Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Sign of Four', 'Reference and Reflexivity' and 'Philosophy without Intuitions'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments

20183	So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen]
	Full Idea: What are called 'thought experiments' in philosophy are in effect just philosophers drawing our attention to interesting features of the world.
	From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 11.3)
	A reaction: Thought experiments are said to rely (perhaps excessively) on 'intuition', but Cappelen says intuition is irrelevant, because we are merely making judgements. It think they ARE experiments, if one feature varies while the rest is held steady.

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition

20182	The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen]
	Full Idea: Careful study of uses of 'intuitive' will reveal that it often plays no significant argumentative role, and that removal will improve overall argumentative transparency.
	From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 04.1)
	A reaction: This is a key part of Cappelen's argument that 'intuition' is a rather empty concept, and that philosophers do not really rely on it. In effect, he is consigning it to mere rhetoric. He gives lots of examples in support.

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

22200	If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
	Full Idea: When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
	From: Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6)
	A reaction: A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought

16391	Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
	Full Idea: Perry's newer token-reflexive framework says indexical thoughts have token-reflexive content, that is, thoughts that are about themselves and ascribe properties to themselves. …They relate not to the subject, but to the occurrence of a thought.
	From: report of John Perry (Reference and Reflexivity [2001]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 18.1
	A reaction: [There seem to be four indexical theories: this one, Recanati's, the earlier Kaplan-Perry one, and Lewis's] Is Perry thinking of second-level thoughts? 'I'm bored' has the content 'boredom' plus 'felt in here'? How does 'I'm bored' refer to 'I'm bored'?