17 ideas
17896 | We need to know the meaning of 'and', prior to its role in reasoning [Prior,AN, by Belnap] |
Full Idea: For Prior, so the moral goes, we must first have a notion of what 'and' means, independently of the role it plays as premise and as conclusion. | |
From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.132 | |
A reaction: The meaning would be given by the truth tables (the truth-conditions), whereas the role would be given by the natural deduction introduction and elimination rules. This seems to be the basic debate about logical connectives. |
17898 | Prior's 'tonk' is inconsistent, since it allows the non-conservative inference A |- B [Belnap on Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: Prior's definition of 'tonk' is inconsistent. It gives us an extension of our original characterisation of deducibility which is not conservative, since in the extension (but not the original) we have, for arbitrary A and B, A |- B. | |
From: comment on Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.135 | |
A reaction: Belnap's idea is that connectives don't just rest on their rules, but also on the going concern of normal deduction. |
11021 | Prior rejected accounts of logical connectives by inference pattern, with 'tonk' his absurd example [Prior,AN, by Read] |
Full Idea: Prior dislike the holism inherent in the claim that the meaning of a logical connective was determined by the inference patterns into which it validly fitted. ...His notorious example of 'tonk' (A → A-tonk-B → B) was a reductio of the view. | |
From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8 | |
A reaction: [The view being attacked was attributed to Gentzen] |
13836 | Maybe introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference leads to absurdity [Prior,AN, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Prior intended 'tonk' (a connective which leads to absurdity) as a criticism of the very idea of introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference. | |
From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960], §09) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? |
17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: We should not use 'in virtue of' where it might express a reflexive relation, such as identity. Since grounding is a relation of determination, and closely linked to the concept of explanation, it is irreflexive and asymmetric. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: E.g. he says someone isn't a bachelor in virtue of being an unmarried man, since a bachelor just is an unmarried man. I can't disagree. 'Determination' looks like the magic word, even if we don't know how it cashes out. |
17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: On my view, grounding relations depend on the natures of the properties involved in them. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I'm cautious about this if we don't find out more exactly what properties are (and they had better not just be predicates). Maybe properties are the only apparatus we have here, though I prefer 'powers' for the fundamentals. |
17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The fact that a given thing is spherical non-causally determines the fact that it has the power to roll. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Quine won't accept this, because you have added something called a 'power' to the ball (intrinsically, it seems), over and above its observable sphericity. Does being a ball 'determine' that it can't be in two places at once? Order of explanation? |
17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The logical principles about grounding include irreflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity, non-monotonicity, and so forth. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.8) | |
A reaction: [It can't ground itself, there is no mutual grounding, grounds of grounds ground, and grounding judgements are not fixed] |
17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: I think the most promising skeptical strategy is to insist on either identity or elimination wherever grounding is alleged to hold. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.9) | |
A reaction: This comes after an assessment of the critiques of grounding by Oliver, Hofweber and Daly. So we don't say chemistry grounds biology, we either say biology is chemistry, or that there is no biology. Everything is just simples. Not for me. |
17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: On my view, grounding is a singular relation between facts. ...Facts, on this view, are obtaining states of affairs. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: He rest this claim on his 'worldly' view of facts, Idea 17293. I seem to be agreeing with him. Note that it is not between types of fact, even if there are such general truths, such as in chemistry. |
17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: Taking facts to be the relata of grounding has the interesting consequence that it does not relate ordinary particulars, objects, considered apart from their properties. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.4) | |
A reaction: It will depend on what you mean by properties, and it seems to me that something like 'powers' must be invoked, to get the active character that seems to be involved in grounding. |
17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The reason we must countenance grounding is that it is indispensible to certain important explanations. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I like this a lot. The first given of all philosophy is the drive to exlain. However, we mustn't go inventing features of the world, simply to give us the possibility of explaining it. The objective fact seems to be the without-which-not relation. |
17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: I deny that when p grounds q, q thereby reduces to p, and I deny that if q reduces to p, then p grounds q. ...On my view, reduction is nothing other than identity, so p is the same fact as q. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.5) | |
A reaction: Very good. I can't disagree with any of it, and it is crystal clear. Philosophical heaven. |
17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: The 'worldly' view of facts says they are obtaining states of affairs, individuated by their constituents and their combination. On the 'conceptual' view, facts will differ if they pick out an object or property via different concepts. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Might it be that conceptual differences between facts are supervenient on worldly differences (with the worldly facts in charge)? |
13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Plantinga assumes that being identical with that snowball names a property which is that snowball's haecceity. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (De Essentia [1979]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §52 | |
A reaction: Only a philosopher would suggest such a bizarre way of establishing the unique individuality of a given snowball. You could hardly keep track of the snowball with just that criterion. How do you decide whether something has Plantinga's property? |
17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: If there is identity between water and H2O, we have neither the asymmetry nor the irreflexivity that explanations require. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Once you realise it is H2O, you understand its deeper features, which will open up new explanations. He's right, though. |
17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
Full Idea: There are a number of explanations where it seems clear that causation is not involved at all: normative grounded in non-normative, disposition grounded in categorical, aesthetic grounded in non-aesthetic, semantic in social and psychological. | |
From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Apart from dispositions, perhaps, these all seem to be experienced phenomena grounded in the physical world. 'Determination' is the preferred term for non-causal grounding. |