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All the ideas for 'works', 'Experimental Researches in Electricity' and 'Davidson on himself'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro
     A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value.
     From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos
     From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The basis on which the concepts of truth and objectivity depend for application is a community of understanding, agreement among speakers on how each is to be understood.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
     A reaction: Obviously all understanding is, in practice, an interpretation by a community, but that isn't what 'truth' means. We mean 'true independently of any community'.
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
     Full Idea: It makes no sense to speak of comparing or agreeing on ultimate standards of rationality, since it is our own standards in each case to which we must turn in interpreting others. This is not a failure of objectivity, but where 'questions come to an end'.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
     A reaction: This seems wrong, given the commitment to truth and charity in interpretation. He could have said the same about perception, but I doubt if he would.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
     Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51
     A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157
     A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus?
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12
     A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
     Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4
     A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6
     A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5
     A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
     Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle
     A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173
     A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5
     A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages).
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
     Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us).
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1
     A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
     Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV
     A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
     Full Idea: There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: I think this is right. It fits with Searle's notion of consciousness as a property, like the liquidity of water. I don't panic if I think "I have no mind, but I have extraordinary properties".
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
     Full Idea: If there are no strict psychophysical laws, this rules out reductionism, either by definition of mental predicates in physical terms, or by way of bridging laws.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: But it is by no means clear that there are no psycho-physical laws. How could this be known a priori?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
     Full Idea: All mental events are causally related to physical events. ..This seems obvious.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: All mental events are physically caused. Some bodily physical events result from mental events. Probably all mental events have some effect of other mental events (all of which are in some sense physical).
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
     Full Idea: There are no strict psychophysical laws (that is, laws connecting mental events under their mental descriptions with physical events under their physical descriptions).
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: This is clearly open to question. It may be just that no human mind could ever grasp such laws, given their probable complexity.
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: This seems to me clearly true, however we propose to characterise mental events.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
     Full Idea: My basic premises lead to the conclusion of ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism (like Spinoza, except that he denied mental causation).
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: 'Conceptual dualism' implies no real difference, but 'property dualism' is better, suggesting different properties when viewed from different angles.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
     Full Idea: To imagine a totally irrational animal is to imagine an animal without thought.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
     A reaction: This wouldn't be so clear without the theory of evolution, which suggests that only the finders of truth last long enough to breed.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial'
     A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
     Full Idea: What we mean by what we say is partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.235)
     A reaction: There is 'strict and literal meaning', which is fixed by the words, even if I don't know what I am saying. But 'speaker's meaning' is surely a pure matter of a state of mind?
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The idea of a proposition is unhelpful, until it is explained how exactly the words in the contained sentence manage to name or describe a proposition (which even Frege failed to achieve).
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
     A reaction: It seems obvious to me that there are brain events best labelled as propositions, even if their fit with language is puzzling.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
     Full Idea: We would have no fully-fledge thoughts if we were not in communication with others.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
     A reaction: This seems a plausible empirical observation, though I would doubt any a priori proof of it. If animals could speak, they would become intellectuals?
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The 'principle of charity' is a misleading term, since there is no alternative if we want to make sense of the attitudes and actions of the agents around us.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
     A reaction: I suppose so, but only with a background of evolutionary theory. I would necessarily assume charity if a robot spoke to me.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586!
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it.
     From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE])
     A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead."
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Without a 'teacher', nothing would give content to the idea that there is a difference between getting things right and getting them wrong.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.234)
     A reaction: Seems right. A group of speculators with no one in the role of 'teacher' would seem to be paralysed with uncertain (except where judgements are very obvious).
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
     Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3
     A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2
     A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
     Full Idea: If two events are related as cause and effect, there is a strict law under which they may be subsumed.
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
     A reaction: Davidson admits that this is open to challenge (though Hume and Kant supported it). It does seem to be central to our understanding of nature.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Faraday's single field of variable forces introduces a criterion of Unity into what is ultimate [Faraday, by Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: In Faraday lines of force picture the directional structure of powers,...so the fundamental entity is a single, unified field. ...A new criterion of the ultimate has stepped in: Unity. The universal field is still the final explanation, but not invariant.
     From: report of Michael Faraday (Experimental Researches in Electricity [1859]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
     A reaction: Almost Parmenides, except that the field is not invariant. But that was always the ancient objection to the One - that it offered no explanation of change.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20
     A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul).