60 ideas
| 6319 | Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no action and practises the teaching that uses no words. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.II.6) | |
| A reaction: Notice that this is an active 'deed', and a positive 'practice'. He is not just recommending indifference and lethargy. Personally I don't find the advice very appealing, but it might be good if you live in 'interesting times'. |
| 6325 | One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVI.128) | |
| A reaction: A famous remark, which my western mind finds simply perplexing. It strikes me as wicked selfishness to keep your wisdom to yourself, and not try to persuade others to follow it. We are all in this together, I say. |
| 6321 | Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XX.47) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think all human beings are deeply perplexed when they actually address their situation, but most people never spend more than a few minutes a year worrying about it. |
| 17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: As Kreisel has remarked, what is important is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical statements. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: [see Maddy 2011:115 for the history of this idea] It seems rather unclear where Frege stands on objectivity. Maddy embraces it, following up this idea, and Tyler Burge's fat book on objectivity. |
| 10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: A classic reduction is the class of ordered pairs <x,y> being reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}}. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
| 10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: We may suppose that with each set is associated an object as its cardinal number, but we have no systematic way, without appeal to the Axiom of Choice, of selecting a representative set of each cardinality. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
| 10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In the intuitionist view, the notion of an intuitive proof cannot be expected to coincide with that of a proof in a formal system, and Gödel's incompleteness theorem is thus unsurprising from an intuitionist point of view. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
| 10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: From the intuitionist point of view natural numbers are mental constructions, so their totality is only potential, but it is neverthless a fully determinate totality. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This could only be if the means of constructing the numbers was fully determinate, so how does that situation come about? |
| 16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I sooner judged that what lacks all form does not exist, than thought of as something in between form and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, unformed and next to nothing. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XII.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
| A reaction: Scholastics were struck by the contrast between this remark, and the remark of Averroes (Idea 16587) that prime matter was halfway existence. Their two great authorities disagreed! This sort of thing stimulated the revival of metaphysics. |
| 10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If abstractions were defined by whether they could affect human sense-organs, light-waves would be concrete but radio waves abstract. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This is a pretty good baseline example. No account should draw an abstract/concrete line through the electromagnetic spectrum. |
| 10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Dummett distinguishes, roughly, between those concrete objects which can be possible objects of ostension, and abstract objects which can only be referred to by functional expressions whose argument is some other object. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
| A reaction: At least someone has proposed a theory! Hale gives a nice critical discussion of the proposal. It is a moot point whether in the second case, when you pick out the 'other object', you are thereby able to refer to some new abstract object. |
| 10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The dichotomy between concrete and abstract objects comes to seem far too crude: to which of the two categories should we assign the Mistral, for instance? | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: He has previously given colours and points as difficult borderline cases. We can generalise this particular problem case as the question of whether a potentiality or possibility is abstract or concrete. |
| 10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: There is no reason for wanting a sharp distinction between concrete and abstract objects. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This rather depends on your ontology. If you are happy for reality to be full of weird non-physical entities, then the blurring won't bother you. If the boundary is blurred but still real, it is a very interesting one. |
| 22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I am told that I can ask three sorts of questions - whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a very Aristotelian approach. I am pleased to see that what it is and what sort it is are not conflated. The first one must be its individual essence, and the second its generic essence. |
| 10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The dictum that a name has meaning only in the context of a sentence repudiates the conception of a special philosophical sense of 'existence', which claims that numbers do not exist while affirming existential statements about them. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: He refers to Frege's Context Principle. Personally I would say you could make plenty of 'affirmations' about arithmetic without them having to be 'existential'. I can say there 'is' a number between 6 and 8, without huge existential claims. |
| 10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: What objects we recognise the world as containing depends upon the structure of our language. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: The background to this claim is the Fregean idea that there are no objects for us if there are no concepts. Dummett is adding that there are no concepts if there is no language. I say animals have concepts and recognise objects. |
| 10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: It is by the study of the character of predication that we shall come to understand the essential nature of universals. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: I haven't founded a clearer manifesto for linguistic philosophy than that! Personally I find it highly dubious, given the shifting nature of linguistic forms, and the enormous variation between remote languages. |
| 10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The original sense of 'nominalism' is the denial of universals, that is the denial of reference to either predicates or to abstract nouns. The modern sense (of Nelson Goodman) is the denial of the existence of abstract objects. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This is why you find loads of modern philosophers vigorous attacking nominalism, only to gradually realise that they don't actually believe in universals, as traditionally understood. It's hard to keep up, when words shift their meaning. |
| 10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: We cannot simply distinguish concrete objects as objects of ostension, if it literally involves a pointing gesture, as this would exclude a colourless gas, a sound or a smell. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: He shifts to verbal ostension as a result, since we can talk of 'this smell'. On p.491 he suggests that affecting our senses is a sufficient condition to be concrete, but not a necessary one. |
| 10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: To say that an abstract object cannot be the cause of change seems plausible enough, but the thesis that it cannot be the subject of change is problematic. The shape of an object can change, or the number of sheep on a hill. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This seems a pretty crucial difficulty for the standard notion of abstracta as non-causal. I would say that it is an acid which could eat away the whole edifice if you thought about it for long enough. He shifts shape-change to the physical object. |
| 10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: For intuitionists, it ceases to be true that abstract objects are not observable and cannot be involved in causal interaction, since such intuitive apprehension of them may be regarded as just such an interaction. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: I would say that since abstract objects can be involved in causal interactions, in the mind, and since the mind is entirely physical (oh yes), this makes abstract objects entirely physical, which may come as a shock to some people. |
| 10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: For an object to be abstract, we require only that an understanding of any name of that object involves a recognition that the object is in the range of some functional expression. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but a function must involve a relation between some objects, such that a unique object is consequently picked out. |
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Dummett's best argument for excluding abstract nouns relies upon the entirely Fregean requirement that with any genuine singular term there must be associated a criterion of identity. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II | |
| A reaction: This sounds a rather rigid test. Must the criteria be logically precise, or must you just have some vague idea of what you are talking about? |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: An abstract object can be referred to only by means of a verbal phrase, ...and no confrontation with an abstract object is possible. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: So does this mean that animals are incapable of entertaining abstract concepts? Some research suggests otherwise. Does a dog understand what a 'walk' is, without use of the word? Dummett disgracefully neglects animals in his theories. |
| 10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The notion of 'object', as it is now commonly used in philosophical contexts, is a modern notion, one first introduced by Frege. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: If we say 'objects exist', I think it is crucial that if we are going to introduce 'object' as a term of art, then 'exist' had better stick to normal usage. If that drifts into a term of art as well (incorporating 'subsist', or some such) we have no hope! |
| 6328 | To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: To know yet to think that one does not know is best. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXI.173) | |
| A reaction: Tricky. Self-deception doesn't sound like a virtue to me. There are epistemic virtues, and caution about one's own knowledge has to be one of them, but a totally false assessment sounds counter-productive. |
| 6323 | Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the Way one does less every day. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVII.108) | |
| A reaction: Everything in my culture has raised the status of the pursuit of learning, so that I can hardly comprehend what is proposed by the Way. I don't believe that the Way can be achieved without great learning, but one might move beyond learning. |
| 22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I can distinguish the scent of lilies from that of violets, even though there is no scent at all in my nostrils. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
| A reaction: Augustine has a nice introspective account of how we experience memory, and identifies lots of puzzling features. I know I can identify the smell of vinegar, but I can't bring it to mind, the way I can the appearance of roses. |
| 22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The mind and the memory are one and the same. We even call the memory the mind, for when we tell a person to remember something, we tell them to 'bear this in mind', and when we forget something 'it slipped out of my mind'. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
| A reaction: This idea has become familiar in modern neuroscience, I think, presumably because we do not find distinct types of neurons for consciousness and for memory. |
| 22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The memory contains the innumerable principles and laws of numbers and dimensions. None of these can have been conveyed to me by the bodily senses. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.12) | |
| A reaction: Even if you have a fairly empirical view of the sources of mathematics (a view with which I sympathise), it must by admitted that our endless extrapolations from the sources also reside in memory. So we remember thoughts as well as experiences. |
| 22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: If we had to experience sorrow or fear every time that we mentioned these emotions, no one would be willing to speak of them. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
| A reaction: Remembering the death of a loved one can trigger fresh grief, but remembering their dangerous illness from which they recovered no longer contains the feeling of fear. |
| 22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: How can it be that my mind can be happy because of the joy that is in it, and yet my memory is not sad by reason of the sadness that is in it? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict his thought in Idea 22981, that memory and mind are the same. Recall seems to be a part of consciousness which is not fully wired up to the rest of the mind. |
| 22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The memory is a vast immeasurable sanctuary. It is part of my nature, but I cannot understand all that I am. Hence the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely. Is the other part outside of itself, and not within it? How then can it be a part? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
| A reaction: He seems to understand the mind as entirely consisting of consciousness. Nevertheless, this seems to be the first inklings of the modern externalist view of the mind. |
| 22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I do not understand the power of memory that is in myself, although without it I could not even speak of myself. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.16) | |
| A reaction: Even if the self is not identical with memory, this idea seems to establish that memory is an essential aspect of the self. This point is neglected by those who see the self as an entity (the 'soul pearl') which persists through all experience. |
| 5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: How do prophets see the future, if there is not a future to be seen? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.17) | |
| A reaction: The answer, I suspect, is that prophets can't see the future. The prospect that the future already exists would seem to saboutage human freedom and responsibility, and point to Calvinist predestination, and even fatalism. |
| 22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: In memory everything is preserved separately, according to its category. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as the first seeds of the idea that the mind functions by means of mental files. Our memories of cats are 'close to' or 'linked to' our memories of dogs. |
| 19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Real functions map objects onto objects, but concepts map objects onto truth value, ...so Dummett says that concepts are not functions, but that they have a 'functional character'. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6 |
| 10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Since we cannot pick an abstract object out from its surrounding, all that we need to master is the use of statements of identity between objects of a certain kind. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This is the necessary Fregean preliminary to using a principle of abstraction to identify two objects which are abstract (when the two objects are in an equivalence relation). Presumably circular squares and square circles are identical? |
| 10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Dummett claims that a realistic conception of reference can be sustained for concrete objects (possible objects of ostension), but breaks down for (putative) names of (pure) abstract objects. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
| A reaction: An extremely hard claim to evaluate, because a case must first be made for abstract objects which are fundamentally different in kind. Realistic reference must certainly deal with these hard cases. Field rejects Dummett's abstract points. |
| 6331 | Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXXI.194) | |
| A reaction: A sharp disagreement with Keats ('Ode to a Grecian Urn'). A deep and important question, especially in relation to Plato's discussion of rhetoric (where he is very ambivalent). Great mathematics is beautiful. Truth can harsh. On the whole, I disagree. |
| 6330 | One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is just because one has no use for life that one is wiser than the man who values life. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181a) | |
| A reaction: To have no use for life certainly seems to put a person into a position of superiority, especially when the 'Titanic' is sinking. However, if our lives have no value, I don't know what does. A balance must clearly be struck. |
| 6327 | Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Do good to him who has done you an injury. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXIII.148) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 6288 (Jesus). People like this really mess up the social contract theory of morality. If they are going to return good for your evil, there doesn't seem much point in helping them, given how much effort is involved. Most peculiar… |
| 22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: Surely happiness is what everyone wants, so much so that there can be none who do not want it? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.20) | |
| A reaction: His concept of happiness is, of course, religious. Occasionally you meet habitual grumblers about life who give the impression that they are only happy when they are discontented. So happiness is achieving desires, not feeling good? |
| 23402 | The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those of highest virtue do not strive for virtue, and so they have it. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 38), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.2 | |
| A reaction: Every moralist's dream is the person to whom virtue comes so naturally that no thought is required. This says they don't even notice it; Aristotle says they simply enjoying behaving virtuously. |
| 6324 | To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those who are good I treat as good; those who are not good I also treat as good; in doing so I gain in goodness. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLIX.111) | |
| A reaction: Socrates (idea 346) and Jesus (Idea 6288) had similar ideas. Who, though, is going to administer justice, and where is the idea that people 'deserve' good or ill treatment? Schoolteachers should treat all children as if they were good. |
| 6322 | There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: There is no crime greater than having too many desires. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVI.104) | |
| A reaction: It seems harsh to call this a 'crime', given that no one is likely to choose to have 'too many' desires. The crime is in deciding to stimulate desire to excess, or deciding to show no sensible restraint. |
| 6320 | The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects; next comes the ruler they love and praise; next comes one they fear; next comes one with whom they take liberties. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XVII.39) | |
| A reaction: This fits our understanding of football referees to perfection. It might apply to anyone doing a vital adminstrative job, such as compiling a school timetable. It is hard, though, to accept anonymity as a mark of success. |
| 6329 | People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is because those in authority are too fond of action that the people are difficult to govern. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181) | |
| A reaction: I love this. It should be on the wall of every human institution in our civilization. How the heart sinks at the prospect of a 'new initiative'. Not that I am against action; it is just important to recognise that inaction is sometimes the best option. |
| 6326 | The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The better known the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVII.132) | |
| A reaction: Nice. I link this with my favourite moral maxim from Democritus (Idea 519). The idea is that continual emphasis on what you should not do fills the mind with evil possibilities. Moral perfection must start by taking goodness for granted. |
| 23401 | A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: A military victory is not a thing of beauty. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.1 | |
| A reaction: Should be written on the wall of every military academy and barracks. |
| 5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I begin to wonder whether time is an extension of the mind itself. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.26) | |
| A reaction: The observation that the mind creates a 'specious present' (spreading experience out over a short fraction of second) reinforces this. Personally I like David Marshall's proposal that consciousness is entirely memory, which would deny this idea. |
| 22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| Full Idea: Augustine answers that for us to be aware of time it must exist only in the mind, …and the difference between past and future is just the difference between memory and anticipation. | |
| From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
| A reaction: This is an extreme idealist view. Are we to say that the past consists only of what can be remembered, and the future only of what is anticipated? Absurd anti-realism, in my view. Where do his concepts come from, asks Le Poidevin. |
| 5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: A short time ago or a short time ahead we might put at ten days, but how can anything which does not exist be either long or short? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
| A reaction: A nice question, which gets at the paradoxical nature of time very nicely. How can it be long, but non-existent? We could break the paradox by concluding '..and therefore time does exist', even though we can't see how. |
| 5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: Of the three divisions of time, how can two, the past and the future, be, when the past no longer is, and the future is not yet? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
| A reaction: This is the oldest bewilderment about time, which naturally leads us to the thought that time cannot actually 'exist'. The remark implies that at least 'now' is safe, but that also succumbs to paradox pretty quickly. |
| 5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: We cannot say that the whole of the current year is present, and if the whole of it is not present, the year is not present. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
| A reaction: Another nice way of presenting the paradox of time. We are in a particular year, so it has to be real. |
| 5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I know well enough what time is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
| A reaction: A justly famous remark, even though it adds nothing to our knowledge of time. This sort of thought pushes us towards accepting many things as axiomatic, such as time, space, identity, persons, mind. |
| 5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I once heard a learned man say that time is nothing but the movement of the sun and the moon and the stars, but I do not agree. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.22) | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to say that you either take time or movement as axiomatic, and describe one in terms of the other, but you are stuck unable to give the initial statement of the axiom without mentioning the second property you were saving for later. |
| 5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The fact that heaven and earth are there proclaims that they were created, for they are subject to change and variation; ..the meaning of change and variation is that something is there which was not there before. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.04) | |
| A reaction: It seems possible that the underlying matter is eternal (as in various conservation laws, such as that of energy), and that all change is in the form rather than the substance. |
| 22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| Full Idea: If nothing existed by God before creation, then what could have happened to, or within, God that led God to decide to create the universe at that particular moment? Why would an eternal or perfect being want or need to change? | |
| From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
| A reaction: I suppose you could reply that change is superior to stasis, but then why did God delay the creation? |
| 5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: O Lord, since you are outside time in eternity, are you unaware of the things that I tell you? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.01) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as the single most difficult and most elusive question about the nature of a supreme divine being. If the being is trapped in time, as we are, it is greatly diminished, and if it is outside, it is hard to see how it could be a participant. |