10502
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We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
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Full Idea:
I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
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From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
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16784
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Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
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Full Idea:
The form is what renders a thing such and distinguishes it from others, whether it is a being really distinct from the matter, according to the Schools, or whether it is only the arrangement of the parts. By this form one must explain its properties.
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From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], III.18 p240), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 27.6
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A reaction:
If we ask 'what explains the properties of this thing' it is hard to avoid coming up with something that might be called the 'form'. Note that they allow either substantial or corpuscularian forms. It is hard to disagree with the idea.
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10501
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A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
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Full Idea:
If I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, ..I shall have an idea of only a single triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus on the three equal lines, I will be able to represent all equilateral triangles.
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From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
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A reaction:
[compressed] They observed that we grasp composites through their parts, and now that we can grasp generalisations through particulars, both achieved by the psychological act of abstraction, thus showing its epistemological power.
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22808
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Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
Liberalism has been defended as a theory of minimal government, or as a theory of basic individual rights, or as an egalitarian philosophy.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
Minimal government tends towards anarchist liberalism, but then what grounds the right to be free of government? Presumably any sensible theory of rights has to be egalitarian. What could ground unequal rights?
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22806
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Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
Because of the mediating structures of small communities, communitarians are less fearful [than liberals] of the emergence of an oppressive government as a result of the politics of the common good.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
A politics of the common good has an obvious implicit conservatism because the central consensus is always likely to disapprove of errant individuals, of all sorts. Only individual rights can block an oppressive government.
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22807
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If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
If communitarians are right that we are not free to choose, but rather that our values are determined by our community, the individualists say, then there is no reason to criticise the values of one's society.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
This is an obvious challenge, but if one's concept of community is a forum for free debate then it can be overcome. There is no avoiding the fact, though, that a good community always needs a high degree of consensus.
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