10 ideas
7910 | Pursue truth with the urgency of someone whose clothes are on fire [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: As though your turban or your clothes were on fire, so with a sense of urgency should you apply your intellect to the comprehension of the truths. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: The best philosophers need no such urging. I retain a romantic view that we should be 'natural' in these things. See Plato's views in Idea 2153 and 1638. However, maybe I should be confronted with this quotation every morning when I awake. |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To define theoretical terms might be to show how to do without them, but it is better to say that it shows there is no good reason to want to do without them. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A logically determinate name is one which names the same thing in every possible world. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This appears to be rigid designation, before Kripke introduced the new word. |
8790 | The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: In my opinion, the 'doctrine of the given' is correct in saying that there are some beliefs or statements which are 'self-justifying' and that among such beliefs are statements some of which concern appearances or 'ways of being appeared to'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (The Myth of the Given [1964], §12) | |
A reaction: To boldly assert that they are 'self-justifying' invites a landslide of criticisms, pointing at a regress. It might be better to say they are self-evident, or intuitively known, or primitive, or true by the natural light of reason. |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If we specify a theory with all of its terms, and then replace all of those terms with variables, we can then say that some n-tuples of entities can satisfy this formula. This Ramsey sentence then says the theory is realised, without specifying by what. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], II) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed Lewis, and cut out the symbolism] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I contend that there is a general method for defining newly introduced terms in a scientific theory, one which uses only the old terms we understood beforehand. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) | |
A reaction: Lewis is game is to provide bridge laws for a reductive account of nature, without having to introduce something entirely new to achieve it. The idea of bridge laws in scientific theory is less in favour these days. |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A uniquely realised theory is, other things being equal, certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realised theory. We should insist on unique realisation as a standard of correctness unless it is a standard too high to be met. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
A reaction: The point is that rewriting a theory as Ramsey sentences just says there is at least one realisation, and so it doesn't meet the highest standards for scientific theories. The influence of set-theoretic model theory is obvious in this approach. |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation. | |
From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], V) |
7909 | The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory. |
7908 | At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff. |