7548
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Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Classes or series of particulars, collected together on account of some property which makes it convenient to be able to speak of them as wholes, are what I call logical constructions or symbolic fictions.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.125)
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A reaction:
When does a construction become 'logical' instead of arbitrary? What is it about a property that makes it 'convenient'? At this point Russell seems to have built his ontology on classes, and the edifice was crumbling, thanks to Wittgenstein.
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17312
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It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Being the successor of the successor of 0 is more explanatory than being predecessor of 3 of the nature of 2, since it mirrors more closely the method by which 2 is constructed from a basic entity, 0, and a relation (successor) taken as primitive.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
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A reaction:
This assumes numbers are 'constructed', which they are in the axiomatised system of Peano Arithmetic, but presumably the numbers were given in ordinary experience before 'construction' occurred to anyone. Nevertheless, I really like this.
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17314
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The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The relata of the grounding relation are typically taken to be facts or propositions, while the relata of ontological dependence ...are objects and their characteristics, activities, constituents and so on.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.5 n25)
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A reaction:
Interesting. Good riddance to propositions here, but this seems a bit unfair to facts, since I take facts to be in the world. Audi's concept of 'worldly facts' is what we need here.
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17309
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For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
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A reaction:
This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions!
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7549
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If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
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Full Idea:
My meaning may be made plainer by saying that if my body could remain in exactly the same state in which it is, though my mind had ceased to exist, precisely that object which I now see when I see a flash would exist, though I should not see it.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.126)
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A reaction:
Zombies, 70 years before Robert Kirk! Sense-data are physical. It is interesting to see a philosopher as committed to empiricism, anti-spiritualism and the priority of science as this, still presenting an essentially dualist picture of perception.
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22200
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If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
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Full Idea:
When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
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From:
Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6)
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A reaction:
A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible.
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17317
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A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
It is plausible to think that an explanation, when successful, captures or represents (by argument, or a why? question) an underlying real-world relation of dependence which obtains among the phenomena cited.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6)
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A reaction:
She cites causal dependence as an example. I'm incline to think that 'grounding' is a better word for the target of good explanations than is 'dependence' (which can, surely, be mutual, where ground has the directionality needed for explanation).
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7546
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A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The real man, I believe, however the police may swear to his identity, is really a series of momentary men, each different one from the other, and bound together, not by a numerical identity, but by continuity and certain instrinsic causal laws.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.124)
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A reaction:
This seems to be in the tradition of Locke and Parfit, and also follows the temporal-slices idea of physical objects. Personally I take a more physical view of things, and think the police are probably more reliable than Bertrand Russell.
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7550
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We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
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Full Idea:
It seems not improbable that if we had sufficient knowledge we could infer the state of a man's mind from the state of his brain, or the state of his brain from the state of his mind.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.131)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as being a very good summary of the claim that mind is reducible to brain, which is the essence of physicalism. Had he been born a little later, Russell would have taken a harder line with physicalism.
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7552
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Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The world of particulars is a six-dimensional space, where six co-ordinates will be required to assign the position of any particular, three to assign its position in its own space, and three to assign the position of its space among the other spaces.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.134)
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A reaction:
Not a proposal that has caught on. One might connect the idea with the notion of 'frames of reference' in Einstein's Special Theory. Inside a frame of reference, three co-ordinates are needed; but where is the frame of reference?
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