Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Artworld', 'Occasions of Identity' and 'Letters to Coste'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The Buridan's Ass case of perfect equilibrium is chimerical. ...The universe has no centre and its parts are infinitely varied; thus it will never happen that all will be perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side or the other.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707)
     A reaction: Can the great Leibniz have missed the point? Surely all that matters is that the ass cannot distinguish the two options - not that they actually are identical in every detail? If the ass is short-sighted, that should be easy to set up.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
     Full Idea: At t1 there is a whole CAR, and a PART of it, which is everything except the right front wheel. At t2 the wheel is removed, leaving just PART, so that CAR is now PART. But PART was a proper part of CAR, and CAR had the front wheel. Different properties!
     From: André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998], 1.II)
     A reaction: [compressed summary] The problem is generated by appealing to Leibniz's Law. My immediate reaction is that this is the sort of trouble you get into if you include such temporal truths about things as 'properties'.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
     Full Idea: A problem for Gallois is that he leaves us no way to talk about questions of genuine identity through time, and thus undercuts one motivation for his own position.
     From: comment on André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.8
     A reaction: Gallois seems to need a second theory of identity to support his Occasional Identity theory. Two things need an identity each, before we can say that the two identities coincide. (Time to read Gallois!)
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
     Full Idea: Gallois's core claim is that the identity relation holds with respect to times, ...and he must claim that there is no such thing as the relation of identity simpliciter.
     From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.5
     A reaction: Gallois is essentially responding to the statue and clay problem, but it seems a bit drastic to entirely change our concept of two things being identical, such as Hesperus and Phosphorus. 'Identity' seems to have several meanings; let's sort them out.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
     Full Idea: Gallois' Occasional Identity Thesis is that objects can be identical at one time without being identical at all times.
     From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.4
     A reaction: The analogy is presumably with two crossing roads being identical at one place but not at others. It is a major misunderstanding to infer from Special Relativity that time is just like space.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There will perhaps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to scent their game at a thousand leagues.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707)
     A reaction: Wonderful. This should immediately replace Lewis's much repeated example of a world containing a talking donkey. We should always honour the first person to suggest an idea. That is one of the motivations for this collection of ideas.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
A thing is only seen as art in an 'artworld', which has a theory and a history [Danto]
     Full Idea: To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry - an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.
     From: Arthur C. Danto (The Artworld [1964], II)
     A reaction: The editors of the volume call this a revolutionary remark, followed up by Danto and George Dickie with a social and institutional account of art. Danto's key example is Warhol's Brillo pads - art in a gallery, cleaning material in a shop.