10502
|
We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
|
|
From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
|
16784
|
Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
The form is what renders a thing such and distinguishes it from others, whether it is a being really distinct from the matter, according to the Schools, or whether it is only the arrangement of the parts. By this form one must explain its properties.
|
|
From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], III.18 p240), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 27.6
|
|
A reaction:
If we ask 'what explains the properties of this thing' it is hard to avoid coming up with something that might be called the 'form'. Note that they allow either substantial or corpuscularian forms. It is hard to disagree with the idea.
|
10501
|
A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
|
|
Full Idea:
If I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, ..I shall have an idea of only a single triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus on the three equal lines, I will be able to represent all equilateral triangles.
|
|
From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] They observed that we grasp composites through their parts, and now that we can grasp generalisations through particulars, both achieved by the psychological act of abstraction, thus showing its epistemological power.
|
5038
|
Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz]
|
|
Full Idea:
Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'.
|
|
From:
Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80)
|
|
A reaction:
They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism.
|
23684
|
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
|
Full Idea:
In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
|
|
From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
|
|
A reaction:
Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
|
23690
|
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
|
Full Idea:
Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
|
|
From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
|
|
A reaction:
The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
|
22379
|
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
|
|
From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
|
|
A reaction:
I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
|