58 ideas
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 109b17) | |
| A reaction: This is a good slogan for the analytic approach to thought. I take Aristotle (or possibly Socrates) to be the father of analysis, not Frege (though see Idea 9840). (He may be thinking of the tableau method of proof). |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning is dialectical which reasons from generally accepted opinions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a30) | |
| A reaction: This is right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophical method, and Greek thinking generally. There are nice modern debates about 'folk' understanding, derived from science (e.g. quantum theory) which suggest that starting from normal views is a bad idea. |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There cannot possibly be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 154a11) | |
| A reaction: The second half of this is much bolder and more controversial, and plenty of modern thinkers would flatly reject it. Are definitions contextual, that is, designed for some specific human purpose. Must definitions be of causes? |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A definition is the easiest of all things to destroy; for, since it contains many assertions, the opportunities which it offers are very numerous, and the more abundant the material, the more quickly the reasoning can set to work. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 155a03) | |
| A reaction: I quote this to show that Aristotle expected many definitions to be very long affairs (maybe even of book length?) |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b05) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be important for showing the definition is more than mere categorisation. A good definition homes in the particular, by gradually narrowing down the differentiae. |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: No differentia indicates the essence [ti estin], but rather some quality, such as 'pedestrian' or 'biped'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 122b17) | |
| A reaction: We must disentangle this, since essence is what is definable, and definition seems to give us the essence, and yet it appears that definition only requires genus and differentia. Differentiae seem to be both generic and fine-grained. See Idea 12280! |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 132a12) | |
| A reaction: We mustn't be deluded into thinking that nothing else is required. I take the increasing refinement of differentiae to be where the real action is. The genus gives you 70% of the explanation. |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The genera and the differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153a19) | |
| A reaction: The definition is words, and the essence is real, so our best definition might not fully attain to the essence. Aristotle has us reaching out to the world through our definitions. |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The differentia, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 101b18) | |
| A reaction: This does not mean that naming the differentia amounts to mere classification. I presume we can only state individual differences by using a language which is crammed full of universals. |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A 'genus' is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a32) | |
| A reaction: Hence a genus is likely to be expressed by a universal, a one-over-many. A particular will be a highly individual collection of various genera, but what ensures the uniqueness of each thing, if they are indiscernible? |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The definition ought to be peculiar to one thing, not common to many. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 149b24) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be very important, against those who think that definition is no more than mere categorisation. To explain, you must get down to the level of the individual. We must explain that uniquely docile tiger. |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The equality of opposite reasonings is the cause of aporia; for it is when we reason on both [sides of a question] and it appears to us that everything can come about either way, that we are in a state of aporia about which of the two ways to take up. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 145b17), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: Other philosophers give up on the subject in this situation, but I love Aristotle because he takes this to be the place where philosophy begins. |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They say that the unit [monada] is the starting point of number (and the point the starting-point of a line). | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 108b30) | |
| A reaction: Yes, despite Frege's objections in the early part of the 'Grundlagen' (1884). I take arithmetic to be rooted in counting, despite all abstract definitions of number by Frege and Dedekind. Identity gives the unit, which is countable. See also Topics 141b9 |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20) | |
| A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters. |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property [idion] at all. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 129a27) | |
| A reaction: This seems to cramp our style in counterfactual discussion. Can't we even mention an individual property if we believe that it will never exist. Utopian political discussion will have to cease! |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: An 'accident' [sumbebekos] is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, such as 'sitting posture' or 'whiteness'. This is the best definition, because it tells us the essential meaning of the term itself. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102b07) | |
| A reaction: Thus a car could be red, or not red. Accidents are contingent. It does not follow that necessary properties are essential (see Idea 12262). There are accidents [sumbebekos], propria [idion] and essences [to ti en einai]. |
| 16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: Beyond the entities there are certain real 'modes', which are positive, and in their own right act on those entities, giving them something that is outside their whole essence as individuals existing in reality. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.1.17), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
| A reaction: Suárez is apparently the first person to formulate a proper account of properties as 'modes' of a thing, rather than as accidents which are separate, or are wholly integrated into a thing. A typical compromise proposal in philosophy. Can modes act? |
| 16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: The inherence of quantity is called its mode, because it affects that quantity, which serves to ultimately determine the state and character of its existence, but does not add to it any new proper entity, but only modifies the preexisting entity. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.1.17), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
| A reaction: He seems to present mode as a very active thing, like someone who gives it a coat of paint, or hammers it into a new shape. I don't see how a 'mode' can have any ontological status at all. To exist, there has to be some way to exist. |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In assigning the essence [ti estin], it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentiae; for he who describes 'man' as an 'animal' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as 'pedestrian'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128a24) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 12279. This idea is only part of the story. My reading of this is simply that assigning a genus gives more information. We learn more about him when we say he is a man than when we say he is Socrates. |
| 16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: In the view of Suárez, substances are radically incomplete entities that cannot exist at all until determined in various ways by things of another kind, modes. …Modes are regarded as completers for their subjects. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
| A reaction: This is correct. In order to be a piece of clay it needs a shape, a mass, a colour etc. Treating clay as an object independently from its shape is a misunderstanding. |
| 17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: A form is required that, as it were, rules over all those faculties and accidents, and is the source of all actions and natural motions of such a being, and in which the whole variety of accidents and powers has its root and unity. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
| A reaction: Pasnau emphasises that this is scholastics giving a very physical and causal emphasis to forms, which made them vulnerable to doubts among the new experiment physicists. Pasnau says forms are 'metaphysical', following Leibniz. |
| 16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: In a tree the part of the form that is in the leaf is not the same character as the part that is in the fruit., but yet they are partial forms, and apt to be united ….to compose one complete form of the whole. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.10.30), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.6 | |
| A reaction: This is a common scholastic view, the main opponent of which was Aquinas, who says each thing only has one form. Do leaves have different DNA from the bark or the fruit? Presumably not (since I only have one DNA), which supports Aquinas. |
| 16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: The most powerful arguments establishing substantial forms are based on the necessity, for the perfect constitution of a natural being, that all the faculties and operations of that being are rooted in one essential principle. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.10.64), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
| A reaction: Note Idea 15756, that this stability not only applies to biological entities (the usual Aristotelian examples), but also to non-living natural kinds. We might say that the drive for survival is someone united around a single entity. |
| 16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: We can say that the form that gives corporeal bulk [molem] or extension to things is the essential nature of quantity. To have bulk is to expel a similar bulk from the same space. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.4.16), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 539 | |
| A reaction: This is one step away from asking why, once we knew the bulk and extension of the thing, we would still have any interest in trying to grasp something called its 'quantity'. |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In the case of a house, where the process of compounding the parts is obvious, though the parts exist, there is no reason why the whole should not be non-existent, and so the parts are not the same as the whole. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 150a19) | |
| A reaction: Compare buying a piece of furniture, and being surprised to discover, when it is delivered, that it is self-assembly. This idea is a simple refutation of the claims of classical mereology, that wholes are just some parts. Aristotle uses modal claims. |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Everything that is has one single essence [en esti to einai]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 141a36) | |
| A reaction: Does this include vague objects, and abstract 'objects'? Sceptics might ask what grounds this claim. Does Dr Jeckyll have two essences? |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A property [idion] is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone. ...No one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 102a18) | |
| A reaction: [See Charlotte Witt 106 on this] 'Property' is clearly a bad translation for such an individual item. Witt uses 'proprium', which is a necessary but nonessential property of something. Necessity is NOT the hallmark of essence. See Idea 12266. |
| 16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: We can almost never set out the essences of things, as they are in things. Instead, we work through their connection to some non-essential feature, and we seem to succeed well enough when we spell it out through the feature closest to the essence. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.4.16), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5 | |
| A reaction: It is a common view that with geometrical figures we can actually experience the essence itself. So has science broken through, and discerned actual essences of things? |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Destruction is a dissolution of essence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 153b30) | |
| A reaction: [plucked from context!] I can't think of a better way to define destruction, in order to distinguish it from damage. A vase is destroyed when its essential function cannot be recovered. |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When things are absolutely the same, their coming-into-being and destruction are also the same and so are the agents of their production and destruction. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a02) | |
| A reaction: Thus Queen Elizabeth II has to be the result of that particular birth, and from those particular parents, as Kripke says? The inverse may not be true. Do twins have a single origin? Things that fission and then re-fuse differently? etc |
| 22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: To be really the same excludes being really other, but does not exclude being other modally or mentally. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.65) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: So the statue and the clay are identical, but they could become separate, or be imagined as separate. |
| 22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Real Essential distinction says if A and B are not of the same natural kind, then they are essentially distinct. This is the highest degree of distinction. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: Boulter says Peter is essentially distinct from a cabbage, because neither has the nature of the other. |
| 22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Minor Real distinction is if A can exist without B, but B ceases to exist without A. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: This is one-way independence. Boulter's example is Peter and Peter's actual weight. |
| 22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Major Real distinction is if A can exist in the real order without B, and B can exist in the real order without A. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: Boulter's example is the distinction between Peter and Paul, where their identity of kind is irrelevant. This is two-way independence. |
| 22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Conceptual or Mental distinction is when A and B are actually identical but we have two different ways of conceiving them. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: This is the Morning and Evening Star. I bet Frege never read Suarez. This seems to be Spinoza's concept of mind/body. |
| 22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Modal distinction is when A is not B or a property of B, but still could not possibly exist without B. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: Duns Scotus proposed in, Ockham rejected it, but Suarez supports it. Suarez proposes that light's dependence on the Sun is distinct from the light itself, in this 'modal' way. |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: 'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result. |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If two things are the same then any accident of one must also be an accident of the other, and, if one of them is an accident of something else, so must the other be also. For, if there is any discrepancy on these points, obviously they are not the same. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152a36) | |
| A reaction: So what is always called 'Leibniz's Law' should actually be 'Aristotle's Law'! I can't see anything missing from the Aristotle version, but then, since most people think it is pretty obvious, you would expect the great stater of the obvious to get it. |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32) | |
| A reaction: See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction. |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning [sullogismos] is a discussion in which, certain things having been laid down, something other than these things necessarily results through them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 100a25) | |
| A reaction: This is cited as the standard statement of the nature of logical necessity. One might challenge either the very word 'necessary', or the exact sense of the word employed here. Is it, in fact, metaphysical, or merely analytic? |
| 22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The scholastic view is that Actuality is our only guide to possibility in the real order. One knows that it is possible to separate A and B if one knows that A and B have actually been separated or are separate. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: It may be possible to separate A and B even though it has never happened, but it is hard to see how we could know that. (But if I put my pen down where it has never been before, I know I can pick it up again, even though this has not previously happened). |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Induction is the progress from particulars to universals; if the skilled pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 105a15) | |
| A reaction: It is a bit unclear whether we are deriving universal concepts, or merely general truths. Need general truths be absolute or necessary truths? Presumably occasionally the best person is not the most skilled, as in playing a musical instrument. |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When it is necessary to establish the universal, people use the expression 'So in all cases of this kind'; but it is one of the most difficult tasks to define which of the terms proposed are 'of this kind' and which are not. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 157a25) | |
| A reaction: It is particularly hard if induction is expressed as the search for universals, since the kind presumably is the universal, so the universal must be known before the induction can apply, which really is the most frightful nuisance for truth-seekers. |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| Full Idea: The best translation of 'phronesis' is probably not 'prudence' (which implies a non-moral motive), or 'practical wisdom' (which makes it sound contemplative), but 'practical intelligence', or just 'intelligence'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.3) |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Since having a virtue does not reduce to performing certain kinds of acts, the Epicurean will achieve pleasure only by aiming at being a certain kind of person. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: No Epicurean would want to merely possess virtues, without enacting them. I assume that virtues are sought as guides to finding the finest pleasures (such as friendship). |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics claimed our final good was pleasure, best achieved by seeking maximum intensity of pleasurable experiences, but they explicitly admitted that this was not happiness. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Instead of modern 'imperative' notions of ethics (involving obligation, duty and rule-following), ancient ethics uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], Intro) |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Friendship is preferable to money; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 118b07) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 12276, which gives a different criterion for choosing between virtues. This idea is an interesting qualification of the doctrine of the mean. |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice [dikaiosune] and self-control [sophrosune] are preferable to courage, for the first two are always useful, but courage only sometimes. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a36) | |
| A reaction: One could challenge his criterion. What of something which is absolutely vital on occasions, against something which is very mildly useful all the time? You may survive without justice, but not without courage. Compare Idea 12277. |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We value friendship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 117a03) | |
| A reaction: In 'Ethics' he distinguishes some friendships which don't meet this requirement. Presumably true friendships survive all vicissitudes (except betrayal), but that makes such things fairly rare. |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| Full Idea: An ethics of virtue moves from an initial interest in what we ought to do to an interest in the kinds of people we are and hope to be, because the latter is taken to be the best way of understanding the former. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.5) |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Supererogatory actions are admirable and valuable, and we praise people for doing them, but they do not generate obligations to perform them, which casts doubt on obligation as the basic notion in ethics. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.6) |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Why should I want to maximise my acting courageously? I act courageously when it is required. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 1) |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is an essential [kath' auto] property of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 128b17) | |
| A reaction: I take this, along with man being intrinsically rational, to be the foundation of Aristotelian ethics. Given that we are civilized, self-evident criteria emerge for how to be good at it. A good person is, above all, a good citizen. |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it has a certain similarity to it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a20) | |
| A reaction: (Cf. Idea 8153) It take this to be the hallmark of a natural kind, and we should not lose sight of it in the midst of discussions about rigid designation and essential identity. Tigers are only a natural kind insofar as they are indistinguishable. |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists. | |
| From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 121a18) | |
| A reaction: Is 'oneness' predicated of water? So existence always was a predicate, it seems, until Kant told us it wasn't. That existence is a quantifier, not a predicate, seems to be up for question again these days. |
| 16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: An angelic substance could be penetrated by other bodies in the same location. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.2.21), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.3 | |
| A reaction: So am I co-located with an angel right now? |