61 ideas
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17) | |
A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof). |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30) | |
A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea. |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11) | |
A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes? |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03) | |
A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?) |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18) | |
A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals. |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32) | |
A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible? |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05) | |
A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae. |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17) | |
A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280! |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12) | |
A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation. |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19) | |
A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions. |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24) | |
A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger. |
9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
Full Idea: Field commits himself to a Platonic view of mathematics. The theorems of set theory are held to imply or presuppose the existence of things that don't in fact exist. That is why he believes that these theorems are false. | |
From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 11.1 | |
A reaction: I am sympathetic to Field, but this sounds wrong. A response that looks appealing is that maths is hypothetical ('if-thenism') - the truth is in the logical consequences, not in the ontological presuppositions. |
10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Field defines logical consequence by taking the notion of 'logical possibility' as primitive. Hence q is a consequence of P if the conjunction of the items in P with the negation of q is not possible. | |
From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.2 | |
A reaction: The question would then be whether it is plausible to take logical possibility as primitive. Presumably only intuition could support it. But then intuition will equally support natural and metaphysical possibilities. |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1 | |
A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins. |
8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
Full Idea: Field's nominalist version of science develops a version of Newtonian gravitational theory, where no quantifiers range over mathematical entities, and space-time points and regions play the role of surrogates for real numbers. | |
From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 5.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very artificial contrivance, but Field has launched a programme for rewriting science so that numbers can be omitted. All of this is Field's rebellion against the Indispensability Argument for mathematics. I sympathise. |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line). | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30) | |
A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9 |
18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
Full Idea: There are two approaches to axiomatising geometry. The 'metric' approach uses a function which maps a pair of points into the real numbers. The 'synthetic' approach is that of Euclid and Hilbert, which does without real numbers and functions. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 5) |
8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
Full Idea: There is one and only one serious argument for the existence of mathematical entities, and that is the Indispensability Argument of Putnam and Quine. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.5), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 9.1 | |
A reaction: Personally I don't believe (and nor does Field) that this gives a good enough reason to believe in such things. Quine (who likes 'desert landscapes' in ontology) ends up believing that sets are real because of his argument. Not for me. |
18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
Full Idea: The most popular approach of nominalistically inclined philosophers is to try to reinterpret mathematics, so that its terms and quantifiers only make reference to, say, physical objects, or linguistic expressions, or mental constructions. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], Prelim) | |
A reaction: I am keen on naturalism and empiricism, but only referring to physical objects is a non-starter. I think I favour constructions, derived from the experience of patterns, and abstracted, idealised and generalised. Field says application is the problem. |
10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Field argues that to account for the applicability of mathematics, we need to assume little more than the possibility of the mathematics, not its truth. | |
From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.2 | |
A reaction: Very persuasive. We can apply chess to real military situations, provided that chess isn't self-contradictory (or even naturally impossible?). |
18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Facts about geometric laws receive satisfying explanations, by the intrinsic facts about physical space, i.e. those laid down without reference to numbers in Hilbert's axioms. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 3) | |
A reaction: Hilbert's axioms mention points, betweenness, segment-congruence and angle-congruence (Field 25-26). Field cites arithmetic and geometry (as well as Newtonian mechanics) as not being dependent on number. |
9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
Full Idea: Field needs the notion of logical consequence in second-order logic, but (since this is not recursively axiomatizable) this is a semantical notion, which involves the idea of 'true in all models', a set-theoretic idea if there ever was one. | |
From: comment on Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], Ch.4) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: Brown here summarises a group of critics. Field was arguing for modern nominalism, that actual numbers could (in principle) be written out of the story, as useful fictions. Popper's attempt to dump induction seemed to need induction. |
18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
Full Idea: No clear explanation of the idea that the conclusion was 'implicitly contained in' the premises was ever given, and I do not believe that any clear explanation is possible. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1) |
18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities are useful because we can use them to formulate abstract counterparts of concrete statements. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 3) | |
A reaction: He defends the abstract statements as short cuts. If the concrete statements were 'true', then it seems likely that the abstract counterparts will also be true, which is not what fictionalism claims. |
18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is in a sense empirical, but only in the rather Pickwickian sense that is an empirical question as to which mathematical theory is useful. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1) | |
A reaction: Field wants mathematics to be fictions, and not to be truths. But can he give an account of 'useful' that does not imply truth? Only in a rather dubiously pragmatist way. A novel is not useful. |
18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Why regard the axioms of standard mathematics as truths, rather than as fictions that for a variety of reasons mathematicians have become interested in? | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.viii) |
18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
Full Idea: One can often reduce one's ontological commitments by expanding one's logic. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.ix) | |
A reaction: I don't actually understand this idea, but that's never stopped me before. Clearly, this sounds like an extremely interesting thought, and hence I should aspire to understand it. So I do aspire to understand it. First, how do you 'expand' a logic? |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20) | |
A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters. |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27) | |
A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease! |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07) | |
A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai]. |
8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
Full Idea: Field regards the eliminability of apparent reference to properties from the language of science as a foregone result. | |
From: report of Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 5.1 n50 | |
A reaction: Field is a nominalist who also denies the existence of mathematics as part of science. He has a taste for ontological 'desert landscapes'. I have no idea what a property really is, so I think he is on to something. |
18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
Full Idea: To be able to apply any postulated abstract entities to the physical world, we need impure abstact entities, e.g. functions that map physical objects into pure abstract objects. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1) | |
A reaction: I am a fan of 'impure metaphysics', and this pinpoints my reason very nicely. |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates. |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19) | |
A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims. |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai]. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36) | |
A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences? |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18) | |
A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266. |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30) | |
A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered. |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02) | |
A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33) | |
A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result. |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36) | |
A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it. |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction. |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25) | |
A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic? |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15) | |
A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument. |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25) | |
A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers. |
18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
Full Idea: A plausible methodological principle is that underlying every good extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 5) | |
A reaction: I'm thinking that Hartry Field is an Aristotelian essentialist, though I bet he would never admit it. |
9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
Full Idea: The term 'abstract entities' may not be entirely clear, but one thing that does seem clear is that such alleged entities as numbers, functions and sets are abstract. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], p.1), quoted by JP Burgess / G Rosen - A Subject with No Object I.A.1.a | |
A reaction: Field firmly denies the existence of such things. Sets don't seem a great problem, if the set is a herd of elephants, but the null and singleton sets show up the difficulties. |
22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88) | |
A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests. |
22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad. |
22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89) | |
A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday? |
22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104) | |
A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical). |
22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing? | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101) | |
A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here. |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36) | |
A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277. |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean. |
22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101) | |
A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group. |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03) | |
A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare. |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17) | |
A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen. |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20) | |
A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable. |
18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
Full Idea: According to theories that take the notion of a field seriously, space-time points or regions are fully-fledge causal agents. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], n 23) |
18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
Full Idea: In general, it seems to me that recent developments in both philosophy and physics have made substantivalism a much more attractive position than it once was. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 4) | |
A reaction: I'm intrigued as to what philosophical developments are involved in this. The arrival of fields is the development in physics. |
18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |
Full Idea: The problem of the relational view of space is especially acute in the context of physical theories that take the notion of a field seriously, e.g. classical electromagnetic theory. | |
From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 4) | |
A reaction: In the Leibniz-Clarke debate I sided with the Newtonian Clarke (defending absolute space), and it looks like modern science agrees with me. Nothing exists purely as relations. |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists. | |
From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18) | |
A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days. |