19076
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Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set').
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
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A reaction:
Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large?
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19077
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Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible.
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
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A reaction:
I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small.
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19078
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Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being.
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
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A reaction:
One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon.
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14753
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The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
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Full Idea:
Burke claims that the 'dominant' sortal is the one whose satisfaction entails possession of the widest range of properties. For example, the statue (unlike the lump of clay) also possesses aesthetic properties, and hence is dominant.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
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A reaction:
[there are three papers by Burke on this; see all the quotations from Burke] Presumably one sortal could entail a single very important property, and the other sortal entail a huge range of trivial properties. What does being a 'thing' entail?
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16072
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'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
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Full Idea:
Burke distinguishes three different readings of 'the rock'. It can be a singular description denoting an object, or a plural description denoting all the little pieces of rock, or a mass description the relevant rocky stuff.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 5
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A reaction:
Idea 16068 is an objection to the second reading. Only the first reading seems plausible, so we must just get over all the difficulties philosophers have unearthed about knowing exactly what an 'object' is. I offer you essentialism. Rocks have unity.
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16234
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Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
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Full Idea:
Michael Burke argues that a sweater is identical with the thread that consitutes it, that both were created at the moment when they began to coincide, and that the original thread was destroyed in the process.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.3
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A reaction:
[Burke's ideas are spread over three articles] It is the thread which is destroyed, because the sweater is the 'dominant sortal' (which strikes me as a particularlyd desperate concept).
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14750
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Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
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Full Idea:
Michael Burke has given an account that avoids distinguishing coinciding entities. ...The statue/lump satisfies both 'lump' and 'statue', but only the latter determines that object's persistence conditions, and so is that object's 'dominant sortal'.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
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A reaction:
Presumably a lump on its own can have its own persistance conditions (as a 'lump'), but those would presumably be lost if you shaped it into a statue. Burke concedes that. Can of worms. Using a book as a doorstop...
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22200
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If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
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Full Idea:
When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
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From:
Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6)
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A reaction:
A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible.
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19074
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Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world.
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro)
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A reaction:
It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions.
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19082
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Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
Coherence theorists can argue that the truth conditions of a proposition are those under which speakers tend to assert it, ...and that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions they can recognise as justifying it.
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.2)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This sounds rather verificationist, and hence wrong, since if you then asserted anything for which you didn't know the justification, that would remove its truth, and thus make it meaningless.
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