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All the ideas for 'Topics', 'talk' and 'Plural Quantification Exposed'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17)
     A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof).
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30)
     A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11)
     A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes?
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03)
     A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05)
     A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae.
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17)
     A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280!
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12)
     A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation.
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19)
     A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions.
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18)
     A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals.
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32)
     A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible?
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24)
     A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1)
     A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed).
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4)
Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0)
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1
     A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line).
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30)
     A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20)
     A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27)
     A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease!
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07)
     A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai].
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2)
     A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24)
     A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19)
     A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai].
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36)
     A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18)
     A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30)
     A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02)
     A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33)
     A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result.
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36)
     A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it.
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32)
     A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25)
     A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic?
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15)
     A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument.
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25)
     A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Jesus said learning was unnecessary, and only the spirit of the Law was needed [Jesus, by Johnson,P]
     Full Idea: Jesus was a learned Jew who said that learning was not necessary, who took the spirit and not the letter as the essence of the Law.
     From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II
     A reaction: This seems to me the perfect opposite of Socrates's intellectualism, offering the essence of morality as 'purity of heart', rather than careful thought about virtue or principles. On the whole I am with Socrates, but the idea is interesting.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love your enemies [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Love your enemies.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.44
     A reaction: The germ of this idea had been around for several hundred years, but this very forceful statement is perhaps Jesus' most distinctive contribution to moral thought. It has the same clarion call as the Stoic demand for pure virtue. What about deserving?
Love thy neighbour as thyself [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Love thy neighbour as thyself.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.19
     A reaction: It would be stronger and better to say 'Love your neighbour, even if you don't love yourself'. Self-loathing and vicious hatred often go together. For once Jesus does not attach an instant heavenly reward to obedience of the command.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Treat others as you would have them treat you [Jesus]
     Full Idea: All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, so ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 07.12
     A reaction: A problem which probably didn't occur to Jesus and the prophets is that of masochists. Personally I like buying philosophy books, but most people have no such desire. The Rule needs restricting to the basics of pleasure and pain.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.07
     A reaction: This appears to be a straightforward application of social contract morality, with God playing the role of Hobbes' absolute monarch. It highlights the uncomfortable fact at the heart of Christian morality, that the motivation for altruism is selfish.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter heaven [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 18.03
     A reaction: The appeal of such purity of heart is undeniable, but essentially I dislike this remark. It is the opponent of education, reason, autonomy, responsibility, democracy and maturity. It confirms the view that religion is the opium of the people.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
If you lust after a woman, you have committed adultery [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Whosoever look on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.28
     A reaction: Compare Democritus, Idea 503. Literally this idea seems absurd, but it is also at the heart of Greek virtue theory. Aristotle (Idea 34) defines virtue as an activity 'of the soul', not an action in the world. Excellence has become purity of soul.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36)
     A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277.
Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.05
     A reaction: If they are truly meek, why would they want to inherit the earth? This is the classic statement of Nietzsche's 'inversion of values', where the qualities of a good slave are elevated above those of the greatest human beings.
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Don't resist evil, but turn the other cheek [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Ye have heard it said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.38-9
     A reaction: Compare Socrates, Idea 346. The viciousness of many Hollywood movies is that they set up a character as thoroughly evil so that we can have the pleasure of watching him pulverised. On the whole, Jesus gives bad advice. 'Doormats' in game theory.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
It is almost impossible for the rich to go to heaven [Jesus]
     Full Idea: It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.24
     A reaction: Aristotle and others (Margaret Thatcher) have observed that you cannot practise charity if you are poor. Jesus implies that the human race should remain in poverty. No wonder autocratic medieval rulers taught Christianity to peasants. Cf. Matt 25.30.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03)
     A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17)
     A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20)
     A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
No one is good except God [Jesus]
     Full Idea: Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God.
     From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.17
     A reaction: This remark raises the problem that if God is good, there must be some separate moral standard by which he can be judged good. What is that standard? It is related to the problem of whether Plato's Form of the Beautiful is itself beautiful.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18)
     A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Jesus turned the ideas of Hillel into a theology reduced to its moral elements [Jesus, by Johnson,P]
     Full Idea: Jesus was a member of the school of Hillel the Elder, and may have sat under him. He repeated some of the sayings of Hillel, ...and turned his ideas into a moral theology, stripping the law of all but its moral and ethical elements.
     From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II
     A reaction: The crucial move, it seems to me, is to strip Judaism of its complexity, and reduce it to very simple moral maxims, which means that ordinary illiterate people no longer need priests to understand and follow it. Jesus was, above all, a great teacher.