97 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics doesn't let itself be held back by anything empirical, and indeed goes right to Ideas, where examples themselves fail. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 412.36) |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
Full Idea: Rational nature separates itself out from all other things by the fact that it sets itself an end. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.82) |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
Full Idea: With the categorical imperative or law of morality we have a very serious difficulty, because it is a synthetic a priori practical proposition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 420.50) |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
22363 | You have only begun to do real science when you can express it in numbers [Kelvin] |
Full Idea: When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be. | |
From: Lord Kelvin (Wm Thomson) (works [1881]), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 4.1 | |
A reaction: [Popular Lectures 1 p.73] Clearly the writer is a physicist! Astronomers discover objects, geologists discover structures, biologists reveal mechanisms. |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
Full Idea: Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational. Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 446.97) |
3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
Full Idea: We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 456.115) |
3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
Full Idea: We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 448.101) |
5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
Full Idea: Kant made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of the "free will", of the will in and for itself. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
A reaction: This is the social determinism of Marx and Engels. Most commentators would say that Kant was taking the idea of "free will" from religion rather than politics, but presumably Marx would merely reply "same thing!" |
24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Kant thinks emotions can't contribute to moral worth because emotions are too capricious, they are too passive, and they are fortuitously distributed by nature. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Morality and the emotions p.226 | |
A reaction: [compressed] If, like Kant, you want morality to be concerned with rational principles, then you will want morality to be clear, stable and consistent - which emotions are not. I'm with Williams on this one. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant united the two ideas of virtue (as being and as doing) into the idea of a law that is founded not upon faith but upon reason. Thus in one stroke he united the seemingly irreconcilable philosophical and religious ethics, preserving the best of both. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8 | |
A reaction: An interesting analysis that sounds exactly right. Taylor's point is that Kant subjects himself to an authority, when the underpinnings of the authority are no longer there. There is a religious strand in the altruistic requirements of utilitarianism too. |
8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
Full Idea: As to what activities we ought to engage in, what ends we should pursue, the categorical imperative seems to be silent. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
A reaction: I think this is the fatal objection to Kant's view. He says, for example, that promise-breaking is inconsistent with a belief that promises are good, but who said promises are good? No ethical system can get started without values. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant was a psychological hedonist about all actions except those done for the sake of the moral law, and this faulty theory of human nature prevented him from seeing that moral virtue might be compatible with the rejection of the categorical imperative. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Philippa Foot - Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives p.165 | |
A reaction: Nice. Kant wasn't unusual in his view, which seems standard in the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Aristotle understood that it is human nature, on the whole, to want to be a good citizen, since we are social beings. |
9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: We are limited to pursuits which are acceptable from the standpoint of others; ..hence we can't value just anything, and there are things which we must value. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' x | |
A reaction: This at least moves towards greater objectivity, compared with Idea 9749, but it now seems deeply conservative. Our values become lowest common denominator. We need space for the Nietzschean moral hero, who creates new values. |
20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant grossly inflated the importance of the human dimension of value in which moral considerations are indeed overriding. He unjustifiably denied the perfectly reasonable contributions of the cultural and personal dimensions to human well-being. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Kekes - The Human Condition 05.5 | |
A reaction: Excellent to see someone talking about the ultimate values that reside behind Kant's theory. Without such assumptions his theory is, frankly, ridiculous (as Mill explained). |
9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: According to Kant, we confer value on the objects of our rational choices. ..When we choose things because they are important to us we are taking ourselves to be important. Hence our humanity is a source of value. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' ix | |
A reaction: He's trying to filter to out our gormless choices with the word 'rational', but it is common sense that I may choose things despite thinking they have little value, like watching soap opera. A more objective account of value seems needed. See 9750! |
7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: Kant's fundamental sermon is that a value is made a value (or, at least, a duty) by human choice and not by some intrinsic quality in itself, out there. Values are what humans freely choose to live, fight and die for. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: If this is right, then it would appear that the great Kant is the father of relativism, which wouldn't please him. However, his whole system rests on what is consistent and rational, and that seems to a value that is above our choices. |
3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
Full Idea: We are pleased to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a nobler motive, but in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get to the bottom of our secret impulsions. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 407.26) | |
A reaction: Sounds more like Nietzsche than Kant. If some impulsions are totally hidden from us, then they are presumably irrelevant to any rational or moral thinking. Look at the deeds. |
3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
Full Idea: Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.16 n) | |
A reaction: Presumably simple love of someone or something could achieve this, without the addition of reverence. I'm suspicious of this idea, because some dreadful people have commanded reverence. |
3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
Full Idea: A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 394.3) | |
A reaction: This invites the obvious objection of the well-meaning fool, who causes misery despite meaning well. I firmly hold the view that what matters is what we do, not what we intend. |
3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
Full Idea: What is essentially good in an action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 416.43) | |
A reaction: Dreadful idea. I always claim that consequences are relevant in Kant, in formulating and choosing maxims for action, but this idea seems to refute my view. This is a slogan for the Spanish Inquisition. |
3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
Full Idea: The 'golden rule' is merely derivative from our principle, but it cannot be a universal law since it isn't the ground of duties to oneself or others (since it implies a breakable contract). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68 n) |
3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
Full Idea: A morally good attitude of mind (or virtue) claims the intrinsic value of dignity, because it affords a rational being a share in the making of universal law, which therefore fits him to be a member in a possible kingdom of ends. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 435.79) |
3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Kant thinks that if virtue becomes a stable disposition of the person, then it turns into a rigid mechanical habit, with respect to which the person is passive, and thus not fully morally accountable. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.1 |
7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: For Kant, generosity is a vice, because it is a form of condescension and patronage, and pity is detestable, because it entails a superiority on the part of the pitier, which Kant stoutly denied. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
A reaction: An interesting view, but being too proud to receive help from friends strikes me as a greater vice. How can friendship and community be built, if we do not rush to help one another when needed? The virtue is generosity without condescension. |
21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
Full Idea: Kantian respect is unlike love. It's unlike sympathy. It's unlike solidarity or fellow feeling. ...Kantian respect is for humanity as such, for a rational capacity that resides, undifferentiated, in all of us. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 05 | |
A reaction: Why is it 'undifferentiated'? If reason is the source of the respect, why don't greater powers of reason command greater respect? The nice thing is that the rejected versions involve bias, but Kant's version does not. |
7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
Full Idea: It has been argued that by 'maxim' Kant does not mean a specific intention for some discrete act, but the underlying intention by which the agent orchestrates his numerous more specific intentions, ...which leads to a virtue reading of Kant. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §7 | |
A reaction: Kant admired virtue of character, and would want to fit it into the framework of his moral duties. Nevertheless a virtue would often seem to be beyond words, and principles seem to crumble in the face of complex cases. |
7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
Full Idea: We can reverse the terms of the comparison and ask not how rational is goodness, but why is it good to be rational? | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History | |
A reaction: [Putnam doesn't mention Kant]. This seems to me to be the biggest question for Kant. See Idea 1403. The main point of tbe romantic movement, I take it, is that purely rational living does not bring happiness or fulfilment. |
4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality essentially in terms of each other. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §20.2 | |
A reaction: An interesting comment on the modern tendency to overvalue freedom at the expense of the other civic virtues. |
3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.1) | |
A reaction: This is precisely the thought of Epictetus, that the will is the source of goodness, because morality resides in choices (as opposed to character, or states of affairs). |
3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
Full Idea: The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil - that is, if its maxim, when made into a universal law, can never be in conflict with itself. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.81) |
3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
Full Idea: Agreeable results could be brought about by other causes;…therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which is present only in a rational being, can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.15) |
20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
Full Idea: The first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.19), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Religion' | |
A reaction: [p.19 in Beck tr] In Aristotle's account these are 'controlled' actions [enkrateia], which are a step below virtuous actions, which combine reason and pleasure. |
3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
Full Idea: To tell the truth for the sake of duty is something entirely different from doing so out of concern for inconvenient results. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.18) |
3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
Full Idea: For the divine or holy will there are no imperatives: 'I ought' is here out of place, because 'I will' is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
Full Idea: A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
Full Idea: Man is subject only to laws which are made by himself and yet are universal. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 432.73) |
3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
Full Idea: An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is decided upon. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 399.13) |
5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
Full Idea: Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
A reaction: Kant is obviously a million miles away from Marxist pragmatism. And yet the members of the revolutionary class can only be identified and endorsed if they show a particular kind of will. |
6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
Full Idea: An implausible and uncomfortable conclusion to be drawn from Kant's conception of morality is that we must attribute high moral worth to deeply unattractive human lives. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Graham quotes a loathsome character from a Victorian novel, who coldly 'does her duty'. Indeed it might be that a robot could be programmed with the categorical imperative (though it would need a table of values first). Virtue theory is the answer. |
8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
Full Idea: Anyone educated into the Kantian notion of duty will (so far) have been educated into easy conformism with authority. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
A reaction: The Nazi Eichmann cited Kant at his trial for mass murder. I'm not sure the criticism is fair. There are surely times when the categorical imperative will go quite contrary to what the irrational authorities are implementing? |
8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
Full Idea: With sufficient ingenuity, almost every precept can be consistently universalized. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
A reaction: A concise statement of J.S.Mill's point (Idea 3762). The point is that Kant seems to allow burglary, as long as you don't complain when you are burgled. What sort of maxim would a suicidal mass murderer being willing to universalize? |
15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative is supposed to capture the widespread intuition that one ought not to make an exception of oneself. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.6:83 | |
A reaction: Interesting. I always take the plain English version to be 'what if everybody did that?' Suppose I were to forgive everyone, except myself? |
8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant's rule about universalisable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176 | |
A reaction: This is one of the key objections to Kant (along with his need for preliminary values). One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. The charge adds up to Nietzsche's view, that Kant could never shake off his very conventional prejudices. |
8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of the categorical imperative provides me with a test for rejecting proposed maxims; it does not tell me whence I am to derive the maxims which first provide the need for a test. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
A reaction: Nice objection. 'What if we all stood on one leg for an hour (in this crisis)?' Question for Kant: what sort of maxims should we consider, when faced with a dilemma. Mill will obviously suggest happiness as a target. Good of society? My own good? |
8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
Full Idea: If we enquire whether I can consistently universalize the maxim 'I may break my promises only when.....', the gap can be filled by a description devised so that it will apply to my present circumstances, but to very few others. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
A reaction: Another good objection to Kant. There is just a huge problem with how you state the maxim under discussion. One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. 'Do everything possible to implement the will of God'. |
3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
Full Idea: Kant's four illustrations of the Categorical Imperative are: the contradiction of suicide, the contradiction of false promises, the contradiction of neglecting your talents, and the contradiction of neglecting charity. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 422.53) by PG - Db (ideas) |
22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
Full Idea: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA429 p.96), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
A reaction: This sets up the Kingdom of Ends. Note that this does not prohibit using people as a means. It just asks you to respect waiters and shop assistants. It seems to say you should not treat 'your own person' merely as a means. Prostitution? |
22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
Full Idea: Morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA434 p.102), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
A reaction: Each individual gives themselves a law in the categorical imperative. Presumably the kingdom of ends is the convergence of these laws, because the categorical imperative has to be rational. |
3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
Full Idea: I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying; for by such a law there could properly be no promises at all. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 403.19) |
3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any logical or physical impossibility in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Stuart Mill - Utilitarianism Ch.1 |
4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
Full Idea: The categorical imperative smells of cruelty. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals II.§6 | |
A reaction: I presume this is because it is so pure and impersonal. Seems harsh. Nowadays we don't think pure just has to be cruel, but Nietzsche may have assumed it had to be. |
3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
Full Idea: I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.17) |
3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
Full Idea: The universal imperative may also run as follows: 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature'. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 421.52) |
22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Kant does not dictate what the maxim (the principle) of my action should be, and this is the crux. The individual has to decide the basis for their actions, rather than have it imposed on them, which differentiates us from the world of nature. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Andrew Bowie - German Philosophy: a very short introduction 1 | |
A reaction: Apparenty this inspired the Romantic era (the Age of Freedom?) just as much as the French Revolution. It is the chief doctrine of extreme individualism - except that the maxim chosen should be one on which rational beings should agree. |
6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
Full Idea: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another always as an end and never as a means only. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Does this really mean that I can't just negligently buy a newspaper without making an effort to respect its seller? How do I ensure that I treat myself as an end, and don't slip into treating myself as a means? What would that be like? Prostitution? |
3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
Full Idea: Rational nature exists as an end in itself; this is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 429.66) |
4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Kant, we may suppose, would say that if a man were 'cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others', he would still find in himself a source that would enable him to do what is benevolent. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This identifies a strong appeal of Kant's theory - that whether we are morally good should not be a matter of luck in our upbringing or natural temperament. How is the vicious person to be saved, if not by reason? |
4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
Full Idea: The Kantian view of what is important is that people should give moral considerations the highest deliberative priority, which Hegel attacked because it gives moral thought no content. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Interesting. This points towards empathy and compassion as motivators, rather than reason, because there is some content to the morality, which calls out to us. |
16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant thought that man is his own law - he binds himself under the law which he gives himself. This is how lawlessness or experimentation is established. This is no more rigorously earnest than Sancho Panza's self-administered blows to his own ass. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Søren Kierkegaard - The Journals of Kierkegaard JP-I, 188 | |
A reaction: It really is tempting to go easy on yourself rather than on others. Kant had the right ideas, but human beings aren't as disciplined as the categorical imperative requires. [SY] |
3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
Full Idea: A good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.2) |
3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
Full Idea: Since reason has been imparted to us as a practical power, which thus influences the will, its true function must be to produce a will which is good. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 396.7) |
3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
Full Idea: Inclinations, as a source of needs, are so far from having an absolute value to make them desirable for their own sake that it must rather be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) |
4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
Full Idea: There are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them. ..I maintain that an action of this kind, however right and amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.66) | |
A reaction: We understand what he means (that principle is everything), but this still seems a big hole in his account, one which drives us to Aristotle's sensible views about what a nice person is really like. |
3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
Full Idea: A violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as a means, not considering that they should be used only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68) |
7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is central to the idea of Kant as the main father of liberalism, the idea that every individual deserves respect, and hence has rights. The idea would also be a crucial element in Europe turning against slavery. |
7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant is often held to have completed a task begun by Grotius, giving a basis for natural law which does not invoke the will of God, but rather commands God himself to obedience. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Roger Scruton - A Dictionary of Political Thought 'Kant' | |
A reaction: This project, if successful, would clinch the naturalistic response to the Euthyphro Question (Ideas 336 and 337). It is a key issue for atheists, who generally wish to deny that their lack of religion leads inevitably to amorality. |
7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: Kant believed in retributive punishment, because he thought that a man would prefer being sent to prison to going to hospital. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: That is, even criminals welcome the dignity of being treated as if they are actually responsible for their deeds, and are not just victims of inner forces. Criminals demand free will! Truth is best, though; many of them are not responsible at all. |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
Full Idea: Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently called 'things' (rather than 'persons'). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) | |
A reaction: Ugh. Is there nothing in between 'persons' and 'things'? How about a deeply comatose human, or an embryo? It is a gross distortion to think of a chimpanzee as a 'thing'. |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
20644 | Energy has progressed from a mere formula, to a principle pervading all nature [Kelvin] |
Full Idea: The name 'energy', first used by Thomas Young, has come into use after it was raised from a mere formula of mathematical dynamics to become a principle pervading all nature, and guiding every field of science. | |
From: Lord Kelvin (Wm Thomson) (works [1881]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 01 'Principle' | |
A reaction: [bit compressed] As far as I can see energy behaves exactly as if it were a substance, like water conserved in rainfalls, and yet it isn't a stuff, and seems to result from a process of abstraction. I take it to be one of the biggest mysteries in physics. |
8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: On Kant's view it never follows that we ought to do what God commands, for we would have to know that we always ought to do what God commands, but that would need a standard of moral judgement independent of God's commands. God's commands are redundant. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very powerful argument, even an undeniable one. How could you accept any authority if you didn't have some standards for accepting it, even if the standard was just to be awestruck by someone's charisma and will-power? |
3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
Full Idea: Where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the idea of moral perfection, which reason traces a priori. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 408.29) |
20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Kant speaks of God not as something known or proved to exist by virtue of rational argument, but as a postulate of moral reflection (that is, of 'practical reason'). | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Morality' | |
A reaction: Presumably it is a necessary postulate, which makes this a transcendental argument, surely? |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |