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All the ideas for 'Cours d'Analyse', 'What is Justified Belief?st2=Alvin I. Goldman' and 'Lysis'

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8 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy]
     Full Idea: When the successive absolute values of a variable decrease indefinitely in such a way as to become less than any given quantity, that variable becomes what is called an 'infinitesimal'. Such a variable has zero as its limit.
     From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
     A reaction: The creator of the important idea of the limit still talked in terms of infinitesimals. In the next generation the limit took over completely.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy]
     Full Idea: When the values successively attributed to the same variable approach indefinitely a fixed value, eventually differing from it by as little as one could wish, that fixed value is called the 'limit' of all the others.
     From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
     A reaction: This seems to be a highly significan proposal, because you can now treat that limit as a number, and adds things to it. It opens the door to Cantor's infinities. Is the 'limit' just a fiction?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
     Full Idea: A characteristic case in which a belief is justified though the cognizer doesn't know that it's justified is where the original evidence for the belief has long since been forgotten.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II)
     A reaction: This is a central problem for any very literal version of internalism. The fully rationalist view (to which I incline) will be that the cognizer must make a balanced assessment of whether they once had the evidence. Were my teachers any good?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
     Full Idea: If one shares my view that justified belief is, at least roughly, well-formed belief, surely animals and young children can have justified beliefs.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], III)
     A reaction: I take this to be a key hallmark of the externalist view of knowledge. Personally I think we should tell the animals that they have got true beliefs, but that they aren't bright enough to aspire to 'knowledge'. Be grateful for what you've got.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
     Full Idea: The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the processes that cause it, where (provisionally) reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II)
     A reaction: Goldman's original first statement of reliabilism, now the favourite version of externalism. The obvious immediate problem is when a normally very reliable process goes wrong. Wise people still get it wrong, or right for the wrong reasons.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Introspection should be regarded as a form of retrospection. Thus, a justified belief that I am 'now' in pain gets its justificational status from a relevant, though brief, causal history.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II)
     A reaction: He cites Hobbes and Ryle as having held this view. See Idea 6668. I am unclear why the history must be 'causal'. I may not know the cause of the pain. I may not believe an event which causes a proposition, or I may form a false belief from it.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is beautiful [Plato]
     Full Idea: The good is beautiful.
     From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 216d)
     A reaction: also Timaeus 87c
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato]
     Full Idea: People say that friendship exists only between good men.
     From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 214d)