Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'works' and 'Events'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


12 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons]
     Full Idea: Some changes are slow and continuous and are called 'processes' rather than events; the growth of a tree or the greying of John's hair.
     From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 3.2)
     A reaction: So making a loaf of bread is an event rather than a process, and World War I was a process rather than an event? If you slow down a dramatic event (on film), you see that it is really a process. I take 'process' to be a much more illuminating word.
Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
     Full Idea: There is arguably a parallel between the mass-count distinction among meanings of nouns and the process-event distinction among meanings of verbs. Processes, like stuff, do not connote criteria for counting, whereas events, like things, do.
     From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 6.2)
     A reaction: Hm. You can have several processes, and a process can come to an end - but then you can have several ingredients of a cake, and you can run out of one of them. This may be quite a helpful distinction.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
     Full Idea: The ontology of events rose in philosophy with the rise of relativity theory in physics. Einstein postulated the relativity of simultaneity to an observer's state of motion. The terms of the relation of simultaneity must be events or their parts.
     From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 1.1.2)
     A reaction: Intriguing. Philosophers no doubt think they are way ahead of physicists in such a metaphysical area. Personally I regard the parentage of the concept as good grounds for scepticism about it. See Idea 7621 for my reason.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Augustine says bodies don't form images in our spirit; our spirit does that itself with amazing quickness. ...So the appearances under which mind knows things aren't drawn from the things themselves.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Thomas Aquinas - Quodlibeta 8.2.1
     A reaction: This is Augustine's theory of 'illumination' - that God creates experience within us. His theory was soon discarded by the early scholastics.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: Instead of supposing that what we know can be abstracted from sensible particulars that instantiate such knowledge, Augustine insists that our mind is so constituted as to see 'intelligible realities' directly by inner illumination.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74
     A reaction: His 'theory of illumination'. This seems to be a sort of super-rationalism. This doesn't make clear the role of sensations. Surely he doesn't thing that we just bypass them?
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: The modern concept of the will is often said to originate with Augustine.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that this is the source of the trouble. How can a thing be intrinsically free? Surely freedom is always a contextual concept?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
     Full Idea: Love, and do what you will.
     From: Augustine (works [c.415])
     A reaction: This sounds libertarian, but Augustine had a stern concept of what love required. It nicely captures one of the essential ideas of virtue ethics.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Augustine claimed that the pagan schools between them had produced nearly three hundred different definitions of the highest good.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5
     A reaction: I would expect the right definition to be in there somewhere, but no doubt Augustine's definition made it 301. Perhaps the biggest problem of human life is that (as with the Kennedy assassination) proliferating stories obscure the true story.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Hesiod reckons envy among the effects of the good and benevolent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in according envy to the gods. ...Likewise the Greeks were different from us in their evaluation of hope: one felt it to be blind and malicious.
     From: report of Hesiod (works [c.700 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Dawn (Daybreak) 038
     A reaction: Presumably this would be understandable envy, and unreasonable hope. Ridiculous envy can't possibly be good, and modest and sensible hope can't possibly be bad. I suspect he wants to exaggerate the relativism.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: Augustine insisted that 'ought' does not, in any straightforward way, imply 'can' - which distinguishes him from most modern ethicists.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74
     A reaction: Not unreasonable. I ought to help my ailing friend who lives abroad, but I haven't the time or money to do it. We can experience impossibilities as duties. Impossibilities are just excuses. Augustine is opposing the Pelagian heresy.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
     Full Idea: Augustine did the most to define Christian heresy. The three most prominent were Donatism, Pelagianism (that humans are perfectible), and Manicheism (that good and evil are equally basic metaphysical realities).
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.73
     A reaction: Manicheans had presumably been studying Empedocles. (I suppose it's too late to identify Christianity as a heresy?).
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]
     Full Idea: Augustine solution to the problem of evil was to say that, strictly speaking, evil does not exist. Human beings are not part evil and part good, but rather just a limited amount of goodness.
     From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
     A reaction: Augustine was rebelling against Manicheanism, which he espoused when young, which proposed a good and an evil force. An apathetic slob seems devoid of goodness, but is not evil. It takes extra effort to perform active evil.