13 ideas
7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm. | |
From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1 | |
A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere. |
15201 | That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b | |
A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful. |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194) | |
A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north? |
6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198) | |
A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist. |
6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203) | |
A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist? |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either. |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics. |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though. |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams. |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity. |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification. |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law. |
22899 | 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: One says 'thank goodness that is over', ..and it says something which it is impossible which any use of any tenseless copula with a date should convey. It certainly doesn't mean the same as 'thank goodness that occured on Friday June 15th 1954'. | |
From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968]), quoted by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 4 'Pervasive' | |
A reaction: [Ref uncertain] This seems to be appealing to ordinary usage, in which tenses have huge significance. If we take time (with its past, present and future) as primitive, then tenses can have full weight. Did tenses mean anything at all to Einstein? |