Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Killing and Letting Die' and 'Morality, Action, and Outcome'

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11 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15201 That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
     A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.
22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.
22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
     Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
     A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
4692 It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
     Full Idea: Many philosophers (e.g. Rachels) have argued that there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and allowing to die (or the related 'acts and omissions'),..as in not sending food, or sending poisoned food. I disagree.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.78)
     A reaction: It appears that some omissions are worse than acts. It is more honest to just shoot an injured person, than to walk away and leave them to die. A range of cases.
4694 Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]
     Full Idea: If a runaway tram is heading towards a track on which five people are standing, and there is someone who can switch the points, diverting it onto a track where there is one person,...this is diverting a fatal sequence, not starting a new one.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.85)
     A reaction: Suppose the one person was of immense community value, or someone you personally hated? Clearly she is interested in the agent's virtue, rather than the actual consequences.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
22470 A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
     Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
     A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
22468 Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
     Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
22469 Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
     Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
4693 The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot]
     Full Idea: There are rights to non-interference (and their corresponding "negative duties"), and the rights to goods and services (with corresponding "positive duties"). Interference usually needs more justification than withholding goods.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.82)
     A reaction: This invites the question of which is the stronger, and whether paternalism can overrule non-interference, or an expectation of self-sufficiency overrule the positive rights.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
22899 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive'
     A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein?