Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Sign of Four', 'Internal and External Reasons' and 'Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

12712	Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I define substance as that which can act.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: This is in tune with the notion that to exist is to have causal powers. I find the view congenial, and the middle period of Leibniz's thought, before monads became too spiritual, chimes in with my view.

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

22200	If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
	Full Idea: When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
	From: Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6)
	A reaction: A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation

12737	Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

9284	Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: Someone has 'internal reasons' to act when the person has some motive which will be served or furthered by the action; if this turns out not to be so, the reason is false. Reasons are 'external' when there is no such condition.
	From: Bernard Williams (Internal and External Reasons [1980], p.101)
	A reaction: [compressed] An external example given is a family tradition of joining the army, if the person doesn't want to. Williams says (p.111) external reason statements are actually false, and a misapplication of the concept of a 'reason to act'. See Idea 8815.