Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types' and 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism'

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6 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism

21558	'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell]
	Full Idea: Norms (containing one variable) which do not define classes I propose to call 'non-predicative'; those which do define classes I shall call 'predicative'.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141)

21559	We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell]
	Full Idea: We need rules for deciding what norms are predicative and what are not, unless we adopt the view (which has much to recommend it) that no norms are predicative. ...[146] A predative propositional function is one which determines a class.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141)
	A reaction: He is referring to his 'no class' theory, which he favoured at that time.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

15201	That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
	Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
	From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
	A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8416	Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
	Full Idea: Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws.
	From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2)
	A reaction: I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation

8418	Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
	Full Idea: Quantum physics seems to lend strong support to the idea that the basic laws of nature may well be probabilistic.
	From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 3.2.1)
	A reaction: Groan. Quantum physics should be outlawed from all philosophical discussions. The scientists don't understand it themselves. I'm certainly not going to build my worldview on it. I don't accept that these probabilities could count as 'laws'.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series

22899	'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]
	Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'.
	From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive'
	A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein?