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All the ideas for 'Saundaranandakavya', 'Probabilities of Conditionals' and 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy

7910	Pursue truth with the urgency of someone whose clothes are on fire [Ashvaghosha]
	Full Idea: As though your turban or your clothes were on fire, so with a sense of urgency should you apply your intellect to the comprehension of the truths.
	From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
	A reaction: The best philosophers need no such urging. I retain a romantic view that we should be 'natural' in these things. See Plato's views in Idea 2153 and 1638. However, maybe I should be confronted with this quotation every morning when I awake.

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

19426	'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284)
	A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps).

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals

14283	A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington]
	Full Idea: Lewis was first to prove this remarkable result: there is no proposition A*B such that, in all probability distributions, p(A*B) = pA(B) [second A a subscript]. A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition.
	From: report of David Lewis (Probabilities of Conditionals [1976]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 3.1
	A reaction: The equation says the probability of the combination of A and B is not always the same as the probability of B given A. Bennett refers to this as 'The Equation' in the theory of conditionals. Edgington says a conditional is a supposition and a judgement.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

19424	Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?

18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas

19427	True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287)
	A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause

19425	In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.

29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism

7909	The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha]
	Full Idea: The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration.
	From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
	A reaction: Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory.

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven

7908	At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha]
	Full Idea: When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed.
	From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
	A reaction: To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff.