71 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In beginning philosophy, the first beginning is from definitions. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.15) | |
A reaction: Note that he doesn't say that definitions are the aim of philosophy, as some analysts might think. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Definitions of things which may be understood to have some cause, must consist of such names as express the cause or manner of their generation, as when we define a circle to be a figure made by the circumduction of a straight line in a plane etc. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.13) | |
A reaction: His account of the circle is based on its mode of construction, which is the preferred account of Euclid, rather than a statement of its pure nature. |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The definition is nothing but a resolution of the name into its most universal parts; ...definitions of this kind always consist of genus and difference; the former names being all, till the last, general; and the last of all, difference. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.14) | |
A reaction: This is basically the scholastic Aristotelian view of definition. Note that Hobbes explicitly denies that the last step of the definition is general in character. |
17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A defined name ought not to be repeated in the definition. ...No total can be part of itself. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.15) |
17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: 'Petitio principii' is when the conclusion to be proved is disguised in other words, and put for the definition or principle from whence it is to be demonstrated. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.18) |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A part of a part is a part of a whole. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.07.09) |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: By saying one, one, one, one, and so forward, we know not what number we are at beyond two or three. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.12.05) | |
A reaction: This makes ordinals sound like meta-numbers. |
17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: All mutation consists in motion only | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.09.06) | |
A reaction: Another little gem of simplicity from Hobbes, and one with which I am inclined to agree. The value of a variable can 'change', but that may be metaphorical. |
16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: An accident is a mode of conceiving a body. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.02) | |
A reaction: In contrast to the other thinkers who followed Suárez on modes in the early 17th century, Hobbes thinks they are just ways of 'conceiving' bodies, rather than actual features of them. |
16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: An accident's being in a body is not to be taken as something contained in that body - as if redness were in blood like blood in a bloody cloth, as part of the whole, for then accident would be a body. It is like body having size or rest or movement. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.03) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Hobbes is fishing for something like the Quinean view of properties, but no one seems to be able to articulate this sceptical view very well. Pasnau says he means to talk of 'the mode of conceiving a body' (De C 8.2). |
16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The power of agent and patient taken together, which may be called the complete power, is the same as the complete cause, for each consists in the aggregation together of all the accidents that are required to produce an effect in both agent and patient. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.10.01) | |
A reaction: They treat powers as macro phenomena, and don't seem to have a sense of the basic powers that build up the big picture. |
17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Nothing is general or universal besides names or signs. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.05) | |
A reaction: This is the perfect motto for nominalists, among which I am inclined to include myself. Hobbes had a fabulous gift for economy of phrasing. This website is dedicated to that ideal. Reality does not contain generalities (obviously!!). |
14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A body is that, which having no dependence on our thought, is coincident or coextended with some part of space. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.01) | |
A reaction: This rather Cartesian view doesn't seem to offer any distinction between empty space and space containing an 'object'. Presumably it is the ancestor of the Quinean account just in terms of space-time points. Don't like it. |
17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: One body cannot be in two places at the same time, ...for the place that a body fills being divided into two, the placed body will also be divided into two; the place and the body that fills that place are divided both together. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.08) | |
A reaction: If every time you manipulated one body it affected both of them, you might say that one body was in two places, rather like a mirror image. |
17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, ..because when a body that fills its whole place is divided into two, the place itself is divided into two also, so that there will be two places. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.08) | |
A reaction: The wonderful things about philosophy is that you are faced with obvious truths of the world, and cannot begin to think why they are true - and then up steps a philosopher and offers you a reason. |
17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: How can any whole body be moved, unless all its parts be moved together with it? | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.05) | |
A reaction: This might be a distinguishing mark for a whole physical body. I think it is probably the main mark for ordinary folk. I've never found this idea in Aristotle. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A body is always the same, whether the parts of it be put together or dispersed; or whether it be congealed or dissolved. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This appears to be a commitment by Hobbes to what we now call 'classical' mereology - that any bunch of things can count as a whole, whether they are together or dispersed. He seems to mean more than a watch surviving dismantling. |
17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In composition, it is to be understood that for the making up of a whole there is no need of putting the parts together, so as to make them touch one another, but only of collecting them into one sum in the mind. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.07.08) | |
A reaction: This seems to the 'unrestricted composition' of classical mereology, since it appears that Hobbes offers no restriction on which parts can be united by a mind, no matter how bizarre. |
17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Universal things are contained in the nature of singular things. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.04) | |
A reaction: That is the neatest and most accurate summary of the situation I have ever read. Particulars come first, but they are all riddled with generalities (but that is not as well said as Hobbes's remark). |
17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: There are certain accidents which can never perish except the body perish also. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.03) | |
A reaction: He is just making an observation, and not proposing a theory about essence. |
17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: That accident for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which denominates its subject, is commonly called the essence thereof. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.23) | |
A reaction: This is clearly a prelude to Locke's more carefully formulated 'nominal essence'. Fairly obvious, for nominalist empiricists. A bit surprising to say this was 'common'. |
17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: That will be the same river which flows from one and the same fountain, whether the same water, or other water, or something other than water, flow thence. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This makes the source the one necessity for a river. I think the end matters too. If the Thames reversed direction, and flowed into Wales, it would not be the Thames any more. |
12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: In the Ship of Theseus, some place individuity in the unity of matter; others, in the unity of form. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: Simons raises this comment into a dogma, that there are at least two objects present in the ship. If I offered you a sum for the contents of your house, they would have a unity of monetary value. |
17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: If some man kept the old planks as they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards together again in the same order, had again made a ship of them, ...there would have been two ships numerically the same, which is absurd. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This is the origin of the famous modern problematical example of the Ship of Theseus. The ancient example is just the case of whether you step into the same river, but using an artefact with parts, to make it clearer. |
16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: It makes a great difference to ask concerning Socrates whether he is the same human being or whether he is the same body. For his body, when he is old, cannot be the same it was when he was an infant. …He can, however, be the same human being. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.07) | |
A reaction: This is not commitment to full (Geachian) relative identity, but it notes the problem. |
17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Two bodies are said to differ from one another, when something may be said of one of them, which cannot be said of the other at the same time. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.11.02) | |
A reaction: Note the astute addition of 'at the same time'. Note also that it is couched in terms of what is true, rather than in terms of 'properties' or 'accidents'. |
16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Even if we can feign in our mind that a point swells to a huge bulk and then contracts to a point - imagining something's made from nothing (ex nihilo), and nothing's made from something - still we cannot comprehend how this could be done in nature. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.20) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Pasnau notes that this offers two sorts of conceivability, of something happening, and of a reason for it happening. A really nice idea, significant (I think) for scientific essentialists, who say possibilities are fewer than you think. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
Full Idea: The taste of chocolate is presumably a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.1.4) | |
A reaction: An interesting distinction when it comes to what they are like, and whether two very different brains can realise them. Sweetness might be the same for most creatures, but the tast of chocolate subtly different. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The end of science is the demonstration of the causes and generation of things. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.13) |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Imagination is nothing else but sense decaying or weakened by the absence of the object. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 4.25.07) | |
A reaction: This sounds more like memory than imagination. He needs to say something about unusual combinations of memories, I would have thought. |
19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Hobbes' notion of 'conatus' is a 'beginning of motion' - a motion through a point of space in an instant of time. In a human subject this is experience as desire or aversion. It thus forms a bridge between physics and psychology. | |
From: report of Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], p.178) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 3 'Worlds' | |
A reaction: This sounds rather like the primitive concept of a power which I like, but the term seems to be used very vaguely, and never discussed carefully. The idea provoked Leibniz to connect physical force with mental life. |
6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
Full Idea: We should return to the old idea that the mind and the self are one and combine it with the new idea that the mind-self is a biological phenomenon. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §8.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't make allowance for the fact that some parts of my mind seem like irritating visitors, and other parts seem like the home-owner. Personally I take the self to be the brain's central controller, or the centre (forum) of brain integration. |
6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
Full Idea: Teleological functions help explain why a trait has come to exist; causal-role functions tell what a trait does or is apt to do. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
A reaction: The teleological view has the merit of nesting nicely with the theory of evolution, and with Aristotelian virtue ethics (which I like). Causal-role functionalism focuses better on what is actually happening inside the head. |
2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Sense in the sentient, can be nothing else but motion in some of the internal parts of the sentient; and the parts so moved are parts of the organs of sense. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 3.15.02) | |
A reaction: Amazingly bold for the time, and presumably influenced by Lucretius. I am sympathetic, but to suggest that sensation is nothing more sounds a bit like a category mistake. Has he grasped that the brain is involved? |
6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
Full Idea: Identity theories locate consciousness at a certain order of abstraction, typically among neurophysiological states, events, processes, or properties. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.7.6) | |
A reaction: I increasingly think that processes are the answer. My new analogy for the mind is a waterfall: its physical ontology is simple, it only exists because there is a sustained process, and it is far too complex to predict individual droplet outcomes. |
17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: All the passions, called passions of the mind, consist of appetite and aversion, except pure pleasure and pain. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 4.25.13) | |
A reaction: He now faces the challenge of explaining all the many other emotions in terms of these two. Good luck with that, Thomas. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: The use of words consists in this, that they may serve for marks by which whatsoever we have found out may be recalled to memory ...but not as signs by which we declare the same to others. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.11) | |
A reaction: This exactly fits the idea of mental files, of which I am a fan. That this is the actual purpose of language is an unusual but interesting view. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
Full Idea: A preserved heart in a jar of formaldehyde has the teleological function of circulating blood. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration. |
6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |
Full Idea: Teleological notions of function specify not just what a thing happens to do, but what it is supposed to do. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.5.3) | |
A reaction: This is the basis of a distinct theory of the mind. It seems to be akin to the 'dispositions' of behaviourism, so that the mind becomes once more a theoretical and abstract entity, rather than a thing of occurrent events and processes. |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Prime matter signifies body considered without the consideration of any form or accident except only magnitude or extension, and aptness to receive form and accidents. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.24) | |
A reaction: I take 'considered without' to indicate that he thinks of it as a psychological abstraction, rather than some actual existing thing. |
17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A body is said to work upon or act, that is to say, do something to another body, when it either generates or destroys some accident in it. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.09.01) |
17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: There can be no effect but from a sufficient and necessary cause. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.10.02) | |
A reaction: To be compared with Mackie's subtler modern account of this matter. If two different separate causes could lead to the same result, it is hard to see how the cause must be 'necessary' (unless you say they lead to different effects). |
17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: A cause it the sum or aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agents and in the patient, as concur to the producing of the effect propounded; all of which existing together, ti cannot be understood but that the effect existenth without them. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.10) | |
A reaction: For most causes we meet, this definition will include gravity and electro-magnetism, so it doesn't help in narrowing things down. Notice that he accepts the necessity, despite his committed empiricism. |
17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: Motion is privation of one place, and the acquisition of another. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.06) | |
A reaction: This is basically the 'at-at' theory of motion which empiricists like, because it breaks motion down into atoms of experience. Hobbes needs an ontology which includes 'places'. |
17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: I define 'force' to be the impetus or quickness of motion multiplied either into itself, or into the magnitude of the movent, by means of which whereof the said movent works more or less upon the body that resists it. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 3.15.02) | |
A reaction: Not very helpful, perhaps, but it shows a view of force at quite an early date, well before Newton. |
17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |
Full Idea: When people speak of the times of their predecessors, they do not think after their predecessors are gone that their times can be any where else than in the memory of those that remember. | |
From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.07.03) |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |