76 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
Full Idea: Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age. | |
From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 188b) | |
A reaction: I have taught teenagers who seemed to me wiser than nearly all the adults I have ever met. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
18137 | Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Poincaré suggested that what is wrong with an impredicative definition is that it allows the set defined to alter its composition as more sets are added to the theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) |
18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: None of the classical ways of defining one logical constant in terms of others is available in intuitionist logic (and this includes the two quantifiers). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) |
18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
Full Idea: There is so far no agreed set of axioms for set theory which is categorical, i.e. which does pick just one structure. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Peano Arithmetic, which is categorical in its second-order version. |
18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything, neither of a set nor of another proper class. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) |
18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We could add the axiom that all sets are constructible (V = L), making the universe of sets as small as possible, or add the axiom that there is a supercompact cardinal (SC), making the universe as large as we no know how to. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Bostock says most mathematicians reject the first option, and are undecided about the second option. |
18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The usual accounts of ZF are not restricted to subsets that we can describe, and that is what justifies the axiom of choice. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4 n36) | |
A reaction: This contrasts interestingly with predicativism, which says we can only discuss things which we can describe or define. Something like verificationism hovers in the background. |
18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Replacement (or the Axiom of Subsets, 'Aussonderung', Fraenkel 1922) in effect enforces the idea that 'limitation of size' is a crucial factor when deciding whether a proposed set or does not not exist. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
18108 | First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is not decidable. That is, there is no test which can be applied to any arbitrary formula of that logic and which will tell one whether the formula is or is not valid (as proved by Church in 1936). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) |
18109 | The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock] |
Full Idea: From the fact that the usual rules for first-level logic are complete (as proved by Gödel 1930), it follows that this logic is 'compact'. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) | |
A reaction: The point is that the completeness requires finite proofs. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
18123 | Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Substitutional quantification and quantification understood in the usual 'ontological' way will coincide when every object in the (ontological) domain has a name. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.3 n23) |
18120 | The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of 'natural deduction' in the first place. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) |
18125 | Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Berry's Paradox can be put in this form, by considering the alleged name 'The least number not named by this name'. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.1) |
18101 | Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If you add to the ordinals you produce many different ordinals, each measuring the length of the sequence of ordinals less than it. They each have cardinality aleph-0. The cardinality eventually increases, but we can't say where this break comes. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) |
18100 | ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If we add ω onto the end of 0,1,2,3,4..., it then has a different length, of ω+1. It has a different ordinal (since it can't be matched with its first part), but the same cardinal (since adding 1 makes no difference). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The ordinals and cardinals coincide up to ω, but this is the point at which they come apart. |
18102 | A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is the usual procedure these days to identify a cardinal number with the earliest ordinal number that has that number of predecessors. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: This sounds circular, since you need to know the cardinal in order to decide which ordinal is the one you want, but, hey, what do I know? |
18106 | Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The cardinal aleph-1 is identified with the first ordinal to have more than aleph-0 members, and so on. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) | |
A reaction: That is, the succeeding infinite ordinals all have the same cardinal number of members (aleph-0), until the new total is triggered (at the number of the reals). This is Continuum Hypothesis territory. |
18095 | Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In addition to cuts, or converging series, Cantor suggests we can simply lay down a set of axioms for the real numbers, and this can be done without any explicit mention of the rational numbers [note: the axioms are those for a complete ordered field]. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.4) | |
A reaction: It is interesting when axioms are best, and when not. Set theory depends entirely on axioms. Horsten and Halbach are now exploring treating truth as axiomatic. You don't give the 'nature' of the thing - just rules for its operation. |
18099 | The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is not difficult to show that the number of the real numbers is the same as the number of all the subsets of the natural numbers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: The Continuum Hypothesis is that this is the next infinite number after the number of natural numbers. Why can't there be a number which is 'most' of the subsets of the natural numbers? |
18093 | For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock] |
Full Idea: As Eudoxus claimed, two distinct real numbers cannot both make the same cut in the rationals, for any two real numbers must be separated by a rational number. He did not say, though, that for every such cut there is a real number that makes it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is in Bostock's discussion of Dedekind's cuts. It seems that every cut is guaranteed to produce a real. Fine challenges the later assumption. |
18110 | Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Non-standard natural numbers will yield non-standard rational and real numbers. These will include reciprocals which will be closer to 0 than any standard real number. These are like 'infinitesimals', so that notion is not actually a contradiction. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) |
18156 | Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A modern axiomatisation of geometry, such as Hilbert's (1899), does not need to claim the existence of real numbers anywhere in its axioms. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5.ii) | |
A reaction: This is despite the fact that geometry is reduced to algebra, and the real numbers are the equivalent of continuous lines. Bostock votes for a Greek theory of proportion in this role. |
18097 | The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Peano Axioms are categorical, meaning that they describe a unique structure. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.4 n20) | |
A reaction: So if you think there is nothing more to the natural numbers than their structure, then the Peano Axioms give the essence of arithmetic. If you think that 'objects' must exist to generate a structure, there must be more to the numbers. |
18148 | Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Hume's Principle will not do as an implicit definition because it makes a positive claim about the size of the universe (which no mere definition can do), and because it does not by itself explain what the numbers are. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18145 | Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Hume's Principle gives a criterion of identity for numbers, but it is obvious that many other things satisfy that criterion. The simplest example is probably the numerals (in any notation, decimal, binary etc.), giving many different interpretations. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18149 | There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: There is not just one way of giving a criterion of identity for numbers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Julius Caesar problem was one reason that led Frege to give an explicit definition of numbers as special sets. He does not appear to notice that the same problem affects his Axiom V for introducing sets (whether Caesar is or is not a set). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: The Julius Caesar problem is a sceptical acid that eats into everything in philosophy of mathematics. You give all sorts of wonderful accounts of numbers, but at what point do you know that you now have a number, and not something else? |
18116 | Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock] |
Full Idea: There is no ground for saying that a number IS a position, if the truth is that there is nothing to determine which number is which position. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: If numbers lose touch with the empirical ability to count physical objects, they drift off into a mad world where they crumble away. |
18117 | Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Structuralism begins from a false premise, namely that numbers have no properties other than their relations to other numbers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.5) | |
A reaction: Well said. Describing anything purely relationally strikes me as doomed, because you have to say why those things relate in those ways. |
18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Nominalism has two main versions, one which tries to 'reduce' the objects of mathematics to something simpler (Russell and Wittgenstein), and another which claims that such objects are mere 'fictions' which have no reality (Field). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9) |
18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The style of nominalism which aims to reduce statements about numbers to statements about their applications does not work for the natural numbers, because they have many applications, and it is arbitrary to choose just one of them. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5.iii) |
18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We all know that in practice no physical measurement can be 100 per cent accurate, and so it cannot require the existence of a genuinely irrational number, rather than some of the rational numbers close to it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.3) |
18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The basic use of the ordinal numbers is their use as ordinal adjectives, in phrases such as 'the first', 'the second' and so on. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.5.iii) | |
A reaction: That is because ordinals seem to attach to particulars, whereas cardinals seem to attach to groups. Then you say 'three is greater than four', it is not clear which type you are talking about. |
18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The simple theory of types distinguishes sets into different 'levels', but this is quite different from the distinction into 'orders' which is imposed by the ramified theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.1) | |
A reaction: The ramified theory has both levels and orders (p.235). Russell's terminology is, apparently, inconsistent. |
18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The response of neo-logicists to the Julius Caesar problem is to strengthen Hume's Principle in the hope of ensuring that only numbers will satisfy it. They say the criterion of identity provided by HP is essential to number, and not to anything else. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The neo-logicists take up Frege's claim that Hume's Principle introduces a new concept (of a number), but unlike Frege they go on to claim that it by itself gives a complete account of that concept. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: So the big difference between Frege and neo-logicists is the Julius Caesar problem. |
18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If logic is neutral on the number of objects there are, then logicists can't construe numbers as objects, for arithmetic is certainly not neutral on the number of numbers there are. They must be treated in some other way, perhaps as numerical quantifiers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) |
18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If Hume's Principle is all we are given, by way of explanation of what the numbers are, the only conclusion to draw would seem to be the structuralists' conclusion, ...studying all systems that satisfy that principle. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: Any approach that implies a set of matching interpretations will always imply structuralism. To avoid it, you need to pin the target down uniquely. |
18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Many of the crucial definitions in the logicist programme are in fact impredicative. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.2) |
18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In its higher reaches, which posit sets of huge cardinalities, set theory is just a fairy story. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.5.iii) | |
A reaction: You can't say the higher reaches are fairy stories but the lower reaches aren't, if the higher is directly derived from the lower. The empty set and the singleton are fairy stories too. Bostock says the axiom of infinity triggers the fairy stories. |
18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A common view is that although a fairy tale may provide very useful predictions, it cannot provide explanations for why things happen as they do. In order to do that a theory must also be true (or, at least, an approximation to the truth). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5) | |
A reaction: Of course, fictionalism offers an explanation of mathematics as a whole, but not of the details (except as the implications of the initial fictional assumptions). |
18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In my personal opinion, predicativism is the best version of conceptualism that we have yet discovered. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4) | |
A reaction: Since conceptualism is a major player in the field, this makes predicativism a very important view. I won't vote Predicativist quite yet, but I'm tempted. |
18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Three simple objections to conceptualism in mathematics are that we do not ascribe mathematical properties to our ideas, that our ideas are presumably finite, and we don't think mathematics lacks truthvalue before we thought of it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Bostock refers back to his Ch 2] Plus Idea 18134. On the whole I sympathise with conceptualism, so I will not allow myself to be impressed by any of these objections. (So, what's actually wrong with them.....?). |
18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If an abstract object exists only when there is some suitable way of expressing it, then there are at most denumerably many abstract objects. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Fine by me. What an odd view, to think there are uncountably many abstract objects in existence, only a countable portion of which will ever be expressed! [ah! most people agree with me, p.243-4] |
18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Classical mathematicians say predicative mathematics omits areas of great interest, all concerning non-denumerable real numbers, such as claims about huge cardinals. There cannot be a predicative version of this theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that anyone will really miss huge cardinals if they are prohibited, though cryptography seems to flirt with such things. Are we ever allowed to say that some entity conjured up by mathematicians is actually impossible? |
18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It has been claimed that only predicative mathematics has a justification through its usefulness to science (an empiricist approach). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed. Quine is the obvious candidate] I suppose predicativism gives your theory roots, whereas impredicativism is playing an abstract game. |
18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If we accept the initial idea that we can think only of what we ourselves can describe, then something like the theory of predicativism quite naturally results | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I hate the idea that we can only talk of what falls under a sortal, but 'what we can describe' is much more plausible. Whether or not you agree with this approach (I'm pondering it), this makes predicativism important. |
18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is with the real numbers that the restrictions imposed by predicativity begin to make a real difference. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) |
18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The predicative approach cannot accept either the usual definition of identity or the usual definition of the natural numbers, for both of these definitions are impredicative. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: [Bostock 237-8 gives details] |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In Modus Ponens where the first premise is 'P' and the second 'P→Q', in the first premise P is asserted but in the second it is not. Yet it must mean the same in both premises, or it would be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) | |
A reaction: This is Geach's thought (leading to an objection to expressivism in ethics, that P means the same even if it is not expressed). |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
Full Idea: To be unafraid (like a small child who doesn't understand the danger) and to be brave are two quite different things. | |
From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 197b) |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |