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All the ideas for 'Topics', 'The Universe as We Find It' and 'Events'

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80 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are not invariably the best people, but the best philosophers I know are the best people I know.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], Pref)
     A reaction: How very nicely expressed. I have often thought the same about lovers of literature, but been horribly disappointed by some of them. On the whole I have found philosophy-lovers to be slightly superior to literature-lovers!
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil]
     Full Idea: Sharing a technical vocabulary is to share a tidy collection of assumptions. Reliance on that vocabulary serves to foreclose discussion of those assumptions.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], Pref)
     A reaction: Love it! I am endlessly frustrated by papers that launch into a discussion using a terminology that is riddled with dubious prior assumptions. And that includes common terms like 'property', as well as obscure neologisms.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil]
     Full Idea: There is an unfortunate tendency to conflate epistemological issues bearing on explanation with issues in metaphysics.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.2)
     A reaction: This is where Heil and I part ways. I just don't believe in the utterly pure metaphysics which he thinks we can do. Our drive to explain moulds our vision of reality, say I.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil]
     Full Idea: A capacity for abstraction is central to our capacity to think about the universe systematically.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 09.7)
     A reaction: This strikes me as obvious. We pick out the similarities, and then discuss them, as separate from their bearers. We explain why things have features in common. Some would just say systematic thinking needs universals, but that's less good.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17)
     A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof).
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30)
     A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11)
     A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes?
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03)
     A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05)
     A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae.
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17)
     A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280!
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12)
     A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation.
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19)
     A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions.
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18)
     A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals.
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32)
     A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible?
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24)
     A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil]
     Full Idea: Truth is a relation between a truthbearer and a truthmaker.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.02)
     A reaction: This implies that all truths have truthmakers, which is fairly controversial. Heil himself denies it!
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil]
     Full Idea: For millenia, philosophers operated with an implicit conception of truthmaking, a conception that remained unarticulated only because it was part of the very fabric of philosophy.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 07.2)
     A reaction: Presumably it is an advance that we have brought it out into the open, and subjected it to critical study. Does Heil want us to return to it being unquestioned? I like truthmaking, but that can't be right.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil]
     Full Idea: I do not subscribe to the thesis that every truth requires a truthmaker. Mathematical truths and truths of logic are compatible with any way the universe could be.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.5)
     A reaction: He makes that sound like a knock-down argument, but I'm not convinced. I see logic and mathematics as growing out of nature, though that is a very unfashionable view. I'm almost ashamed of it. But I'm not giving it up. See Carrie Jenkins.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1
     A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line).
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30)
     A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil]
     Full Idea: It is a mistake to think of an infinite number as a very large number. Infinite numbers differ qualitatively from finite numbers.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.5)
     A reaction: He cites Dedekind's idea that a proper subset of an infinite number can match one-one with the number. Respectable numbers don't behave in this disgraceful fashion. This should be on the wall of every seminar on philosophy of mathematics.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil]
     Full Idea: I do not understand how structures could serve as truthmakers for mathematical truths, ...Mathematical truths are not true in virtue of any way the universe is. ...Mathematical truths hold, whatever ways the universe is.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.08)
     A reaction: I like the idea of enquiring about truthmakers for mathematical truths (and my view is more empirical than Heil's), but I think it may be a misunderstanding to think that structures are intended as truthmakers. Mathematics just IS structures?
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons]
     Full Idea: Some changes are slow and continuous and are called 'processes' rather than events; the growth of a tree or the greying of John's hair.
     From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 3.2)
     A reaction: So making a loaf of bread is an event rather than a process, and World War I was a process rather than an event? If you slow down a dramatic event (on film), you see that it is really a process. I take 'process' to be a much more illuminating word.
Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
     Full Idea: There is arguably a parallel between the mass-count distinction among meanings of nouns and the process-event distinction among meanings of verbs. Processes, like stuff, do not connote criteria for counting, whereas events, like things, do.
     From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 6.2)
     A reaction: Hm. You can have several processes, and a process can come to an end - but then you can have several ingredients of a cake, and you can run out of one of them. This may be quite a helpful distinction.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
     Full Idea: The ontology of events rose in philosophy with the rise of relativity theory in physics. Einstein postulated the relativity of simultaneity to an observer's state of motion. The terms of the relation of simultaneity must be events or their parts.
     From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 1.1.2)
     A reaction: Intriguing. Philosophers no doubt think they are way ahead of physicists in such a metaphysical area. Personally I regard the parentage of the concept as good grounds for scepticism about it. See Idea 7621 for my reason.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil]
     Full Idea: Categories we use to describe and explain our universe do not line up in the neat way reductive schemes require.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2)
     A reaction: He takes reduction to be largely a relation between our categories, rather than between entities, so he is bound to get this result. He may be right.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil]
     Full Idea: Fundamental ontology is in the business of telling us what the universe must be like if any theory is true.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.1)
     A reaction: Heil is good at stating simple ideas simply. This seems to be a bold claim, but I think I agree with it.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
     Full Idea: Looking at what you quantify over reveals, at most, truths to which you are committed. What the ontology is, what the truthmakers are for these truths, is another matter, one tackled, if at all, only in the pursuit of fundamental physics.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.08)
     A reaction: Exactly right. Nouns don't guarantee objects, verbs don't guarantee processes. If you want to know my ontological commitments, ask me about them! Don't infer them from the sentences I hold true, because they need interpreting.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20)
     A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil]
     Full Idea: The task of ontology is to spell out the fundamental categories of being.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.5)
     A reaction: This is the aspiration of 'pure' metaphysics, which I don't quite believe in. There is too much convention involved, on the one hand, and physics on the other.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil]
     Full Idea: It is a measure of how far we have fallen that so few philosophers nowadays see any difficulty at all in the idea that relations have full ontological standing.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.4)
     A reaction: We have 'fallen' because medieval metaphysicians didn't believe it. Russell seems to have started, and the tendency to derive ontology from logic has secured the belief in relations. How else can you be allowed to write aRb? I agree with Heil.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil]
     Full Idea: If causal relations are the manifesting of powers, then causal relations would appear to be a species of internal relation.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 07.4)
     A reaction: The point being that any relations formed are entirely dependent on the internal powers of the relata. Sounds right. There are also non-causal relations, of course.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27)
     A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease!
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil]
     Full Idea: When a tomato depresses a scale, it does so in virtue of its mass - how it is masswise - and not in virtue of its colour or shape. Were we barred from saying such things, we would be unable to formulate truths about the fundamental things.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.3)
     A reaction: It doesn't follow that we have an ontological commitment to properties, but we certainly need to point out the obvious fact that things being one way rather than another makes a difference to what happens.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07)
     A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai].
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
     Full Idea: Categorical properties were introduced originally by philosophers bent on distinguishing properties possessed 'categorically', that is, actually, by objects from mere if-then, conditional properties, mere potentialities.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 04.3)
     A reaction: He cites Ryle on dispositions in support. It is questionable whether it is a clear or useful distinction. Heil says the new distinction foreclosed the older more active view of properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil]
     Full Idea: If you are going to have emergent fundamental properties, you are going to need emergent fundamental substances as bearers of those properties.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.6)
     A reaction: Presumably the theory of emergent properties (which I take to be nonsense, in its hardcore form) says that the substance is unchanged, but the property is new. Or else the bundle gives collective birth to a new member. Search me.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil]
     Full Idea: Only when you get to fundamental physics, do predicates begin to line up with properties.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2)
     A reaction: A nice thought. I assume the actual properties of daily reality only connect to our predicates in very sloppy ways. I suppose our fundamental predicates have to converge on the actual properties, because the fog clears. Sort of.
In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil]
     Full Idea: It may be that F applies truly to a because F is a determinable predicate satisfied by a's possession of a property answering to a determinate of that determinable predicate.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.01)
     A reaction: Heil aims to break the commitment of predicates to the existence of properties. The point is that there is no property 'coloured' to correspond to 'a is coloured'. Red might be the determinate that does the job. Nice.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
     Full Idea: Properties are central to the universe's causal order in a way that sets could not possibly be.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.3)
     A reaction: The idea that properties actually are sets is just ridiculous. It may be that you can treat them as sets and get by quite well. The sets can be subsumed into descriptions of causal processes (or something).
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers who embrace properties as powers hold that every property is a power (Bird), or that some properties are qualities and some are powers (Ellis; Molnar). The latter include powers which are 'grounded in' qualities (Mumford).
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 04.4)
     A reaction: I don't like Heil's emphasis on 'qualities', which seems to imply their phenomenal rather than their real aspect. I'm inclined to favour the all-powers view, but can't answer the question 'but what HAS these powers?' Stuff is intrinsically powerful.
Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil]
     Full Idea: In my account of properties they are at once qualitative and dispositional: properties are powerful qualities.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 05.1)
     A reaction: I have never managed to understand what Heil means by 'qualities'. Is he talking about the phenomenal aspects of powers? Does he mean categorical properties. I can't find an ontological space for his things to slot into.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil]
     Full Idea: It would be difficult to understand the popularity of 'abstract entities' - numbers, sets, propositions - in the absence of an implicit acknowledgement of the importance of truthmakers.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07)
     A reaction: I love Idea 18496, because it leads us towards a better account of modality, but dislike this one because it reveals that the truthmaking idea has led us to a very poor theory. Truthmaking is a good question, but not much of an answer?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24)
     A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil]
     Full Idea: Substances, as property bearers, must be simple; substances of necessity lack constituents that are themselves substances.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.3)
     A reaction: How can he think that this is a truth of pure metaphysics? A crowd has properties because we think of it as a simple substance, not because it actually is one. Can properties have properties? Are tree and leaf both substances?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil]
     Full Idea: An object is not made up of its spatial parts: spatial parts are regions of some object. ...Complex objects, wholes, are made up of, and so depend on, their substantial parts.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.1)
     A reaction: Presumably objects also 'depend on' their spatial parts, so I am not convinced that we have a sharp distinction here.
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]
     Full Idea: Blancmange 'gunky' universes are not just universes with an endless number of parts. Rather a blancmange universe is a universe with no simple parts, no parts themselves lacking parts.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.3)
     A reaction: Hm. Lewis seemed to think it was parts all the way down. Is gunk homogeneous stuff, or what is endlessly subdividable, or an infinite shrinking of parts? We demand clarity.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19)
     A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims.
Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil]
     Full Idea: A whole - or some wholes - might be thought to survive gradual replacement of its parts, perhaps, but not their elimination.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.1)
     A reaction: You can't casually replace the precious golden parts of a statue with cheap lead ones. It depends on whether the parts matter. Nevertheless this is a really important idea in metaphysics. It enables the s=Ship of Theseus to survive some change.
Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil]
     Full Idea: A sand dune depends on the individual grains of sand that make it up. In an important sense, however, a line's segments depend on the line rather than it on them.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.4)
     A reaction: The illustrations are not clear cut. As you cut off segments of the line, you reduce its length. Heil is hoping for something neat here, but I don't think he has quite got. The difficulty of trying to do pure metaphysics!
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai].
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36)
     A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18)
     A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30)
     A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02)
     A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33)
     A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result.
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36)
     A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it.
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32)
     A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25)
     A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic?
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
     Full Idea: If electrons and gravitational fields have definite natures, why not reality itself? And if reality has a nature, if this makes sense, then reality grounds the deepest necessities of all.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.09)
     A reaction: Nice speculation! Scientists and verificationists seem to cry 'foul!' when philosophers offer such wild speculations, but I say that's exactly what we pay them do. I'm not sure whether I understand reality having its own nature, though!
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
     Full Idea: If the other possible worlds are merely useful fictions, we are left wondering what the truthmakers for all those modal judgements might be.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07)
     A reaction: I suddenly see that this is the train of thought that led me to believe in real powers and dispositions, and which retrospectively led me to love the truthmaker idea. Even real Lewisian worlds don't seem adequate as truthmakers here.
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15)
     A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument.
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25)
     A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil]
     Full Idea: Talk of abstraction and 'partial consideration' (Locke) does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent. In abstracting, you attend to what is there to be considered.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 05.7)
     A reaction: Quite so. The point is to focus on aspects of reality. Does anyone seriously doubt that reality has 'aspects'?
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil]
     Full Idea: Existing things are particular, and generality is a feature of our ways of representing the universe.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 01.1)
     A reaction: This is right, and expressed with beautiful simplicity. How could anyone disagree with this? But they do!
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil]
     Full Idea: You can entertain thoughts of things like tomatoes without a grasp of what they are.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.10)
     A reaction: Lowe seemed to think that you had to grasp the generic essence of a tomato before you could think about it, but I agree entirely with Heil.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil]
     Full Idea: Thinking - ordinary conscious thinking - is imagistic. This is so for 'linguistic' or 'sentential' thoughts as well as for patently non-linguistic thoughts.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10)
     A reaction: This claim (that linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought) strikes me as an excellent insight.
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil]
     Full Idea: Non-conscious thought need not resemble conscious thought occurring out of sight.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10)
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil]
     Full Idea: I like to think that the subject-predicate form reflects a fundamental division in reality.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 10.1)
     A reaction: That is, he defends the idea that there are substances, and powerful qualities pertaining to those substances. I sympathise, but this slogan makes it too simple.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
     Full Idea: It is the difficulty in imagining what truthmakers for normative judgements might be that leads many philosophers to find 'moral realism' unappealing.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07)
     A reaction: I like that a lot. My proposal for metaethics is that it should be built on the concept of a 'value-maker'
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean.
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36)
     A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03)
     A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17)
     A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil]
     Full Idea: In a universe containing an infinite number of electrons would mass-energy be conserved? ...Electrons could come and go without affecting the total mass-energy.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.6)
     A reaction: This seems to be a very persuasive reason for doubting that the universe contains an infinite number of electrons. In fact I suspect that infinite numbers have no bearing on nature at all. (Actually, I suspect them of being fictions).
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20)
     A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil]
     Full Idea: I believe our understanding of causation would benefit from a shift of attention from causal sequences and laws, to instances of causation: 'causings'.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 06.1)
     A reaction: His aim is to get away from generalities, and focus on the actual operation of powers which is involved. He likes the case of two playing cards propped against one another. I'm on his side. Laws come last in the story, and should not come first.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil]
     Full Idea: The label 'probabilistic causation' is misleading. What you have is not a weakened or tentative kind of causing, but a probability of there being a cause.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 06.5)
     A reaction: The idea of 'probabilistic causation' strikes me as an empty philosophers' concoction, so I agree with Heil.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil]
     Full Idea: Although it is convenient to speak of electrons as particles or elementary substances, when they enter into relations they can 'lose their individuality. Then an electron becomes a kind of 'abstract particular', a way a given system is, a mode.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.7)
     A reaction: Heil rightly warns us against basing our metaphysics on disputed theories of quantum mechanics.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil]
     Full Idea: Maybe the universe is fine-tuned as it is, not because things happened to fall out as they did during and immediately after the Big Bang, or because God so ordained it, but because God or the Big Bang had no choice.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.09)
     A reaction: You'd be hard put to so why it had to be fine-tuned, so this seems to be a nice speculation. Unverifiable but wholly meaningful. Maybe the stuff fine-tunes itself, by mutual interaction. Or it is the result of natural selection (Lee Smolin).
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18)
     A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days.