Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Sign of Four', 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson' and 'The Material Mind'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Many decent candidates could the referent of this 'cup', differing over whether outlying particles are parts. No further sortal I could invoke will be selective enough to rule out all but one referent for it.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1 n8)
     A reaction: I never had much faith in sortals for establishing individual identity, so this point comes as no surprise. The implication is strongly realist - that the cup has an identity which is permanently beyond our capacity to specify it.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: There can be determinately true identity claims despite indeterminate reference of the terms flanking the identity sign; these will be identity claims true under all admissible interpretations of the flanking terms.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson [2009], 3.1)
     A reaction: In informal contexts there might be problems with the notion of what is 'admissible'. Is 'my least favourite physical object' admissible?
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
22200 If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
     Full Idea: When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
     From: Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
6386 In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
     Full Idea: There is no important sense in which psychology can be reduced to the physical sciences.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Material Mind [1973], p.259)
     A reaction: In no 'important' way can the beauty of the Lake District be reduced to geology - but it is geology. 'Important' to whom? To a metaphysician, I would say psychology does reduce to physics, and that is important, but it is not important to a psychologist.