Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'The Conquest of Happiness' and 'New system of communication of substances'

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12 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

15201	That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
	Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
	From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
	A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

13168	My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: To find real entities I had recourse to a unified formal atom. Hence I rehabilitated the substantial forms in a way to render them intelligible. I found that their nature consists in force, from which follows something analogous to sensation and appetite.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: [several lines are here compressed] This passage sums up the key to Leibniz's essentialism, which I take to be a connection between Aristotelian form and the physicists' notion of force. This gives us a modern version of Aristotelianism for science.

13169	I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples

13170	The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
	A reaction: I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

13171	Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.144)
	A reaction: Bravo. Most metaphysical musings regarding 'substance' seem entirely wrapped up in the problem of pure identity, and forget about the role of objects in activity and change.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness

20180	A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell]
	Full Idea: A happy life must to a great extent be a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
	A reaction: Most people's image of happiness is absorption in an interesting task, or relaxing in good company. The idea that happiness is wild excitement exists, but is a minority view.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom

20177	Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell]
	Full Idea: It is one of the essentials of boredom that one's faculties must not be fully occupied.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
	A reaction: He gives running for your life as an example of non-boredom. I suspect that this is only the sort of boredom that troubled Russell, and not the sort of profound boredom that led the actor George Sanders to suicide (according to his last note).

20179	Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell]
	Full Idea: A certain power of enduring boredom is essential to a happy life, and is one of the things that ought to be taught to the young.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
	A reaction: As an example he suggests that Wordsworth would never have written 'The Prelude' is he had never been bored when young. Which suggests that Russell doesn't really get boredom, seeing it merely as a stimulus to work.

20176	Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell]
	Full Idea: Boredom has been, I believe, one of the great motive powers throughout the historical epoch, and is so at the present day more than ever.
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
	A reaction: Most of his essay tells us how to avoid boredom, rather than how it motivates.

20178	Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell]
	Full Idea: We are less bored than our ancestors were, but we are more afraid of boredom
	From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
	A reaction: I get the impression that the invention of the powerful mobile phone has largely banished boredom from human life, except when you are obliged to switch it off. The fear of boredom may hence be even greater now.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

13167	We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series

22899	'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]
	Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'.
	From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive'
	A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein?