capitalism.
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8660
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There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3
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A reaction:
Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle.
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19327
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The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom, and in goodness, since it relates to all that which is possible. Also, since all is connected together, there is no ground for admitting more than one.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.128), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
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A reaction:
Notice that Leibniz's possible worlds seem to be all connected together, unlike David Lewis's worlds, which are discrete. Personally I suspect that all perfections will lead to contradiction, though Leibniz strongly argues against it.
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19330
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If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The three dogmas (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) it is fixed, but not certain God will observe it, or (3) the justice we know is not that which God observes, destroy our confidence in the love of God.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.237), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
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A reaction:
Leibniz proceeds to carefully refute these three responses to the dilemma about how justice relates to God.
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19329
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The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
These admirable laws [of physics] are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato and Spinoza.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.332), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.II
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A reaction:
Note the swipe at Spinoza. Leibniz defends the absolute necessities residing in God, but is too polite to call those 'brute', though personally I can't see the difference. But he says the laws arise from 'perfection and order', not from God's necessity.
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22729
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The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20
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A reaction:
The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul).
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19337
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How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There is this question of natural theology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has been able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could resolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.098), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
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A reaction:
His answer is, roughly, that there is an unavoidable trade-off, which humans cannot fully understand. Personally I would say that if there is a God, the evidence for his benevolence towards humanity is not encouraging.
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19345
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Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the justice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and justice which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our gaze.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Theodicy [1710], p.120), quoted by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.IV
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A reaction:
Hm. If this locality is full of evils, and the rest of it is much better, how come we are stuck in this miserable corner of things? God is obliged to compromise, but did he select us to get the worst of it?
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