61 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
22338 | An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: An unexamined life can be virtuous. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Nice. A firm rejection of the intellectualist view of virtue, to which most Greeks subscribed. Jesus would have liked this one. |
22337 | Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Philosophy has in a sense to keep trying to return to the beginning. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: This is a sign that philosophy is not like other subjects, and indicates that although the puzzles are not solved, they won't go away. Also that, unlike most other subjects, the pre-suppositions are not part of the subject. |
23563 | Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the building of elaborate theories, and a move back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Nice. Without the theories there is no philosophy, but without continual reference back to the obvious facts the theories are worthless. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
17925 | Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: In intuitionist logic double negation elimination fails. After all, proving that there is no proof that there can't be a proof of S is not the same thing as having a proof of S. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 1.1.3) | |
A reaction: I do like people like Colyvan who explain things clearly. All of this difficult stuff is understandable, if only someone makes the effort to explain it properly. |
17926 | Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist rejection of double negation elimination undermines the important reductio ad absurdum proof in classical mathematics. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 1.1.3) |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
17924 | Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle (for every proposition P, either P or not-P) must be carefully distinguished from its semantic counterpart bivalence, that every proposition is either true or false. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 1.1.3) | |
A reaction: So excluded middle makes no reference to the actual truth or falsity of P. It merely says P excludes not-P, and vice versa. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
17929 | Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Löwenheim proved that if a first-order sentence has a model at all, it has a countable model. ...Skolem generalised this result to systems of first-order sentences. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 2.1.2) |
17930 | Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: A set of axioms is said to be 'categorical' if all models of the axioms in question are isomorphic. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: The best example is the Peano Axioms, which are 'true up to isomorphism'. Set theory axioms are only 'quasi-isomorphic'. |
17928 | Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Ordinal numbers represent order relations. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 1.2.3 n17) |
17923 | Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: For intuitionists, all but the smallest, most well-behaved infinities are rejected. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 1.1.3) | |
A reaction: The intuitionist idea is to only accept what can be clearly constructed or proved. |
17941 | Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: The problem with infinitesimals is that in some places they behaved like real numbers close to zero but in other places they behaved like zero. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 7.1.2) | |
A reaction: Colyvan gives an example, of differentiating a polynomial. |
17922 | Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Given Dedekind's reduction of real numbers to sequences of rational numbers, and other known reductions in mathematics, it was tempting to see basic arithmetic as the foundation of mathematics. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: The reduction is the famous Dedekind 'cut'. Nowadays theorists seem to be more abstract (Category Theory, for example) instead of reductionist. |
17936 | Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Transfinite inductions are inductive proofs that include an extra step to show that if the statement holds for all cases less than some limit ordinal, the statement also holds for the limit ordinal. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 5.2.1 n11) |
17940 | Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Most mathematical proofs, outside of set theory, do not explicitly state the set theory being employed. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 7.1.1) |
17931 | Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Structuralism is able to explain why mathematicians are typically only interested in describing the objects they study up to isomorphism - for that is all there is to describe. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 3.1.2) |
17932 | If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: In re structuralism does not posit anything other than the kinds of structures that are in fact found in the world. ...The problem is that the world may not provide rich enough structures for the mathematics. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: You can perceive a repeating pattern in the world, without any interest in how far the repetitions extend. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
17943 | Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Those who see probabilities as ratios of frequencies can't use Bayes's Theorem if there is no objective prior probability. Those who accept prior probabilities tend to opt for a subjectivist account, where probabilities are degrees of belief. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 9.1.8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
17939 | Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Mathematics can demonstrate structural similarities between systems (e.g. missing population periods and the gaps in the rings of Saturn). | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 6.3.2) | |
A reaction: [Colyvan expounds the details of his two examples] It is these sorts of results that get people enthusiastic about the mathematics embedded in nature. A misunderstanding, I think. |
17938 | Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Mathematics can show that under a broad range of conditions, something initially surprising must occur (e.g. the hexagonal structure of honeycomb). | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 6.3.2) |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
17933 | Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: One kind of proof that is thought to be unexplanatory is the 'reductio' proof. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 5.2.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably you generate a contradiction, but are given no indication of why the contradiction has arisen? Tracking back might reveal the source of the problem? Colyvan thinks reductio can be explanatory. |
17935 | If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: It might be argued that any proof by induction is revealing the explanation of the theorem, namely, that it holds by virtue of the structure of the natural numbers. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 5.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is because induction characterises the natural numbers, in the Peano Axioms. |
17942 | Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: The proof of the four-colour theorem raises questions about whether a 'proof' that no one understands is a proof. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 9.1.6) | |
A reaction: The point is that the theorem (that you can colour countries on a map with just four colours) was proved with the help of a computer. |
17934 | Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Another style of proof often cited as unexplanatory are brute-force methods such as proof by cases (or proof by exhaustion). | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 5.2.1) |
17937 | Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan] |
Full Idea: One type of generalisation in mathematics extends a system to go beyond what is was originally set up for; another kind involves abstracting away from some details in order to capture similarities between different systems. | |
From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 5.2.2) |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
22341 | Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The most essential and fundamental aspect of culture is the study of literature, since this is an education in how to picture and understand human situations. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], i) | |
A reaction: It is significant that literature belongs more clearly to a nation or community than does most music or painting. You learn about Russians from their literature, but not much from their music. |
22347 | Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it checks selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Not keen on 'spiritual' exercises, but I very much like 'seeing the real' as a promotion of the good life. The hard bit is to know what reality you are seeing in a work of art. [p.84] Her example is the sudden sight of a hovering kestrel. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
22339 | Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Love is a central concept in morals. ....[p.30] The central concept of morality is 'the individual' thought of as knowable by love, thought of in the light of the command 'Be ye therefore perfect'. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a critique of the chillier aspects of utilitarianism and Kantian duty. Love doesn't seem essential to Aristotle's concept of virtue either, and Murdoch's tradition seems to be Christian. I'm undecided about this idea. |
22348 | Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Is not ordinary human love ...striking evidence of a transcendental principle of good? | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Sorry to be mean, but I would say not. Love is tied up with sexual desire, and with family and tribal loyalty, and can be observed in quite humble animals. (Love, I should quickly add, is a very good thing indeed. Really). |
22343 | If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: If I attend properly I will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: I take it this is an expression of what we now call Particularism. It is not just that every moral situation is subtly morally different, but that the particulars of the situation will lead directly to moral choices (in a 'healthy' agent). |
22340 | It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It is the historical, individual, nature of the virtues as actually exemplified which makes it difficult to learn goodness from another person. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: A penetrating remark, which strikes me as true. When confronted with a virtuous person you might want to acquire their virtue, just as you might want them to teach you algebra, but their virtues are too bound up with their individuality. |
22349 | Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: Very Aristotelian to talk of 'training'. Unfortunately it is children who have the greatest need for training, but most art is aimed at mature adults. Can you be too old to be trained by art, even if you enjoy it? |
22346 | Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world, and increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: As an example she suggests asking what is the best type of courage. Connections to other virtues will emerge. That is a persuasive example. We all have strong views on what type of courage is the most admirable. |
22350 | Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible to have only one virtue, unless it were a very trivial one such as thrift. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: A nicely nuanced commitment to the unity of virtue. You might exhibit courage alone in a brute animal way, but the sort of courage we all admire is part of more extended virtues. |
22351 | Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by his choices. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This looks like a swipe at Nietzsche, more than anyone. Sartre and co talk less about values, other than authenticity. Philosophy can definitely be corrupting. |
22342 | Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: What may be called the Kantian wing and the Surrealist wing of existentialism may be distinguished by the degree of their interest in reasons for action, which diminishes to nothing at the Surrealist end. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Presumably for all existentialists moral decisions are the most important aspect of life, since they define what you are, but the Surrealist wing seem to be nihilists about that, so they barely count as existentialists. For them life is sleepwalking. |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
22345 | Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention. ....Moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central concept which has all these characteristics. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: This is a combination of middle Platonism (which sees the Form of the Good as the mind of God) and G.E. Moore's indefinable ideal of goodness. Murdoch connects this suggestion with the centrality of love in moral philosophy. I disagree. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |