8242
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Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy does not consist in knowing, and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.3)
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A reaction:
Speak for yourself. I wonder what the criteria are for 'Interesting' or 'Important'. They can't seriously count 'remarkable' as a criterion of philosophical success, can they? There can be remarkable stupidity.
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8223
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The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
Those who criticise without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1)
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A reaction:
This seems to be the continental view of analytical philosophy, that it is pathetically conservative. I would offer MacIntyre as a response, who gives a beautiful analysis of why the super-modern view is dead. The French are hopelessly romantic.
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8224
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'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
'Eris' is the Greek divinity of discord, conflict, and strife, the complementary opposite of Philia, the divinity of union and friendship.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.2 n)
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A reaction:
Are these actual gods? This interestingly implies that the wonders of dialectic and Socrates' elenchus are simply aspects of friendship, which was elevated by Epicurus to the highest good. The Greeks just wanted wonderful friends and fine speeches.
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17896
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We need to know the meaning of 'and', prior to its role in reasoning [Prior,AN, by Belnap]
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Full Idea:
For Prior, so the moral goes, we must first have a notion of what 'and' means, independently of the role it plays as premise and as conclusion.
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From:
report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.132
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A reaction:
The meaning would be given by the truth tables (the truth-conditions), whereas the role would be given by the natural deduction introduction and elimination rules. This seems to be the basic debate about logical connectives.
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17898
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Prior's 'tonk' is inconsistent, since it allows the non-conservative inference A |- B [Belnap on Prior,AN]
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Full Idea:
Prior's definition of 'tonk' is inconsistent. It gives us an extension of our original characterisation of deducibility which is not conservative, since in the extension (but not the original) we have, for arbitrary A and B, A |- B.
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From:
comment on Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.135
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A reaction:
Belnap's idea is that connectives don't just rest on their rules, but also on the going concern of normal deduction.
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10180
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Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects [Poincaré]
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Full Idea:
Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects; it is a matter of indifference if the objects are replaced by others, provided the relations do not change. They are interested in form alone, not matter.
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From:
Henri Poincaré (Science and Hypothesis [1902], p.20), quoted by E Reck / M Price - Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths §6
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A reaction:
This connects modern structuralism with Aritotle's interest in the 'form' of things. Contrary to the views of the likes of Frege, it is hard to see that the number '7' has any properties at all, apart from its relations. A daffodil would do just as well.
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8222
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Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
If one concept is 'better' than an earlier one, it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys (survole) us.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1)
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A reaction:
I don't get much of that, but it is certainly in tune with the Kuhn/Feyerabend idea that what science can generate is fresh visions, rather than precisely expanded truths. Personally I consider it dangerous nonsense, but I thought I ought to pass it on.
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8248
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Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
According to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world - with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations.
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Conclusion)
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A reaction:
The development of externalist views of mind, arising from the Twin Earth idea, seems to provide a link to continental philosophy, where similar ideas are found in Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. So study science, psychology, or sociology?
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8245
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The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
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Full Idea:
Logic is reductionist not accidentally, but essentially and necessarily: following the route marked out by Frege and Russell, it wants to turn the concept into a function (...when actually a concept is a form, or a force).
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From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6)
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A reaction:
[Last part on p.144] I'm not sure that I understand 'form or force', but the idea that concepts are mere functions is like describing something as 'transport', without saying whether it is bus/bike/train.. Is a concept a vision, or a tool?
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