12 ideas
6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The rejection of idealism by Moore and Russell was marked in 1898 by the publication of Moore's article 'The Nature of Judgement'. | |
From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This now looks like a huge landmark in the history of British philosophy. |
7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
Full Idea: For Moore and Russell analysis is not - as is commonly understood now - a linguistic activity, but an ontological one. To analyse a proposition is not to investigate language, but to carve up the world so that it begins to make some sort of sense. | |
From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
A reaction: A thought dear to my heart. The twentieth century got horribly side-tracked into thinking that ontology was an entirely linguistic problem. I suggest that physicists analyse physical reality, and philosophers analyse abstract reality. |
18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Among the candidates [for truthbearers] are beliefs, propositions, judgments, assertions, statements, theories, remarks, ideas, acts of thought, utterances, sentence tokens, sentence types, sentences (unspecified), and speech acts. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I vote for propositions, but only in the sense of the thoughts underlying language, not the Russellian things which are supposed to exist independently from thinkers. |
19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do. ...Thus it matters not whether we define truth as satisfaction by some sequence or as satisfaction by all sequences. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |
A reaction: So if the striker scores a goal, the team has scored a goal. |
19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: A 'sequence' of objects is like a set of objects, except that, unlike a set, the order of the objects is important when dealing with sequences. ...An infinite sequence satisfies 'x2 is purple' if and only if the second member of the sequence is purple. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This explains why Tarski needed set theory in his metalanguage. |
19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Because the definition of satisfaction must have a separate clause for each predicate, Tarski's method only works for languages with a finite number of predicates, ...but natural languages have an infinite number of predicates. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.5) | |
A reaction: He suggest predicates containing natural numbers, as examples of infinite predicates. Davidson tried to extend the theory to natural languages, by (I think) applying it to adverbs, which could generate the infinite predicates. Maths has finite predicates. |
19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: In a quantified language it is possible to build new sentences by combining two expressions neither of which is itself a sentence. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |
A reaction: In propositional logic the components are other sentences, so the truth value can be given by their separate truth-values, through truth tables. Kirkham is explaining the task which Tarski faced. Truth-values are not just compositional. |
19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: An object satisfies an open sentence if and only if it possesses the property expressed by the predicate of the open sentence. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This applies to atomic sentence, of the form Fx or Fa (that is, some variable is F, or some object is F). So strictly, only the world can decide whether some open sentence is satisfied. And it all depends on things called 'properties'. |
19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
Full Idea: It has been said that there are no disjunctive facts, conditional facts, or negative facts. ...but it is not at all clear why there cannot be facts of this sort. | |
From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.6) | |
A reaction: I love these sorts of facts, and offer them as a naturalistic basis for logic. You probably need the world to have modal features, but I have those in the form of powers and dispositions. |
22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |
Full Idea: When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. | |
From: Arthur Conan Doyle (The Sign of Four [1890], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A beautiful statement, by Sherlock Holmes, of Eliminative Induction. It is obviously not true, of course. Many options may still face you after you have eliminated what is actually impossible. |
22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Moore avoided the problematic correspondence between propositions and reality by identifying the former with the latter; the world consists of true propositions, and there is no difference between a true proposition and the fact that makes it true. | |
From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 28 'Refut' | |
A reaction: This is "the most platonic system of modern times", he wrote (letter 14.8.1898). He then added platonist ethics. This is a pernicious and absurd doctrine. The obvious problem is that false propositions can be indistinguishable, but differ in ontology. |
7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
Full Idea: Moore rejected the Hegelian view, that a proposition is a unity that defies analysis; instead, it is a complex that positively cries out to be broken up into its constituent parts, which parts Moore called 'concepts'. | |
From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Russell was much influenced by this idea, though it may be found in Frege. Anglophone philosophers tend to side instantly with Moore, but the Hegel view must be pondered. An idea comes to us in a unified flash, before it is articulated. |