Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility' and 'Mathematics, Science and Language'

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5 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Brouwer made the rather extraordinary claim that mathematics is a mental activity which uses no language.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1
     A reaction: Since I take language to have far less of a role in thought than is commonly believed, I don't think this idea is absurd. I would say that we don't use language much when we are talking!
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Brouwer regards as somehow 'wicked' the idea that mathematics can be applied to a non-mental subject matter, the physical world, and that it might develop in response to the needs which that application reveals.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1
     A reaction: The idea is that mathematics only concerns creations of the human mind. It presumably has no more application than, say, noughts-and-crosses.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
     A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity.
     From: report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1
     A reaction: [her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive'
     A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein?