14 ideas
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: The important thing about proper names is that it would be ridiculous to think that having linguistic competence can be equated in their case with knowledge of a necessary and sufficient condition. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II B) |
| 15201 | That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN] |
| Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact. | |
| From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b | |
| A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful. |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| Full Idea: The only place for essentialism to come from in Putnam's semantic account is out of the 'same kind' relation. But if the same kind relation can be cashed out in terms that do not involve sharing properties (apart from 'being water') there is a gap. | |
| From: comment on Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.4 | |
| A reaction: [This is the criticism of Salmon and Mellor] See Mackie's discussion for details. I would always have thought that relations result from essences, so could never be used to define them. |
| 6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
| Full Idea: The taste of chocolate is presumably a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.1.4) | |
| A reaction: An interesting distinction when it comes to what they are like, and whether two very different brains can realise them. Sweetness might be the same for most creatures, but the tast of chocolate subtly different. |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Scientists are not trying to maximise some formal property of 'simplicity'; they are trying to maximise truth. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], III B) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws of nature, as the simplest axioms of experience. I'm with Putnam (as he was at this date). |
| 6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
| Full Idea: We should return to the old idea that the mind and the self are one and combine it with the new idea that the mind-self is a biological phenomenon. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §8.3) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't make allowance for the fact that some parts of my mind seem like irritating visitors, and other parts seem like the home-owner. Personally I take the self to be the brain's central controller, or the centre (forum) of brain integration. |
| 6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
| Full Idea: Teleological functions help explain why a trait has come to exist; causal-role functions tell what a trait does or is apt to do. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
| A reaction: The teleological view has the merit of nesting nicely with the theory of evolution, and with Aristotelian virtue ethics (which I like). Causal-role functionalism focuses better on what is actually happening inside the head. |
| 6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
| Full Idea: Identity theories locate consciousness at a certain order of abstraction, typically among neurophysiological states, events, processes, or properties. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.7.6) | |
| A reaction: I increasingly think that processes are the answer. My new analogy for the mind is a waterfall: its physical ontology is simple, it only exists because there is a sustained process, and it is far too complex to predict individual droplet outcomes. |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: In previous papers I suggested that the reference is fixed by a test known to experts; it now seems to me that this is just a special case of my use being causally connected to an introducing event. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C) | |
| A reaction: I think he was probably right the first time, and has now wandered off course. |
| 6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
| Full Idea: A preserved heart in a jar of formaldehyde has the teleological function of circulating blood. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
| A reaction: A nice illustration. |
| 6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |
| Full Idea: Teleological notions of function specify not just what a thing happens to do, but what it is supposed to do. | |
| From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.5.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the basis of a distinct theory of the mind. It seems to be akin to the 'dispositions' of behaviourism, so that the mind becomes once more a theoretical and abstract entity, rather than a thing of occurrent events and processes. |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Natural kinds can be associated with 'strong' stereotypes (giving a strong picture of a typical member, like a tiger), or with 'weak' stereotypes (with no idea of a sufficient condition, such as molybdenum or elm). | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C) |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
| Full Idea: Putnam implies dispensing with the designation of natural kinds by singular terms in favour of the postulation of necessary but a posteriori connections between predicates. ...We might call this 'predicate essentialism', but not 'de re essentialism'. | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.1 | |
| A reaction: It is characteristic of modern discussion that the logical form of natural kind statements is held to be crucial, rather than an account of nature in any old ways that do the job. So do I prefer singular terms, or predicate-connections. Hm. |
| 22899 | 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN] |
| Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'. | |
| From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive' | |
| A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein? |