Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking)', 'Reply to Sixth Objections' and 'Introduction to 'New Pragmatists''

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10 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak]
     Full Idea: One of the pillars of the new pragmatism is the thought that the standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time, but that being historically situated in this way does not detract from their objectivity.
     From: Cheryl Misak (Introduction to 'New Pragmatists' [2007], p.2)
     A reaction: This looks to me like pragmatism finally coming to its senses. I would say that being any sort of 'social construct' (beloved of cultural relativists) in no way detracts from its capacity for objectivity and truth.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The fact that we often see two things joined together does not license the inference that they are one and the same.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Sixth Objections [1641], 444)
     A reaction: Correct. The problem comes when they are never ever apart, and you begin to suspect that they are conjoined in all possible worlds. Why might this be so? It can only be identity or a causal link.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: We can have knowledge of what is outside us only through the mediation of ideas in us.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], p.63), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Sense alone does not suffice to correct visual error: we also need a degree of reason to tell us that we should believe the judgement based on touch rather than vision. Since we don't have this power in infancy, it must be attributed to the intellect.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Sixth Objections [1641], 439)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: The form is what renders a thing such and distinguishes it from others, whether it is a being really distinct from the matter, according to the Schools, or whether it is only the arrangement of the parts. By this form one must explain its properties.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], III.18 p240), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 27.6
     A reaction: If we ask 'what explains the properties of this thing' it is hard to avoid coming up with something that might be called the 'form'. Note that they allow either substantial or corpuscularian forms. It is hard to disagree with the idea.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: The mind cannot perfectly understand things that are even slightly composite unless it considers them a part at a time. ...This is generally called knowing by abstraction. (..the human body, for example).
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: This adds the interesting thought that the mind is forced to abstract, rather than abstraction being a luxury extra feature. Knowledge through analysis is knowledge by abstraction. Also a nice linking of abstraction to epistemology.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: If I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, ..I shall have an idea of only a single triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus on the three equal lines, I will be able to represent all equilateral triangles.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] They observed that we grasp composites through their parts, and now that we can grasp generalisations through particulars, both achieved by the psychological act of abstraction, thus showing its epistemological power.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: Geometers by no means assume that there are lines without width or surfaces without depth. They only think it is possible to consider the length without paying attention to the width. We can measure the length of a path without its width.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: A nice example which makes the point indubitable. The modern 'rigorous' account of abstraction that starts with Frege seems to require more than one object, in order to derive abstractions like direction or number. Path widths are not comparatives.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so.
     From: René Descartes (Reply to Sixth Objections [1641], 432)