8942
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Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher]
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Full Idea:
In response to Aristotle's sea-battle problem, Lukasiewicz proposed a three-valued logic that has come to be known as L3. In addition to the values true and false (T and F), there is a third truth-value, I, meaning 'indeterminate' or 'possible'.
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From:
report of Jan Lukasiewicz (Elements of Mathematical Logic [1928], 7.I) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic
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A reaction:
[He originated the idea in 1917] In what sense is the third value a 'truth' value? Is 'I don't care' a truth-value? Or 'none of the above'? His idea means that formalization doesn't collapse when things get obscure. You park a few propositions under I.
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22200
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If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
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Full Idea:
When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
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From:
Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6)
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A reaction:
A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible.
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17367
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Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
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Full Idea:
The four main concepts of a species are 'phenetic' (similarity of traits), 'biological species' (interbreeding and isolated), 'ecological niche' (occupying an adaptive zone), or 'phylogenetic-cladistic' (start and finish at splits in lineage)
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From:
report of Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 4) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
[my summary of Devitt's list] Devitt attacks the whole lot, in favour of essentialism - the species being fixed by its underlying explanatory mechanisms.
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