Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Probability and Logic of Rational Belief' and 'Possible Worlds'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
6368 If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz]
     Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says you should rationally conclude that your ticket will not win the lottery, and then apply the same reasoning to all the other tickets, and conclude that no ticket will win the lottery.
     From: report of Henry E. Kyburg Jr (Probability and Logic of Rational Belief [1961]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §7.2.8
     A reaction: (Very compressed by me). I doubt whether this is a very deep paradox; the conclusion that I will not win is a rational assessment of likelihood, but it is not the result of strict logic.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15201 That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
     A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15793 We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Stalnaker suggests talking 'ways things might have been' as sui generis elements of our ontology - actual abstract entities in their own right, not to be reduced to more familiar items.
     From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (Possible Worlds [1976]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 09
     A reaction: This seems to rest on an ontology of 'states of affairs', favoured by Armstrong, and implied in the Tractatus. How big is a state of affairs? How manys states of affairs can be co-present?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
22899 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive'
     A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein?