6 ideas
15201 | That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b | |
A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful. |
22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.72), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp' | |
A reaction: For most of us, you can refer to something because you take it to be an object. For these Fregean influenced guys (e.g. Hale) something is an object because you can refer to it. Why don't they use 'object*' for their things? |
14280 | The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first [Bayes] |
Full Idea: The probability that two events will both happen is the probability of the first [multiplied by] the probability of the second on the supposition that the first happens. | |
From: Thomas Bayes (Essay on a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances [1763]), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 3.1 |
18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17 | |
A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope. |
18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much. |
22899 | 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive' | |
A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein? |