Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Saundaranandakavya', 'Many, but almost one' and 'Sickness unto Death'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy

7910	Pursue truth with the urgency of someone whose clothes are on fire [Ashvaghosha]
	Full Idea: As though your turban or your clothes were on fire, so with a sense of urgency should you apply your intellect to the comprehension of the truths.
	From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
	A reaction: The best philosophers need no such urging. I retain a romantic view that we should be 'natural' in these things. See Plato's views in Idea 2153 and 1638. However, maybe I should be confronted with this quotation every morning when I awake.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

15538	Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Semantic indecision will suffice to explain the phenomenon of vagueness. [note] Provided that there exist the many precisifications for us to be undecided between. If you deny this, you will indeed have need of vague objects.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'Two solutions')
	A reaction: [He mentions Van Inwagen 1990:213-83] There seem to be three solutions to vague objects: that they really are vague, that they are precise but we can't know precisely, or Lewis's view. I like Lewis's view. Do animals have any problem with vagueness?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

15537	If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
	Full Idea: To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox')
	A reaction: He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536).

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

15536	We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be boundaries of a cloud; therefore many aggregates of droplets are equally good candidates to be the cloud. How is it that we have just one cloud? And yet we do. This is Unger's (1980) 'problem of the many'.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The problem')
	A reaction: This is the problem of vague objects, as opposed to the problem of vague predicates, or the problem of vague truths, or the problem of vague prepositions (like 'towards').

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical

16002	The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard]
	Full Idea: A human being is essentially spirit, but what is spirit? Spirit is to be a self. But what is the Self? In short, it is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity.
	From: Søren Kierkegaard (Sickness unto Death [1849], p.59)
	A reaction: The dense language of his first paragraph was to poke fun at fashionable Hegelian writing. The book gets very lucid afterwards! [SY]

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity

15539	Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution')
	A reaction: Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth.

29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism

7909	The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha]
	Full Idea: The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration.
	From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
	A reaction: Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory.

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven

7908	At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha]
	Full Idea: When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed.
	From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
	A reaction: To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff.