74 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: An analysis is an attempt at providing finite, non-circular, and intuitively adequate necessary and sufficient conditions. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the 'conditions' for something doesn't seem to quite add up to telling you what the thing is. A trivial side-effect might qualify as a sufficient condition for something, if it always happens. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: 'Reification' occurs when a mere concept is mistaken for a thing. We seem generally prone to this sort of error. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Personally I think we should face up to the fact that this is the only way we can think about generalised or abstract entities, and stop thinking of it as an 'error'. We have evolved to think well about objects, so we translate everything that way. |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: System T is a normal modal system augmented with the reflexivity-generating axiom □p→p, and is, I think, the best modal logic for modeling lawhood. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n46) | |
A reaction: Schaffer shows in the article why transitivity would not be appropriate for lawhood. |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Science represents our best systematic understanding of the world, and if a certain notion proves unneeded in our best attempt at that, this provides strong evidence that what this notion concerns is not ontologically basic. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3.2) | |
A reaction: But is the objective of science to find out what is 'ontologically basic'? If scientists can't get a purchase on a question, they have no interest in it. What are electrons made of? |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Theoretical reduction concerns terms found in a theory; Definitional reduction concerns concepts found in the mind; Ontological reduction is independent of how we conceptualize entities, or theorize about them, and is about reality. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: An Aristotelian definition refers to reality, rather than to our words or concepts. |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Tropes can be identified with events. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n17) | |
A reaction: This is presumably on the view of events, associated with Kim, as instantiations of properties. This idea is a new angle on tropes and events which had never occurred to me. |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Individuation principles are attempts to describe how to count entities in a given domain, by saying when there is one. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: At last, someone tells me what they mean by 'individuation'! So it is just saying what your units are prior to counting, followed (presumably) by successful counting. It seems to aim more at kinds than at particulars. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The only plausible link from conceivability to possibility is via ideal conceivability. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Causation and Laws of Nature [2008], n22) | |
A reaction: [He cites Chalmers 2002] I'm not sure what 'via' could mean here. Since I don't know any other way than attempted conceivability for assessing a possibility, I am a bit baffled by this idea. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Gravity is an odd sort of force, not least because it only ever works one way. Electromagnetism attracts and repels, but with gravity there are only positive masses always attract. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) | |
A reaction: This leads to speculation about anti-gravity, but there is no current evidence for it. |
21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: At the origin of the universe gravity becomes so powerful that general relativity breaks down, giving infinity for every answer. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The theory of electromagnetism that incorporates both special relativity and quantum mechanics is quantum electrodynamics (QED). It was developed by Dirac and others, and perfected in the 1940s. The field is a collection of quanta. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: This builds on Maxwell's earlier classical theory. QED is said to be the best theory in all of physics. |
21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Photons, the field quanta of the electromagnetic force, have zero rest mass, so virtual photons can exist indefinitely and travel any distance, meaning the electromagnetic force has an infinite range. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The standard model says that the fields of all fundamental forces should merge at extremely high energies, meaning there is also a unified, high-energy field out there. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03) | |
A reaction: Not quite sure what 'out there' means. This idea is linked to the quest for dark energy. Is this unified phenomenon only found near the Big Bang? |
21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Electrons in atoms move at high speeds, so they are subject to the special theory of relativity. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: Presumably this implies a frame of reference, and defining velocities relative to other electrons. Plus time-dilation? |
21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Experiments show that the nuclear binding force does not follow the inverse square law, but is repulsive at the shortest distances, then attractive, then fades away rapidly as distance increases further. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So how does it know when to be strong? Magnetism doesn't vary according to distance, and light obeys the inverse square law, because everything is decided at the output. - See 21151 for an explanation. It interacts after departure. |
21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The strong force holds quarks together within protons and neutrons, and residual effects of the strong force bind protons (whch repel one another) and neutrons together in nuclei. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So the force is much stronger between quarks (which can't escape), and only 'residual' in the nucleus, which must be why smashing nuclei open is fairly easy, but smashin protons open needs higher energies. |
21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: In QCD the particles that carry the strong force are called gluons. ...Gluons carry their own colour charges, so they can interact with each other (unlike photons) via the strong nuclear force (which limits the range of the force). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So the force varies in strength with distance because the degree of separation among the spreading gluons varies? The force has one range, which is squashed when close, effective at medium, and loses touch with distance? |
21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Just as mixing three colours of light gives white, so the three colour charges of quarks can add up to give no colour. This is what happens in the proton, which always contains one blue-charge quark, one red and one green. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Classifying hadrons according to charge, strangeness and spin revealed patterns of eight and ten particles (SU(3) symmetery). The mathematics then showed that these are built from a basic group of only three members. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) |
21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ (proton, duu; neutron, ddu; lambda, dus), or with spin 3/2 (omega-minus, sss). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) |
21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The quantum field theory of the weak force needs three carrier particles. The W+ and W- are electrically charged, and enable the weak force to change the charge of a particle. The Z° is uncharged, and mediates weak interactions with no charge change. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The W and Z particles are heavy, and so cannot travel far from their parents. The weak force therefore has a very short range. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: There are four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, and the weak and strong nuclear forces. Particle physics has so far failed to encompass the force of gravity. The forces that shape our world are themselves the effect of particles. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: Philosophers must take note of the fact that forces are the effects of particles. Common sense pictures forces imposed on particles, like throwing a tennis ball, but the particles are actually the sources of force. The gravitino is speculative. |
21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The beta decay of the neutron (into a proton, an electron and an antineutrino) can be described in terms of the weak force, which is 10,000 times weaker than the strong force. It allows the quarks and leptons to change from one type to another. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: This seems to make it the key source of radioactivity. Perhaps it should be called the Force of Change? |
21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Why do the proton and electron charges mirror each other so perfectly when they are such different particles? | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
A reaction: We seem to have reached a common stage in science, where we have a wonderful descriptive model (the Standard Model), but we cannot explain why what is modelled is the way it is. |
21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The standard model cannot explain dark matter, or dark energy (which is causing expansion to accelerate). It cannot explain how matter survived annihilation with anti-matter in the Big Bang, or explain gravity. The strength of each force is unexplained. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06) | |
A reaction: [compressed] P.141 adds that the model has to be manipulated to keep the Higgs mass low enough. |
21158 | Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Particles with half-integer spin, such as electrons, protons or quarks (all spin ½) have an asymmetry in their wavefunction that makes them antisocial. These particles (Fermions) cannot share a quantum state. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: This is said to explain the complexity of matter, with carbon an especially good example. |
21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Spin is a quantum-mechanical property of a particle akin to rotation about its own axis. Particles of different spins respond to magnetic fields in different ways, so it is a relatively easy thing to measure. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
A reaction: I wish I knew what 'akin to' meant. Maybe particles are not rigid bodies, so they cannot spin in the way a top can? It must be an electro-magnetic property. Idea 21166 says spin has two possible directions. |
21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Particles obeying the laws of quantum mechanics have wave-like properties - moving as a quantum wave-function, spread out in space, with wavelengths that get shorter as their energy increases. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: Thus X-rays are dangerous, but long wave radio is not. De Broglie's equation. |
21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Quarks have a property akin to electric charge, called their colour charge. It comes in three varieties, red, green and blue. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: As an outsider all I can do is collect descriptions of such properties from the experts. The experts appear to be happy with the numbers inserted in the equations. |
21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Most of a proton's or neutrino's mass is contained in the interaction energies of a 'sea' of quarks, antiquarks and gluons that bind them. ...You might feel solid, but in fact you're 99 per cent binding energy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
A reaction: This is because energy is equivalent to mass (although gluons are said to have energy but no mass - puzzled by that). This is a fact which needs a bit of time to digest. Once you've grasped we are full of space, you still have understood it. |
21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: There are two types of mass: gravitational mass quantifies how strongly an object feels gravity, while inertial mass quantifies an object's resistance to acceleration. There proven equality is at the heart of General Relativity. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) | |
A reaction: It had never occurred to me that these two values might come apart. Doesn't their identical values demonstrate that they are in fact the same thing? Sounds like Hesperus/Phosphorus to me. The book calls it 'mysterious'. |
21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The proton (938.3 MeV) is lighter than the neutron (939.6 MeV) and does not decay, but the heavier neutron can change into a proton by emitting an electron. (If you gather a bucketful of neutrons, after ten minutes only half of them would be left). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: Protons are more or less eternal, but some theories have them decaying after billions of years. Smashing protons together is a popular pastime for physicists. |
21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Quarks can change from one variety to another, and the top, bottom, charm and strange quarks all rapidly decay to the up and down quarks of everyday life. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: Hence the universe is largely composed of up and down quarks and electrons. The other quarks seem to be more important in the early universe. |
21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: When a neutron decays into a proton and an electron (one example of beta decay), the energy of the two particles adds up to less than the starting energy of the neutron. Pauli and Fermi concluded that a neutrino (an electron antineutrino) is emitted. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: I'm wondering how much they could infer about the nature of the new particle (which was only confirmed 26 years later). |
21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Neutrinos are the only particles that seem just to spin anticlockwise. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06) | |
A reaction: See 21166. Anti-neutrino spin is the opposite way. Which way up do you hold the neutrino when pronouncing that it is 'anticlockwise? |
21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: In the conventional standard model neutrinos have antiparticles - which spin in the opposite direction, and have the opposite lepton number. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) |
21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: In the very early hot universe the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces were one. The early emergence of the Higgs field led to electroweak symmetry breaking. The W and Z bosons grew fat, and the photon raced away mass-free. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07) |
21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A future accelerator might create 'stringballs', when two strings slam into one another and, rather than combining to form a stretched string, make a tangled ball. Finding them would prove string theory. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) | |
A reaction: This is the only possible test for string theory which I have seen suggested. How do you 'slam strings together'? |
21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory works as a quantum theory of gravity because string vibrations can describe gravitons, the hypothetical carriers of the gravitational force. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) | |
A reaction: Presumably the main aim of a quantum theory of gravity is to include gravitons within particle theory. This idea has to be a main attraction of string theory. Compare Idea 21166. |
21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory has now been incorporated into Ed Witten's M-Theory, which is a mathematical framework that lives in 11-dimensional space-time, involving higher-dimensional objects called p-branes, of which strings are a special case. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory, together with its supersymmetric particles, has recently been rewritten in the space-time described by loop quantum gravity (which says that space-time ust be made from finite chunks). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Supersymmetry posits heavy boson partners for all fermions, and heavy fermions for all bosons. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: The main Fermions are electron, proton and quark. Do extra bosons imply extra forces? Peter Higgs favours supersymmetry. |
21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Peter Higgs says he is a fan of supersymmetry, largely because it seems to be the only route by which gravity can be brought into the scheme. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03) | |
A reaction: Peter Higgs proposed the Higgs boson (now discovered). This seems a very good reason to favour supersymmetry. A grand unified theory that left out gravity doesn't seem to be unified quite grandly enough. |
21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The old front-runner theory, supersymmetry, has fallen from grace as the Large Hadron Collider keeps failing to find it. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07) |
21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The key to supersymmetry is that in the high-energy soup of the early universe, particles and their superpartners were indistinguishable. Each pair existed as single massless entities. With expansion and cooling this supersymmetry broke down. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) |
21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The point about the Higgs field is that even the lowest-energy state of space is not empty. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So where is the Higgs field located? Even if there is no utterly empty space, the concept of location implies a concept of space more basic than the fields (about 16, I gather) which occupy it. You can't describe movement without a concept of location. |
21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Whatever dark matter is made of, it must have mass to feel and generate gravity; but no electric charge, so it does not interact with light. The leading candidate has been the weakly interacting massive particle (WIMP), much heavier than a proton. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) | |
A reaction: Note that it must 'generate' gravity. The idea of a law of gravity which is externally imposed on matter is long dead. Heavy WIMPs have not yet been detected. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |