6862
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Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
Fuzzy logic is based on a continuum of degrees of truth, but it is committed to the idea that it is half-true that one identical twin is tall and the other twin is not, even though they are the same height.
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.154)
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A reaction:
Maybe to be shocked by a contradiction is missing the point of fuzzy logic? Half full is the same as half empty. The logic does not say the twins are different, because it is half-true that they are both tall, and half-true that they both aren't.
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10009
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Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
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Full Idea:
In a famous paper, Wallace argued that all interpretations of quantifiers (including the substitutional interpretation) are, in the end, variants of that proposed by Tarski (in 1936).
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From:
report of Wallace, J (On the Frame of Reference [1970]) by Thomas Baldwin - Interpretations of Quantifiers
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A reaction:
A significant-looking pointer. We must look elsewhere for Tarski's account, which will presumably subsume the objectual interpretation as well. The ontology of Tarski's account of truth is an enduring controversy.
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6861
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What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)
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A reaction:
This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.
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6860
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How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
If one takes a spectrum of colours from yellow to red, it might be that given a series of colour samples along that spectrum, each sample is indiscriminable by the naked eye from the next one, though samples at either end are blatantly different.
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151)
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A reaction:
This seems like a nice variant of the Sorites paradox (Idea 6008). One could demonstrate it with just three samples, where A and C seemed different from each other, but other comparisons didn't.
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7909
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The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha]
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Full Idea:
The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration.
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From:
Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
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A reaction:
Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory.
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7908
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At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha]
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Full Idea:
When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed.
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From:
Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI)
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A reaction:
To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff.
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