6 ideas
15201 | That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b | |
A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful. |
23900 | Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil] |
Full Idea: Chance is not the contrary of necessity; it is not incompatible with necessity. On the contrary, it never appears except at the same time as necessity. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Scientific Image [1941], p.175) | |
A reaction: She illustrates it with the six terminating results of a die throw, and the innumerabe ways the throw can occur. This thought strikes me as relevant to discussions of free will. …But I'm not sure I fully understand it. |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove. |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II) | |
A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs? |
23899 | The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil] |
Full Idea: A just blend of unity and that which opposes it is the condition of the beautiful, and it is the secret of art. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Scientific Image [1941], p.169) | |
A reaction: Rather sweeping, but the observation strikes me as fairly accurate. It seems to work for most novels, paintings and music, though more recent art may provide counterexamples. |
22899 | 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive' | |
A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein? |