41 ideas
| 21122 | Liberal Nationalism says welfare states and democracy needed a shared sense of nationality [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: The Liberal Nationalist argument is that if we want to have welfare states or vibrant democracies, then we will need the kind of solidarity that shared nationality fosters. …Unwelcome democratic decisions are more acceptable when made by co-nationals. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
| A reaction: We've just experienced this with Brexit (2016), where perfectly sensible decisions were being made in Brussels, but the popular press whipped up hostility because the British had a restricted role in the decisions. Prefer our idiots to their sages. |
| 18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning; even when it doesn't look like that because we seem to be using words to talk about mathematical things. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Grammar [1932], p.468), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
| A reaction: I would have thought that an algorithm needs some raw material to work with. This leads to the idea that meaning arises from rules of usage. |
| 16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I sooner judged that what lacks all form does not exist, than thought of as something in between form and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, unformed and next to nothing. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XII.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
| A reaction: Scholastics were struck by the contrast between this remark, and the remark of Averroes (Idea 16587) that prime matter was halfway existence. Their two great authorities disagreed! This sort of thing stimulated the revival of metaphysics. |
| 22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I am told that I can ask three sorts of questions - whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a very Aristotelian approach. I am pleased to see that what it is and what sort it is are not conflated. The first one must be its individual essence, and the second its generic essence. |
| 22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I can distinguish the scent of lilies from that of violets, even though there is no scent at all in my nostrils. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
| A reaction: Augustine has a nice introspective account of how we experience memory, and identifies lots of puzzling features. I know I can identify the smell of vinegar, but I can't bring it to mind, the way I can the appearance of roses. |
| 22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: How can it be that my mind can be happy because of the joy that is in it, and yet my memory is not sad by reason of the sadness that is in it? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict his thought in Idea 22981, that memory and mind are the same. Recall seems to be a part of consciousness which is not fully wired up to the rest of the mind. |
| 22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The mind and the memory are one and the same. We even call the memory the mind, for when we tell a person to remember something, we tell them to 'bear this in mind', and when we forget something 'it slipped out of my mind'. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
| A reaction: This idea has become familiar in modern neuroscience, I think, presumably because we do not find distinct types of neurons for consciousness and for memory. |
| 22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The memory contains the innumerable principles and laws of numbers and dimensions. None of these can have been conveyed to me by the bodily senses. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.12) | |
| A reaction: Even if you have a fairly empirical view of the sources of mathematics (a view with which I sympathise), it must by admitted that our endless extrapolations from the sources also reside in memory. So we remember thoughts as well as experiences. |
| 22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: If we had to experience sorrow or fear every time that we mentioned these emotions, no one would be willing to speak of them. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
| A reaction: Remembering the death of a loved one can trigger fresh grief, but remembering their dangerous illness from which they recovered no longer contains the feeling of fear. |
| 22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The memory is a vast immeasurable sanctuary. It is part of my nature, but I cannot understand all that I am. Hence the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely. Is the other part outside of itself, and not within it? How then can it be a part? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
| A reaction: He seems to understand the mind as entirely consisting of consciousness. Nevertheless, this seems to be the first inklings of the modern externalist view of the mind. |
| 22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I do not understand the power of memory that is in myself, although without it I could not even speak of myself. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.16) | |
| A reaction: Even if the self is not identical with memory, this idea seems to establish that memory is an essential aspect of the self. This point is neglected by those who see the self as an entity (the 'soul pearl') which persists through all experience. |
| 5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: How do prophets see the future, if there is not a future to be seen? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.17) | |
| A reaction: The answer, I suspect, is that prophets can't see the future. The prospect that the future already exists would seem to saboutage human freedom and responsibility, and point to Calvinist predestination, and even fatalism. |
| 22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: In memory everything is preserved separately, according to its category. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as the first seeds of the idea that the mind functions by means of mental files. Our memories of cats are 'close to' or 'linked to' our memories of dogs. |
| 21136 | Utilitarians conflate acts and omissions; causing to drown and failing to save are the same [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: Most uitlitarians do not distinguish between acts and omissions, and see no morally relevant difference between walking past a drowning child and pushing a child into a pond. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 09) | |
| A reaction: He cites Peter Singer as an instance. The notorious Trolley Problem focuses on such issues. Michael Sandel in 'Justice' is good on that. If motive and intention matter, the two cases could be very different. Too timid to push, but also too timid to help? |
| 6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Suppose someone were to say: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful"?! | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Grammar [1932], §127), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason | |
| A reaction: This reminds us that the concept of supervenience was originally introduced in aesthetics. Beauty is supervenient on physical form. But "Imagine how someone else might look at this butterfly and think it was ugly". |
| 22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: Surely happiness is what everyone wants, so much so that there can be none who do not want it? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.20) | |
| A reaction: His concept of happiness is, of course, religious. Occasionally you meet habitual grumblers about life who give the impression that they are only happy when they are discontented. So happiness is achieving desires, not feeling good? |
| 21135 | There are eight different ways in which groups of people can be oppressed [Shorten, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Groups can be oppressed in seven different ways: by violence, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural domination, exploitation, stigmatisation, neglect of interests, and lack of egalitarian ethos. | |
| From: report of Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 08) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: [my summary of Shorten's summary] These headings seem to overlap somewhat. It strengthens my growing view that if one builds a political philosophy around the supreme virtue of respect, then all of these modes of oppression are undermined. |
| 21118 | Constitutional Patriotism unites around political values (rather than national identity) [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: 'Constitutional patriots' favour a 'post-national' form of political identity in which members share common political values, but not necessarily a common national identity. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Not sure if you can keep political values distinct from community values. In theory it is an approach designed for cultural pluralism. But if the political values are liberal that implies cultural freedoms for (e.g.) women. |
| 21129 | Democracy is a method of selection, or it involves participation, or it concerns public discussion [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: Competitive democrats believe that democracy is simply a method for selecting political leaders …Participatory democrats associate the democratic ideal with living in a participatory society …Deliberative democrats identify public reasoning as key. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 05) | |
| A reaction: Personally I would favour public discussion, but that is the last thing leaders want, especially if they are not very knowledgeable or clever. |
| 21130 | Some say democracy is intrinsically valuable, others that it delivers good outcomes [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: Some theorist think that democracy is intrinsically valuable, but others believe that it is valuable because it delivers good outcomes. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 05) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see how the majority having a dictatorship over the minority could be an intrinsic good. If we start with respect as the supreme social virtue, then participation and public discussion might be intrinsic goods. |
| 21126 | Representative should be either obedient, or sensible, or typical [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: Mandate Representation says they are delegates who should not deviate from instructions; Trustee says they use their discretion and judgement; Descriptive says they share group characteristics. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 04) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] There is also being a representative because you have an audience (such as celebrity campains). The second type was famously defended by Edmund Burke. The third implies being the same colour, or gender, or religion. |
| 21128 | There is 'mirror representation' when the institution statistically reflects the population [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: The general theory of 'mirror representation' says that a representative body or institution should be a statistically accurate sample of the wider society it represents. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 04) | |
| A reaction: How fine-grained should this be in accuracy. Should every small minority have at least one rep? Can't reps be trusted to speak for people a bit different from themselves? Maybe not! He quotes Mirabeau in support of this idea. |
| 21127 | In a changed situation a Mandated Representative can't keep promises and fight for constituents [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: An important tension in Mandate Representation seemingly requires politicians to both uphold their electoral promises and promote the interests of their constituents. These can conflict, with changed circumstances or information. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 04 Box 4.1) | |
| A reaction: So be careful what you promise, and don't take on a party loyalty that conflicts with your constituents' interests. Easy. |
| 21117 | Liberal citizens have a moral requirement to respect freedom and equality [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: The liberal theory of political community contains a moral thesis which says that members should share a moral concern for one another as free and equal citizens. …Citizens are not required to have much else in common with one another. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
| A reaction: A key thought. Liberal hearts swell with pride at the first half, but anti-liberals are interested in the second bit. If my neighbour lives in miserable poverty, should I only ask whether they are 'equal and free'? Respect everything! |
| 21134 | Maybe the rational autonomous liberal individual is merely the result of domination [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: On a radical reading of Foucault, the very ideal of a rational, autonomous moral agent that lies at the heart of liberal governmentality is nothing more than the effect of a particular form of domination. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 06) | |
| A reaction: [Apologies for the word 'governmentality'; I'm just the messenger] Presumably Foucault's philosophy is also the result of domination, so it is hard to know where to start. The status of rationality is the central issue. |
| 21113 | Liberal equality concerns rights, and liberal freedom concerns choice of ends [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: A liberal society treats people as equals by equipping them with the same set of rights, and it respects their freedom by allowing them to choose their own freely chosen ends. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 01) | |
| A reaction: Equality of rights is fairly standard in any modern society (at least in principle). Freedom of ends is trickier. You can dismiss someone sleeping in the gutter as living a life that resulted from their choices. How many people have clear goals in life? |
| 21121 | Liberal Nationalism encourages the promotion of nationalistic values [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: 'Liberal nationalists' say liberalism is compatible with promoting nationality, by teaching national history and literature and supporting its language. Compatriot priority adds that the needs of compatriots can override those of foreigners. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] As a teacher of literature I always preferred to teach the literature of my own country, but without considering the reasons for it. But it was a combination of pride in my people's achievements, and a desire to strengthen social bonds. |
| 21115 | Liberalism should not make assumptions such as the value of choosing your own life plan [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians say that liberalism could only justified by appealing to controversial assumptions that are not universally shared, such as the significance of choosing one's own plan of life. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 01) | |
| A reaction: In the past, at least, huge numbers of people have been perfectly happy living a life designed for them by their parents. It is not much consolation for a disastrous life that at least you planned it yourself. Liberal values are not self-evident. |
| 21114 | Liberals treat individuals as mutual strangers, rather than as social beings [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians say that liberalism treats individuals as strangers to one another, and underestimates the extent to which individuals are 'constituted' by their societies and social memberships. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 01) | |
| A reaction: On the other hand you can have 'too much community'. Surely the test for any political system is the quality of lives led by individual citizens? There can never be a wonderful community full of miserable citizens. |
| 21123 | Liberal Nationalism is more communitarian, and Constitutional Patriotism more cosmopolitan [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: While Liberal Nationalists push liberalism in a particularist and communitarian direction, Constitutional Patriots emphasise its universalistic and cosmopolitan aspects. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 02) | |
| A reaction: So many attractive qualities to choose from! A tolerant community ought to be cosmopolitan. Being universalistic should not entail a neglect of the particular. Etc. |
| 21124 | Religious toleration has been institutionalised by the separation of church and state [Shorten] |
| Full Idea: One historically influential solution to the discord unleashed by the fact of religious diversity was to institutionalise the principle of toleration by separating church and state. | |
| From: Andrew Shorten (Contemporary Political Theory [2016], 03) | |
| A reaction: In 2018 Britain we still have an established religion (Anglicanism - Episcopalianism in the US), but toleration has arrived with the decline of religious belief. It must still be tough for Muslims, Jews etc to see a different religion as the official one. |
| 5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I begin to wonder whether time is an extension of the mind itself. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.26) | |
| A reaction: The observation that the mind creates a 'specious present' (spreading experience out over a short fraction of second) reinforces this. Personally I like David Marshall's proposal that consciousness is entirely memory, which would deny this idea. |
| 22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| Full Idea: Augustine answers that for us to be aware of time it must exist only in the mind, …and the difference between past and future is just the difference between memory and anticipation. | |
| From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
| A reaction: This is an extreme idealist view. Are we to say that the past consists only of what can be remembered, and the future only of what is anticipated? Absurd anti-realism, in my view. Where do his concepts come from, asks Le Poidevin. |
| 5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: A short time ago or a short time ahead we might put at ten days, but how can anything which does not exist be either long or short? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
| A reaction: A nice question, which gets at the paradoxical nature of time very nicely. How can it be long, but non-existent? We could break the paradox by concluding '..and therefore time does exist', even though we can't see how. |
| 5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: Of the three divisions of time, how can two, the past and the future, be, when the past no longer is, and the future is not yet? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
| A reaction: This is the oldest bewilderment about time, which naturally leads us to the thought that time cannot actually 'exist'. The remark implies that at least 'now' is safe, but that also succumbs to paradox pretty quickly. |
| 5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: We cannot say that the whole of the current year is present, and if the whole of it is not present, the year is not present. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
| A reaction: Another nice way of presenting the paradox of time. We are in a particular year, so it has to be real. |
| 5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I know well enough what time is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
| A reaction: A justly famous remark, even though it adds nothing to our knowledge of time. This sort of thought pushes us towards accepting many things as axiomatic, such as time, space, identity, persons, mind. |
| 5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I once heard a learned man say that time is nothing but the movement of the sun and the moon and the stars, but I do not agree. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.22) | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to say that you either take time or movement as axiomatic, and describe one in terms of the other, but you are stuck unable to give the initial statement of the axiom without mentioning the second property you were saving for later. |
| 5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: The fact that heaven and earth are there proclaims that they were created, for they are subject to change and variation; ..the meaning of change and variation is that something is there which was not there before. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.04) | |
| A reaction: It seems possible that the underlying matter is eternal (as in various conservation laws, such as that of energy), and that all change is in the form rather than the substance. |
| 22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
| Full Idea: If nothing existed by God before creation, then what could have happened to, or within, God that led God to decide to create the universe at that particular moment? Why would an eternal or perfect being want or need to change? | |
| From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
| A reaction: I suppose you could reply that change is superior to stasis, but then why did God delay the creation? |
| 5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: O Lord, since you are outside time in eternity, are you unaware of the things that I tell you? | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.01) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as the single most difficult and most elusive question about the nature of a supreme divine being. If the being is trapped in time, as we are, it is greatly diminished, and if it is outside, it is hard to see how it could be a participant. |