9766
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Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
My investigation of vagueness began with the question 'What is the correct logic of vagueness?', which led to the further question 'What are the correct truth-conditions for a vague language?', which led to questions of meaning and existence.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
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A reaction:
This is the most perfect embodiment of the strategy of analytical philosophy which I have ever read. It is the strategy invented by Frege in the 'Grundlagen'. Is this still the way to go, or has this pathway slowly sunk into the swamp?
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9775
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Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Maybe classical logic fails for vagueness in Excluded Middle. If 'H bald ∨ ¬(H bald)' is true, then one disjunct is true. But if the second is true the first is false, and the sentence is either true or false, contrary to the borderline assumption.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 4)
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A reaction:
Fine goes on to argue against the implication that we need a special logic for vague predicates.
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9768
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Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
I take vagueness to be a semantic feature, a deficiency of meaning. It is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability, and ambiguity.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
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A reaction:
Sounds good. If we cut nature at the joints with our language, then nature is going to be too subtle and vast for our finite and gerrymandered language, and so it will break down in tricky situations. But maybe epistemology precedes semantics?
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9776
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A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
There is a possibility of 'higher-order vagueness'. The vague may be vague, or vaguely vague, and so on. If J has few hairs on his head than H, then he may be a borderline case of a borderline case.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 5)
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A reaction:
Such slim grey areas can also be characterised as those where you think he is definitely bald, but I am not so sure.
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9770
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Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
With a three-value approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&P is indefinite, but P&R is false, and P∨P is indefinite, but P∨R is true. This means the connectives & and ∨ are not truth-functional.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 1)
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A reaction:
The point is that there could then be no logic in any way classical for vague sentences and three truth values. A powerful point.
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9773
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With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
With the super-truth approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&R is false, and P∨R is true, since one of P and R is true and one is false in any complete and admissible specification. It encompasses all 'penumbral truths'.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 3)
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A reaction:
[See Idea 9767 for the super-truth approach, and Idea 9770 for a contrasting view] The approach, which seems quite appealing, is that we will in no circumstances give up basic classical logic, but we will make maximum concessions to vagueness.
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7909
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The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha]
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Full Idea:
The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration.
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From:
Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
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A reaction:
Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory.
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7908
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At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha]
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Full Idea:
When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed.
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From:
Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
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A reaction:
To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff.
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