9 ideas
15201 | That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b | |
A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful. |
5998 | From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ] |
Full Idea: Diodorus' Master Argument inferred that since what is past (i.e. true in the past) is necessary, and the impossible cannot follow from the possible, that therefore if something neither is nor ever will be the case, then it is impossible. | |
From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Michael J. White - Diodorus Cronus | |
A reaction: The argument is, apparently, no longer fully clear, but it seems to imply determinism, or at least a rejection of the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. (Epictetus 2.19) |
20832 | The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus] |
Full Idea: The Master Argument: these conflict 1) what is past and true is necessary, 2) the impossible does not follow from the possible, 3) something possible neither is nor will be true. Hence only that which is or will be true is possible. | |
From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Epictetus - The Discourses 2.19.1 | |
A reaction: [Epictetus goes on to discuss views about which of the three should be given up] It is possible there will be a sea fight tomorrow; tomorrow comes, and no sea fight; so there was necessarily no sea fight; so the impossible followed from the possible. |
14304 | Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus] |
Full Idea: The connected (proposition) is true when it begins with true and neither could nor can end with false. | |
From: Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 03.4 | |
A reaction: [Mumford got the quote from Bochenski] This differs from the truth-functional account because it says nothing about when the antecedent is false, which fits in also with the 'supposition' view, where A is presumed. This idea adds necessity. |
6024 | Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius] |
Full Idea: No one says or thinks anything ambiguous, and nothing should be held to be being said beyond what the speaker thinks he is saying. | |
From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 11.12.2 | |
A reaction: A key argument in favour of propositions, implied in this remark, is that propositions are never ambiguous, though the sentences expressing them may be |
299 | What is fine is always difficult [Plato] |
Full Idea: The proverb says 'Anything fine is difficult'. | |
From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 304e) | |
A reaction: attributed (as usual) to Solon |
297 | What is fine is the parent of goodness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Fineness is the father of goodness. | |
From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 297b) |
298 | While sex is very pleasant, it should be in secret, as it looks contemptible [Plato] |
Full Idea: As for sex, everyone agrees that, while it is extremely pleasant, it should be indulged in (if at all) in secret, because it is a highly contemptible sight. | |
From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 299a) |
22899 | 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive' | |
A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein? |