50 ideas
7910 | Pursue truth with the urgency of someone whose clothes are on fire [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: As though your turban or your clothes were on fire, so with a sense of urgency should you apply your intellect to the comprehension of the truths. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: The best philosophers need no such urging. I retain a romantic view that we should be 'natural' in these things. See Plato's views in Idea 2153 and 1638. However, maybe I should be confronted with this quotation every morning when I awake. |
23770 | Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: A reductive analysis is one that provides an alternative set of concepts by which some target concept can be understood. It must be non-circular, and given in terms of concepts that are themselves better understood. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.2) | |
A reaction: There seem to be two aims of analysis: this one emphasises understanding, but the other one concerns ontology - by demonstrating that some concept or thing can be understood fully by what happens at a lower level. |
501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
23769 | Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The form of argument which sells an ontology on the basis a metaphysic is known as an 'argument-by-display'. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.2) | |
A reaction: [Attributed to John Bigelow 1999] New to me, but I'm quite a fan of this. For example, my rejection of platonism is not based on specific arguments, but on looking at the whole platonic picture of reality. |
23783 | Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of change. I am starting with the assumptions that it is a causal phenomenon, and that it requires explanation. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.1) | |
A reaction: That is, I take it, that we need a theory which explains change, rather than just describing it. Well said. Williams says, roughly, that each stage causes the next stage. |
23784 | Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: No process every really starts or ends. …A process we see as derailed is really just an expected sequence that continues in an unexpected direction. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.3) | |
A reaction: Obviously if you cannot individuate processes, then the concept of a process is not much use in ontology. Williams rejects processes, and I think he is probably right. He breaks processes down into smaller units. |
23790 | Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Processes can be modelled in two ways. They are drawn out events encompassing many changes, but dissectible into short-lived states, none including change. Or they are continuous and impenetrable, and to split them is impossible. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 09.3) | |
A reaction: Obviously a process has temporal moments in it, so the unsplittability is conceptual. I find the concept of changeless parts baffling. But if processes are drawn out, they can't be basic to ontology. |
23786 | The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The status quo is part of what exists, and thus it is a proper topic of concern for the metaphysician, and so it warrants explanation. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 07.2) | |
A reaction: His point is that ontology as a mere inventory of things gives no account of why they remain unchanged, as well as their processes and connections. |
23768 | A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: A metaphysic is what you get when you embed a fundamental ontology within a larger metaphysical framework by repeatedly appealing to elements of that ontology in explaining metaphysical phenomena. …Only then do you see what the ontology is worth. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Confirming my mantra that metaphysics is an explanatory activity. I think it is important that the ontology includes relations (such as 'determinations'), and is not just an inventory of types of entity. |
23773 | Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The main components of neo-Humean metaphysics are that properties are inherently non-modal and passive, that what is possible is restricted only by imagination and coherence, that laws are non-governing descriptions, and causation is weak and extrinsic. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 02.1) | |
A reaction: This is Williams identifying the enemy, prior to offering the much more active and restictive powers ontology. I'm with Williams. |
23779 | We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: There seems to be a mysterious desire to posit entities simply because certain terms pop up in our vocabulary. But we should not be so indiscriminate about our posits, even if our talk is properly vetted. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 04.1) | |
A reaction: This should hardly need saying, and the familiar example is 'for the sake of' entailing sakes, but it seems to be a vice that is still found in metaphysical philosophy. The word 'nothingness' comes to mind. |
23775 | Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Powers are 'multi-track', meaning that they are capable of producing a variety of different manifestations when me with diverse stimuli. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.1) | |
A reaction: He later mentions magnetism. Not convinced of this. Powers probably never exist in isolation, so a different manifestation could be because a different power becomes involved. (Bird is a single-tracker). |
23780 | Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: On the model of powers I prefer, every possible state of affairs that can arise is written into the powers that would constitute them. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 04.3) | |
A reaction: I can't make any sense of 'written into', any more than I could when Leibniz proposed roughly the same thing about monads. I presume he means that any state of affairs which ever arises is the expression of the intrinsic nature of powers. |
23789 | Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Naming powers is unwise; the main reason is that there is a long tradition of naming powers according to the manifestations they can produce, and that does not square well with multi-track powers. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 08.4) | |
A reaction: On the other hand there must be some attempt to individuate powers (by scientists, if not by philosophers), and that can only rely on the manifestations. Describe them, rather than name them? Just assign them a number! |
23771 | Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Physics describes fundamental entities exclusively in terms of what sound like powers. 'Charge' names the power to produce electromagnetic fields; 'spin' the power to contribute to the angular momentum of of system; 'mass' to produce gravitational force. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.4) | |
A reaction: These are the three basic properties of an electron, which is fundamental in the standard model. You can say that their field is more fundamental than the particles, but the field is also only known as a set of powers. Powers rule! |
23776 | Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Power Monism: all properties are powers. Categoricalism: all fundamentals are categorical. Dualism allows both types. I defend Mixed Monism - that there is a single class of fundamental properties that are at once powerful and categorical. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.3) | |
A reaction: This is the main dilemma for the powers ontology - of how powers can be basic, if there needs to be some entity which possesses the power. But what possesses the powers of an electron? I like Williams's idea, without being clear about it. |
23777 | Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: The mode in which a power presents itself is more complicated than those properties that have (strictly) nothing more to them than that which is always on display. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.3) | |
A reaction: This is the key idea that nature is dynamic, and so must consist of potentials as well as actuals. Interesting distinction. A basic division between those properties 'always on display', and those that are not? |
23774 | There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: It is no surprise that talk of dispositions, capacities, abilities, tendencies, powers, and potentialities are part of our everyday interactions. …I have in mind a basic set of powers, the sort which underlie all of these. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the correct picture. It is misleading say that a ball has a 'power' to roll smoothly. The powers are inside the ball. |
23791 | Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Powers are the properties at the core of the powers ontology, and dispositions are more like useful talk. …Dispositions are the phenomena to be explained by the power metaphysic. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 10.2) | |
A reaction: The picture I subscribe to. The first step is to see nature as dynamic (as Aristotle does with his 'potentialities'), and the next step to understand what must ground these dynamic dispositional properties. He calls dispositions 'process initiators'. |
23772 | If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: If objects are bundles of properties …they must be robust enough to enter into building relations with one another such that they can form objects. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.5) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. The Humean bundle view of objects just seems to take properties to be 'impressions' or verbal predicates, but they must have causal powers to be a grounding for ontology. |
23788 | Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: 'Perdurantism' is the view that objects persist by being composed of temporal parts. When it is commonly combined with the eternalist account of the ontology of time, the result is known as 'four-dimensionalism'. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 08.1) | |
A reaction: At last, a clear account of the distinction between these two! They're both wrong. He says the result is the spatiotemporal 'worm' view (i.e. one temporal extended thing, rather than a collection of parts). |
514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |
23785 | Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: I believe that it is also the job of a theory of causation to explain non-change | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 07.2) | |
A reaction: Good point. Most attempts to pin down causation refer only to changes and differences. Two playing cards propping one another up is his example. |
23782 | Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Causation is the exercising of powers. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Job done. Get over it. This is the view I prefer. |
23787 | If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: It would be shocking if an account of causation ruled out the possibility of change. But if a cause perfectly overlaps its effect in time, then the rejection of change is precisely what follows. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 07.6) | |
A reaction: He cites Kant, Martin, Heil and Mumford/Anjum for this view. The latter seem to see causation as a 'process' (allowing change), which Williams as ruled out. The Williams point must be correct. |
23778 | Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE] |
Full Idea: Powers carry their lawlike features within them: it is part of their essence, qua power. Their pointing at future states just is their internal law-like nature; it is what gets expressed in such and such conditions. | |
From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Modern writers on powers seem unaware that Leibniz got there first. This seems to me the correct account of the ontology of laws. The formulation of laws is probably the best descriptive system for nature's patterns (over time as well as space). |
7909 | The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory. |
7908 | At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff. |