57 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro | |
A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea. |
24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All the major problems were formulated before Socrates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[064]) | |
A reaction: So much for it all being 'footnotes to Plato'! Nietzsche's lectures on the pre-Socratics are in print. Given how little survives, this idea is surprising. Nietzsche knew enough to infer a lot of what is lost. |
24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What can be made out of humans: this is what matters to superior human beings. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[435]) | |
A reaction: That seems to sum up the main aim of Nietzsche's philosophy. What would we then do if the aim was somehow achieved? Does he seriously think that one magnificent ubermensch could achieve this aim? |
24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is sufficient if we [thinkers] come to agree about a totality of methodological presuppositions - about 'provisional truths' that we want to use as a guideline for our work. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[449]) | |
A reaction: Descartes attempted this. Maybe Frege is another attempt. Husserl, perhaps? Parmenides? Hume? Lewis? It is hard to imagine Nietzsche joining in a professional consensus! He has just rejected systems. |
24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Aristotle probably had his best moments when he coldly and clearly (and joyfully) enjoyed the sensual sham of the highest generalities. To perceive the world as a system, and as the pinnacle of human happiness: how the schematic mind betrays itself then! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[017]) | |
A reaction: Painful, this. One of my heroes laughing at the other one. I love systems, and love John Richardson's suggestion that Nietzsche was very systematice, despite his protestations. |
24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A thought is not taken to be immediately certain, but rather a sign, a question mark. That each thought is initially ambiguous and fluctuating, and is in itself only an occasion for multiple interpretations …is experienced by every deep observer. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[092]) | |
A reaction: This idea makes me a little more sympathetic to the hermeneutic view of philosophy, as endless interpretations. I assumed it only referred to texts. A thought is not a done deal, but an occasion for further thought. He says the same of feelings. |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26 |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos | |
From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95 |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'. |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157 | |
A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus? |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12 | |
A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit. |
24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Mathematics contains axioms (definitions) and conclusions from definitions. Its objects do not exist. The truth of its conclusions rests on the accuracy of logical thought. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
A reaction: Not suprising to find Nietzsche defying platonism. This is evidence that he was a systematic philosopher, who knew mathematics could be a challenge to his naturalism. |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4 | |
A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional. |
24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Being' is unprovable, because there is no 'being'. The concept of being is formed out of the opposition to 'nothingness'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[185]) | |
A reaction: Presumably a comment on Hegel's most basic idea. I find both thoughts bewildering. 'Being' is just a generalised (and unhelpful) way of referring to the self-evident existence of stuff. |
24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I am not interested …in ways of thinking that are not anchored in the body and the senses and in the earth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[352]) | |
A reaction: Exhibit A for Nietzsche as Naturalist. Indeed, this could be a manifesto for the whole school. I totally and completely and utterly agree with Nietzsche's assertion!. I see the 'anchor' as two-way: thought connects to earth, and thought arises from it. |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter. |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5 | |
A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact. |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have only one form of understanding - concept, the more general case that subsumes the particular case. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[156]) | |
A reaction: This is precisely Aristotle's problem with scientific explanation - that we aim to understand each particular, but accounts and definitions have to be expressed with universals. |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What we believe the most, everything a priori, is not for that reason more certain, just because it is so strongly believed. Rather, it is perhaps a consequence of the condition for the existence of our species. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
A reaction: This is in defiance of Leibniz and Kant. His proposed explanation is not very convincing. Russell agreed with Nietzsche. |
24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Belief is already present in every sense impression going back to the very moment it begins: a kind of Yes-saying first intellectual activity! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
A reaction: He seems right that there is an intrinsic commitment to believing sense impressions, even in animals. Presumably more of a default setting than an intellectual choice. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |
24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have been granted perspectives in all directions, broader than any humans have ever been granted, everywhere we look there is no end in sight. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[013]) | |
A reaction: Clearly perspectivism is not the simple relativism of being trapped in our own private perspective. What strikes me as missing from Nietzsche's brief thoughts is the question of consensus, and even rational and objective consensus. |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1 |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us). | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1 | |
A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century. |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV | |
A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object. |
24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The entire cognitive mechanism is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification - not aimed at knowing, but taking control of things. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[061]) | |
A reaction: It is my view that we can explain our metaphysics in this way, though I am more realist than Nietzsche, because I think the world has created these capacities within us, so they fit the world. To control, you must know. |
24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A cognitive mechanism that wants to know itself!! We definitely should have moved beyond this absurd goal! (The stomach that consumes itself! -) | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[018]) | |
A reaction: We see his point, but Nietzsche learns a huge amount about himself by introspection. To know the Self is a cat chasing its tail. I don't have to leave England to study England. |
24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Individuals contain many more persons than they think. 'Person' is merely a point of emphasis, synopsis of characteristics and qualities | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[363]) | |
A reaction: He makes similar remarks abour character. For Locke 'person'' is a forensic and legal concept, and so must be enduring and unique. |
24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I have perfected fatalism, through eternal recurrence and preexistence, and through the elimination of the concept 'will'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[214]) | |
A reaction: 'Amor fati' - love of fate - was his oft repeated slogan. We can all understand 'go with the flow', but I'm not sure about anything more universal than that. |
24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Fate is an inspiring thought for those who understand that they are part of it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[442]) | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit like the Niagara Falls being inspiring if you are being swept over it. I find the possibility of fatalism neutral, rather than inspiring. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Images first, the words applied to images. Finally concepts, not possible until there are words a summary of many images. When see similar images for which there is one word - this weak emotion is the common element, the foundation of the concept. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
A reaction: Unusual to have an account of the origin of concepts in 1884. His theory entails that animals can't have concepts, but presumably they can combine images, and hence recognise things. I think he is wrong, but interestng. Mental files. |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
21338 | I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine] |
Full Idea: I am not concerned even to avoid the trivial extreme of sustaining a law by changing a meaning; for the cleavage between meaning and fact is part of what ...I am questioning. | |
From: Willard Quine (Letters [1962], 1962.06.01) | |
A reaction: [Letter to Adolf Grünbaum. Found on Twitter] A strikingly helpful expression of his position by Quine. We should take about the 'meaning/fact distinction' in order to understand clearly what is going on here. |
24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To judge people by intentions! That would be like classifying artists, not according to their paintings, but according to their visions! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[119]) | |
A reaction: What is wrong is to judge an action by any simple single principle. Our nuanced attitude to excuses shows the true complexity of it. 'I didn't mean to do that'. |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All value judgements involve a particular perspective: preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a belief, a culture. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[119]) | |
A reaction: This chimes in with my Aristotelian view of value, as arising out of the thing valued, rather than descending on it from outside. I think more than mere 'preservaation' is at stake. Fostering, cherishing. |
24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To appreciate and love anything, I must understand it as absolutely necessarily connected with everything that is - therefore I must affirm the goodness of all existence for its own sake. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[117]) | |
A reaction: For those of you out there imagining that Nietzsche was a nihilist…… It's a plausible idea. You could hardly love your dog, but hate the whole universe. A true misanthrope would struggle to love one exceptional person. |
24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Egoism! But no one has ever asked: what kind of ego! Instead, every person automatically assumes that the ego of every ego is equal. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[287]) | |
A reaction: The implication, I presume, is that you should be egoistic if you have a really excellent ego, but very altruistic if you are a loser. Or a slave. Or a monk. |
24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: From Socrates onwards arete [virtue] is misunderstood - first it had to reestablish itself over and over, and yet it did not want to do this on an individual basis! But rather tyrannically 'good for all!'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[208]) | |
A reaction: Why not both? The virtues of a good citizen can't be private, but we are all allowed to develop virtues that concern us alone. |
24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a multitude of characters hidden within each one of us: and attempts should be made to allow some of them to appear. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[021]) | |
A reaction: So character is not fate, contrary to Heraclitus (his hero). We are more inclined now to see varied characters as social roles (as in Irving Goffman). This idea challenges it, with our intrinsic nature containing variety. |
24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I conduct the great test: who will endure the thought of eternal recurrence? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[290]) | |
A reaction: He sometimes talks as if eternal recurrence were a cosmic fact, but we should definitely ignore that. This idea captures his idea best, I think - that we should try to live with the prospect of recurrence always in mind. A type of existentialism. |
24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whoever wants to have a single experience again must want all of them again. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 29[054]) | |
A reaction: Nehemas says this is the main factual commitment of eternal recurrence (and certainly not that global recurrence actually occurs). It might be expressed in terms of possible worlds. We yearn for recurrence, then dread it? |
24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If a community is what absolutely determines the nature of humans, then the drive that allows the community to be preserved will be most forcefully developed in them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 27[030]) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche was a loner, who despised 'the herd' and its dull 'good and evil', but humans are obviously social creatures, who need to raise families, so it seems perverse to despise the values this requires. Note the Marxist view of human nature. |
24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In truth there is always slavery - whether you want it or not; e.g. Prussian officials. Scholars. Monks. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[225]) | |
A reaction: Not very persuasive examples. Monks are free to join and to leave. Maybe a lot of marriages are close to slavery for one side (usually the woman). Strict slavery has almost ceased in western civilisation (I think!). Nietzsche saw 'the herd' as slaves. |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it. | |
From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) | |
A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance. |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead." | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11 |
24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Earlier we sought God's intentions in history: then an unconscious purposefulness, in a people or an idea. Only recently are we considering the history of animals, and the first insight is that no plan has so far existed. Coincidences have been dominant. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[127]) | |
A reaction: Not a Whig historian then! Presumably Hegel is his main target. In 2024 there is a definite feeling that western democracies are regressing. |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3 | |
A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle. |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2 | |
A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now. |
24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Cause and effect is not a truth but rather a hypothesis - and indeed the one which we use to anthropomorphise the world for ourselves, bringing it in closer proximity to our feelings ('willing' is projected into it). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[371]) | |
A reaction: That is (I think), we read the gap between thought and action onto natural external events, dividing them up. We treat the flow of events as if they were agent causation. Modern theories seem close to Nietzsche's unified view. |
24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Our derivation of the sense of time etc. still presupposes time as absolute. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[406]) | |
A reaction: 'Etc.'? I suppose this is meant to pre-empt whatever Bergson might have been planning to say. The idea that time actually is subjective strikes as very wrong. Whether physicists can reduce time to something else is above my pay scale. |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20 | |
A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul). |