3 ideas
7529 | All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Leibniz [1900], p.8), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 483. The obvious response to Russell is that it must actually begin with a decision about which propositions are worth analysing - and that ain't easy. I like analysis, but philosophy is also a vision of truth. |
18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
Full Idea: The signs are that truth-making is not analysable in terms of anything more primitive, but we need to be able to say more than just that. So we ought to consider it as specified by principles of truth-making. | |
From: Barry Smith (Truth-maker Realism: response to Gregory [2000], p.20), quoted by Fraser MacBride - Truthmakers 1.5 | |
A reaction: This is the axiomatic approach to such problems - treat the target concept as an undefinable, unanalysable primitive, and then give rules for its connections. Maybe all metaphysics should work like that, with a small bunch of primitives. |
22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |
Full Idea: When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. | |
From: Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible. |