45 ideas
1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: He studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgement on all points. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.3 | |
A reaction: In what sense was Pyrrho a philosopher, then? He must have asserted SOME generalised judgments. |
22270 | Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's 1879 logic transformed philosophy because it greatly expanded logic's reach - what thought can achieve unaided - and hence compelled a re-examination of everything previously said about the grounds of thought when logic gives out. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 Intro | |
A reaction: I loved the gloss on logic as 'what thought can achieve unaided'. I largely see logic in terms of what is mechanically computable. |
1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The Sceptics say that they only employ reason as an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of reason, without employing reason. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8 |
8939 | We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher] |
Full Idea: Frege disagree that logic should merely describe the laws of thought - how people actually did reason. Logic is essentially normative, not descriptive. We want the one logic which successfully tracks the truth. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 1.III | |
A reaction: This explains Frege's sustained attack on psychologism, and it also explains we he ended up as a platonist about logic - because he wanted its laws to be valid independently of human thinking. A step too far, perhaps. Brains are truth machines. |
4971 | I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege] |
Full Idea: A distinction of subject and predicate finds no place in my way of representing a judgement. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879], §03) | |
A reaction: Perhaps this sentence could be taken as the beginning of modern analytical philosophy. The old view doesn't seem to me entirely redundant - merely replaced by a much more detailed analysis of what makes a 'subject' and what makes a 'predicate'. |
17745 | For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: 'All A's are B's' meant for Frege that the concept A implies the concept B, or that to be A implies also to be B. Moreover this applies to arbitrary x which happens to be A. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to hit the renate/cordate problem. If all creatures with hearts also have kidneys, does that mean that being enhearted logically implies being kidneyfied? If all chimps are hairy, is that a logical requirement? Is inclusion implication? |
7728 | Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: Frege distinguished between asserting a proposition and expressing it, and he introduced the judgement stroke (a small vertical line, assertion) and the content stroke (a long horizontal line, expression) to represent them. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.3 | |
A reaction: There are also strokes for conditional and denial. |
16881 | The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege] |
Full Idea: Since in view of the boundless multitude of laws that can be enunciated we cannot list them all, we cannot achieve completeness except by searching out those that, by their power, contain all of them. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879], §13) | |
A reaction: He refers to these laws in the previous sentence as the 'core'. His talk of 'power' is music to my ears, since it implies a direction of explanation. Burge says the power is that of defining other concepts. |
7622 | In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: By 1879 Frege had discovered an algorithm, a mechanical proof procedure, that embraces what is today standard 'second order logic'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Note that Frege did more than introduce quantifiers, and the logic of predicates. |
7729 | Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: Frege's regimentation is based on the view of the simplest sort of statement as having, not subject/predicate form (as in Aristotle), but function/argument form. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Joan Weiner - Frege | |
A reaction: This looks like being a crucial move into the modern world, where one piece of information is taken in and dealt with, as in computer procedures. Have educated people reorganised their minds along Fregean lines? |
9950 | A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The contribution of the quantifier to the truth conditions of sentences of which it is a part cannot be adequately explained if it is treated as other than a second-level predicate (for instance, if it is viewed as name). | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: They suggest that this makes it something like a 'property of properties'. With this account it becomes plausible to think of numbers as quantifiers (since they do, after all, specify quantities). |
9991 | For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait] |
Full Idea: For Frege the variable ranges over all objects. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind XII | |
A reaction: The point is that Frege had not yet seen the necessity to define the domain of quantification, and this leads him into various difficulties. |
10536 | Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege] |
Full Idea: For Frege there is no need to specify the domain of the individual variables, which is taken as the totality of all objects. This contrasts with the standard notion of an interpretation, which demands that we first fix the domain. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14 | |
A reaction: What intrigues me is how domains of quantification shift according to context in ordinary usage, even in mid-sentence. I ought to go through every idea in this database, specifying its domain of quantification. Any volunteers? |
7730 | Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: In order to express generality, Frege introduced quantifier notation. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Joan Weiner - Frege | |
A reaction: This is the birth of predicate logic, beloved of analytical philosophers (but of no apparent interest to phenomenalists, deconstructionists, existentialists?). Generality is what you get from induction (which is, of course, problematic). |
7742 | Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh] |
Full Idea: Frege treated 'everything' as basic, and suggested ways of recasting propositions containing other quantifiers so that this was the only one remaining. He recast 'something' as 'at least one thing', and defined this in terms of 'everything' and 'not'. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 1.6 | |
A reaction: Extreme parsimony seems highly desirable in logic as well as ontology, but it can lead to frustrations, especially over the crucial question of the existence of things quantified over. See Idea 6068. |
13824 | Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz] |
Full Idea: Frege's formal definition of derivability is perhaps the first investigation in general proof theory. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Dag Prawitz - Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs 2 n2 | |
A reaction: In 'On General Proof Theory §1' Prawitz says "proof theory originated with Hilbert" in 1900. Presumably Frege offered a theory, and then Hilbert saw it as a general project. |
13609 | Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan] |
Full Idea: Frege's work supplied a set of axioms for logic itself, at least partly because it was a well-known way of presenting the foundations in other disciplines, especially mathematics, but it does not nowadays strike us as natural for logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by David Kaplan - Dthat 5.1 | |
A reaction: What Bostock has in mind is the so-called 'natural' deduction systems, which base logic on rules of entailment, rather than on a set of truths. The axiomatic approach uses a set of truths, plus the idea of possible contradictions. |
17855 | It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Frege's account of the ancestral has made it possible, in effect, to define the natural numbers as entities for which induction holds. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 4.xix | |
A reaction: This is the opposite of the approach in the Peano Axioms, where induction is used to define the natural numbers. |
10607 | Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P] |
Full Idea: Frege's general logical system involves a type hierarchy, distinguishing objects from properties from properties-of-properties etc., with every item belonging to a determinate level. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 14.1 | |
A reaction: The Theory of Types went on to apply this hierarchy to classes, where Frege's disastrous Basic Law V flattens the hierarchy of classes, putting them on the same level (Smith p.119) |
11008 | Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read] |
Full Idea: When Kant said that existence was not a property, what he meant was, according to Frege, that existence is not a first-order property - it is not a property of individuals but a property of properties, that the property has an instance. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
22167 | Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Augustine says bodies don't form images in our spirit; our spirit does that itself with amazing quickness. ...So the appearances under which mind knows things aren't drawn from the things themselves. | |
From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Thomas Aquinas - Quodlibeta 8.2.1 | |
A reaction: This is Augustine's theory of 'illumination' - that God creates experience within us. His theory was soon discarded by the early scholastics. |
22117 | Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews] |
Full Idea: Instead of supposing that what we know can be abstracted from sensible particulars that instantiate such knowledge, Augustine insists that our mind is so constituted as to see 'intelligible realities' directly by inner illumination. | |
From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74 | |
A reaction: His 'theory of illumination'. This seems to be a sort of super-rationalism. This doesn't make clear the role of sensations. Surely he doesn't thing that we just bypass them? |
6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Against the Stoics, the Pyrrhonians argued that if someone presents a criterion of truth, then it will be important to determine whether it is the correct criterion. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Hence Davidson says that attempts to define truth are 'folly'. If something has to be taken as basic, then truth seems a good candidate (since, for example, logical operators could not otherwise be defined by means of 'truth' tables). |
6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The attacks of the Pyrrhonian sceptics are directed against the dogmas of the 'professors', not against the beliefs of the common people pursuing the business of daily life. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This may be because they thought that ordinary people were too confused to be worth attacking, rather than because they lived in a state of beautifully appropriate beliefs. Naďve realism is certainly worth attacking. |
6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: The ancient Academic sceptics charged the Pyrrhonian sceptics with 'negative dogmatism' when they claimed that a certain kind of knowledge is impossible. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
A reaction: It is this kind of point which should push us towards some sort of rationalism, because certain a priori 'dogmas' seem to be indispensable to get any sort of discussion off the ground. The only safe person is Cratylus (see Idea 578). |
1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fifth mode: judgements vary according to local custom, law and culture (Persians marry their daughters). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Seventh mode: perception varies according to viewing distance and angle (the sun, and a dove's neck). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Tenth mode: perceptions and judgements depend on comparison (light/heavy, above/below). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Second mode: individual men vary in responses and feelings (heat and cold, for example). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: First mode: animals vary in their feelings and judgements (of food, for example). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fourth mode: perceivers vary in their mental and physical state (such as the mad and the sick). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Eighth mode: perceptions of things depend on their magnitude or quantity (food and wine). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sixth mode: the perception of an object depends on surrounding conditions (sunlight and lamplight). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Ninth mode: we perceive things according to what we expect (earthquakes and sunshine). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Third mode: things like an apple vary according to which sense perceives them (yellow, sweet, and fragrant). | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Frege's account was top-down, not bottom-up: he aimed to decompose and discern function-argument structure in already existing sentences, not to explain how those sentences acquired their meanings in the first place. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 03 'Func' | |
A reaction: This goes with the holistic account of meaning, which leads to Quine's gavagai and Kuhn's obfuscation of science. I recommend compositionality for everthing. |
22118 | Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews] |
Full Idea: The modern concept of the will is often said to originate with Augustine. | |
From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74 | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that this is the source of the trouble. How can a thing be intrinsically free? Surely freedom is always a contextual concept? |
4348 | Love, and do what you will [Augustine] |
Full Idea: Love, and do what you will. | |
From: Augustine (works [c.415]) | |
A reaction: This sounds libertarian, but Augustine had a stern concept of what love required. It nicely captures one of the essential ideas of virtue ethics. |
7821 | Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Augustine claimed that the pagan schools between them had produced nearly three hundred different definitions of the highest good. | |
From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I would expect the right definition to be in there somewhere, but no doubt Augustine's definition made it 301. Perhaps the biggest problem of human life is that (as with the Kennedy assassination) proliferating stories obscure the true story. |
22119 | Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews] |
Full Idea: Augustine insisted that 'ought' does not, in any straightforward way, imply 'can' - which distinguishes him from most modern ethicists. | |
From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74 | |
A reaction: Not unreasonable. I ought to help my ailing friend who lives abroad, but I haven't the time or money to do it. We can experience impossibilities as duties. Impossibilities are just excuses. Augustine is opposing the Pelagian heresy. |
3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The idea of cause is relative to that of which it is the cause, and so has no real existence. …Also cause must either be body causing body, or incorporeal causing incorporeal, and neither of these is possible. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |
3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Motion is not moved in the place in which it is is, and it is impossible that it should be moved in the place in which it is not, so there is no such thing as motion. | |
From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |
7741 | The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: On Frege's logical analysis, the predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift [1879]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.8 | |
A reaction: However see Idea 6067, for McGinn's alternative view of quantifiers. In the normal conventions of predicate logic it may be that existence is treated as a quantifier, but that is not the same as saying that existence just IS a quantifier. |
22116 | Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews] |
Full Idea: Augustine did the most to define Christian heresy. The three most prominent were Donatism, Pelagianism (that humans are perfectible), and Manicheism (that good and evil are equally basic metaphysical realities). | |
From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.73 | |
A reaction: Manicheans had presumably been studying Empedocles. (I suppose it's too late to identify Christianity as a heresy?). |
19338 | Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins] |
Full Idea: Augustine solution to the problem of evil was to say that, strictly speaking, evil does not exist. Human beings are not part evil and part good, but rather just a limited amount of goodness. | |
From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III | |
A reaction: Augustine was rebelling against Manicheanism, which he espoused when young, which proposed a good and an evil force. An apathetic slob seems devoid of goodness, but is not evil. It takes extra effort to perform active evil. |