59 ideas
| 19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
| A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
| 16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I suppose so. Physics only works at one level of description. Metaphysics often works with concepts which only emerge at a more general level than physics. There are also many metaphysical problems which are of no interest to most physicists. |
| 16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Kantian strain survives in the notion that metaphysics is not about the world, but about our 'conceptual system', especially as what structures our thought about the world. This keeps it a priori, and so not about the world itself. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: Strawson would embody this view, I suppose. I take our conceptual system to be largely a reflection of (and even creation of) the world, and not just an arbitrary conventional attempt to grasp the world. Analysing concepts partly analyses the world. |
| 16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If metaphysical possibility extends more widely than physical possibility, this may make metaphysics out to be nothing but the analysis of fantastical descriptions produced by philosophers. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin wants metaphysics to be firmly constrained in its possibilities by what scientific undestanding permits, and he is right. Metaphysics must integrate into science, or wither away on the margins. |
| 1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
| 1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
| 16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If the universe has been profligate, then Ockham's Razor will lead us astray. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: That is, there may be a vast number of entities which exist beyond what seems to be 'necessary'. |
| 16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Razor is good when it councils higher credence to explanations which posit a single cause to multiple events that occur in a striking pattern, over explanations involving coincidental multiple causes. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: This is in the context of Maudlin warning against embracing the Razor too strongly. Presumably inductive success suggests that the world supports this particular use of the Razor. |
| 8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
| 4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
| A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
| 13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
| A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
| 4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
| 16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Humean project is unjustified, in that both the laws of nature and the direction of time require no analysis, and is misconceived, in that the atoms it employs do not correspond to present physical ontology. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I certainly find it strange, or excessively empirical, that Lewis thinks our account of reality should rest on 'qualities'. Maudlin's whole books is an implicit attack on David Lewis. |
| 16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: At base it is not merely, as Lewis says, that everything else supervenes on the Mosaic; but rather that anything that exists at all is just a feature or element or generic property of the Mosaic. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
| A reaction: [Maudlin has just quoted Idea 16210] Correct about Lewis, but Lewis just has a normal view of supervenience. Only 'emergentists' would think the supervenience allowed anything more, and they are deeply misguided, and in need of help. |
| 16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Humean Mosaic appears to admit of no further explanation. Since it is the ontological bedrock, …none of the further things can account for the structure of the Mosaic itself. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
| A reaction: A very nice point, reminiscent of Popper's objection to essentialism, that he thought it blocked further enquiry, when actually further enquiry was possible. Lewis and Hume seem too mesmerised by epistemology. They need best explanation. |
| 16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The 'spinning disc' is not metaphysically possible. We have every reason to believe that there is no such thing as 'perfectly homogeneous matter'. The atomic theory of matter is as well established as any scientific theory is likely to be. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
| A reaction: This is a key case for Maudlin, and his contempt for metaphysics which is not scientifically informed. I agree with him. Extreme thought experiments are worth considering, but impossible ones are pointless. |
| 16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of ontological commitment becomes a central element in a theory of ontology if one merely adds that a particular theory is, in fact, true | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Helpful. I don't think the truth of a theory entails the actual existence of every component mentioned in the theory, as some of them may be generalisations, abstractions, vague, or even convenient linking fictions. |
| 16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Naïve translation from natural language into formal language can obscure necessary ontology as easily as it can create superfluous ontological commitment. …The lion's share of metaphysical work is done when settling on the right translation. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: I suspect this is more than a mere problem of 'naivety', but may be endemic to the whole enterprise. If you hammer a square peg into a round hole, you expect to lose something. Language is subtle, logic is crude. |
| 16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Fragility is not a fundamental physical property, in that two pieces of glass cannot be physically identical save for their fragility. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: Nice. The best idea I have found in Maudlin, so far! This gives a very nice test for picking out the fundamental physical and intrinsic properties. |
| 16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If one believes that fundamental physics is the place to look for the truths about universals (or tropes or natural sets), then one may find that physics is telling us there are no such things. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: His prior discussion of quantum chromodynamics suggests, to me, merely that properties can be described in terms of vectors etc., and remains neutral on the ontology - but then I am blinded by science. |
| 16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: On one line of thought, the question of whether universals exist seems to reduce to the question of the utility, or necessity, of using second-order rather than first-order logic. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Second-order logic quantifies over properties, where first-order logic just quantifies over objects. This is an extreme example of doing your metaphysics largely through logic. Not my approach. |
| 13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
| 13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
| A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
| 13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
| Full Idea: Generality is often necessary for capturing the essence of a particular. | |
| From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.36) | |
| A reaction: The most powerful features of an entity are probably those which are universal, like intelligence or physical strength in a human. Those characteristics are powerful because they compete with the same characteristic in others (perhaps?). |
| 16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: While logical impossibility is a species of metaphysical impossibility, logical possibility is not a species of metaphysical possibility. The logically impeccable description 'Cicero was not Tully' describes a metaphysically impossible situation. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
| A reaction: The context of this is Maudlin attack on daft notions of metaphysical possibility that are at variance with the limits set by science, but he is still conceding that there are types of metaphysical modality. |
| 16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The purpose of the antecedent of a counterfactual is to provide instructions on how to pick a Cauchy surface (pick a moment in time) and how to generate an altered description of that moment. It is more of a command than an indicative sentence. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Quite plausible, but the antecedent might contain no description. 'If things had gone differently, we wouldn't be in this mess'. The antecedent might be timeless. 'If pigs had wings, they still wouldn't fly'. |
| 5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
| A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
| 11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
| 23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
| A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
| 16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
| 16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
| Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
| 16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Induction is always a leap beyond the known, but we are constantly assured by later experience that we have landed safely. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: Not philosophically very interesting, but a nice remark for capturing the lived aspect of inductive thought, as practised by the humblest of animals. |
| 11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
| A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
| 3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
| 16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: A law ought to be capable of playing some role in explaining the phenomena that are governed by or are manifestations of it. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: I find this attitude bewildering. 'Why do electrons have spin?' 'Because they all do!' The word 'governed' is the clue. What on earth is a law, if it can 'govern' nature? What is its ontological status? Natures of things are basic, not 'laws'. |
| 13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
| Full Idea: Maybe to deduce a theorem as an instance of a generalization is more explanatory than to deduce it correctly. | |
| From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.32) | |
| A reaction: Steiner eventually comes down against this proposal, on the grounds that some proofs are too general, and hence too far away from the thing they are meant to explain. |
| 12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
| A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
| 13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
| Full Idea: My proposal is that an explanatory proof makes reference to the 'characterizing property' of an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem, where the proof depends on the property. If we substitute a different object, the theory collapses. | |
| From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.34) | |
| A reaction: He prefers 'characterizing property' to 'essence', because he is not talking about necessary properties, since all properties are necessary in mathematics. He is, in fact, reverting to the older notion of an essence, as the core power of the thing. |
| 23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
| A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
| 11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
| 6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
| 11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
| From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
| A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
| 3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
| 8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
| A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
| 12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
| A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
| 16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The evaluation of counterfactual claims is widely recognised as being influenced by context and interest. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Such evaluation certainly seems to involve imagination, and so the pragmatics can creep in there. I don't quite see why it should be deeply contextual. |
| 16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: It seems unlikely the psychological process could mirror Lewis's semantics: people don't imagine a multiplicity of worlds and the pick out the most similar. Rather we construct representations of possible worlds from counterfactual descriptions. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: I approve of fitting such theories into a psychology, but this may be unfair to Lewis, who aims for a logical model, not an account of how we actually approach the problem. |
| 16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: A counterexample to the counterfactual approach is that perhaps the effect would have occurred despite the absence of the cause since another cause would have stepped in to bring it about. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
| A reaction: …Hence you cannot say 'if C had not occurred, E would definitely not have occurred'. You have to add 'ceteris paribus', which ruins the neatness of the theory. |
| 16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: When we think we know the cause of an event, we typically assent to the corresponding Hume counterfactual. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is the correct grounding of the counterfactual approach - not that we think counterfactuals are causation, but that knowledge of causation will map neatly onto a network of counterfactuals, thus providing a logic for the whole process. |
| 16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If Kennedy had still been President in Dec 1963, he would not have been assassinated in Nov 1963, so the counterfactual goes both ways (where the cause seems to only go one way). | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin says a lot of fine-tuning has sort of addressed these problems, but that counterfactual causation is basically wrong-headed anyway, and I incline to agree, though one must understand what the theory is (and is not) trying to do. |
| 16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Laws are ontologically primitives at least in that two worlds could differ in their laws but not in any observable respect. ….[21] I take content of the laws to be expressed by equations. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: At least that spells out his view fairly dramatically, but I am baffled as to what he thinks a law could be. He is arguing against the Lewis regularity-axioms view, and the Armstrong universal-relations view. He ignores the essentialist view. |
| 16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental laws of nature appear to be laws of temporal evolution: they specify how the state of the universe will, or might, evolve from a given intial state. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin takes both laws of nature and the passage of time to be primitive facts, and this is how they are connected. I think (this week) that I take time and causation to be primitive, but not laws. |
| 16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The laws of nature stand in no need of 'philosophical analysis'; they ought to be posited as ontological bedrock. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is Maudlin's most basic principle, and I don't agree with it. The notion that laws are more deeply embedded in reality than the physical stuff they control is a sort of 'law-mysticism' that needs to be challenged. |
| 16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: 'All humans who live in houses with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law because the class referred to is not a natural kind. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin wants laws to be primitive, but he now needs a primitive notion of a natural kind to make it work. If kinds generate laws, you can ditch the laws, and build your theory on the kinds. He also says no death is explained by 'all humans are mortal'. |
| 16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: On the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, I take it that if the world is extensive and variegated enough, then there must be laws. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. If there is any sort of pattern discernible in the surface waves on the sea, then there must be a law to cover it, not matter how vague or complex. |
| 16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: I believe that it is a fundamental, irreducible fact about the spatio-temporal structure of the world that time passes. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4) | |
| A reaction: Worth quoting because it comes from a philosopher fully informed about, and heavily committed to, the physicist's approach to reality. One fears that physicists steeped in Einstein are all B-series Eternalists. Get a life! |
| 16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary and, I suppose, a priori that if time passes at all it passes at one second per second. …Similarly, the fair exchange rate for a dollar must be a dollar. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: [He is discussing Huw Price on time] This is a reply to the claim that if time passes it has to pass at some rate, and 'one second per second' is ridiculous. Not very convincing, even with the dollar analogy. |
| 16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Given events ordered in a B series, one defines an infinitude of different A series that correspond to taking different events as 'now' or 'present'. McTaggart talks of 'the A series' when there is an infinitude of such. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.3 n11) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a rather mathematical (and distorted) claim about the A series view. The A-series is one dynamic happening. Not an infinity of static times lines, each focused on a different 'now'. |
| 22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
| A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |