51 ideas
23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is a matter of living both thoughtfully and passionately, bringing understanding to bear on every passion and forcing every passion into the light of reflection. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.4) | |
A reaction: His main point is that passion is a key part of wisdom, and the idea that wisdom is cold and detached is quite false. Good point. At the very least, wise people must relate sympathetically to others. |
6602 | Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon] |
Full Idea: Philosophy and the intellectual sciences stand like statues, worshipped and celebrated, but not moved or advanced. | |
From: Francis Bacon (Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal) [1620], Vol.4.14), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Still the view of most scientists, I suspect. Personally I disagree, because I think philosophy has made enormous advances, in accurate analysis of arguments. The trouble is there is so much of it that it is hard to discern, and we don't live long enough. |
23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is conceptual sculpture, the shaping and developing of the intellectual structures within which we live our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.1) | |
A reaction: Nice. I tend to see philosophy as conceptual analysis (though creating new concepts doesn't quite fit that), but the vision of creating a huge conceptual sculpture sounds good. I would call it a system. (See my book, 'Natural Ideas'!). |
23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is called 'reason' is the passions enlightened, 'illuminated' by reflection and supported by a perspicacious deliberation that the emotions in their urgency normally excluded. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: To suggest that reason more or less is emotions strikes me as missing the point of 'perspicacious', which takes in facts outside our emotional world. We excitedly climb a cliff, then stop when we see the rocks are crumbling. |
16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I sooner judged that what lacks all form does not exist, than thought of as something in between form and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, unformed and next to nothing. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XII.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
A reaction: Scholastics were struck by the contrast between this remark, and the remark of Averroes (Idea 16587) that prime matter was halfway existence. Their two great authorities disagreed! This sort of thing stimulated the revival of metaphysics. |
22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I am told that I can ask three sorts of questions - whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.10) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very Aristotelian approach. I am pleased to see that what it is and what sort it is are not conflated. The first one must be its individual essence, and the second its generic essence. |
16724 | The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon] |
Full Idea: It is certain that the senses deceive, but they also testify to their own errors. | |
From: Francis Bacon (Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal) [1620], p.32), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.1 | |
A reaction: Nice. This is the empiricist view, rather than the rationalist line that reason sorts out the mess created by the senses. Most people know things if you just show them. |
23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: We trust certain rational 'intuitions' in ourselves which dispense with reflection but seem to follow an indisputable logic. (note: it is thought ineffable because reflection is the paradigm of rationality. It is no less rational than reflection). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Solomon uses the example to support that emotion is part of rationality. Since this view of intuition is more or less mine (that intuition can be knowledge, when the justification is obscure), it seems to support his claim. |
22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The memory contains the innumerable principles and laws of numbers and dimensions. None of these can have been conveyed to me by the bodily senses. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.12) | |
A reaction: Even if you have a fairly empirical view of the sources of mathematics (a view with which I sympathise), it must by admitted that our endless extrapolations from the sources also reside in memory. So we remember thoughts as well as experiences. |
22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The mind and the memory are one and the same. We even call the memory the mind, for when we tell a person to remember something, we tell them to 'bear this in mind', and when we forget something 'it slipped out of my mind'. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
A reaction: This idea has become familiar in modern neuroscience, I think, presumably because we do not find distinct types of neurons for consciousness and for memory. |
22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
Full Idea: If we had to experience sorrow or fear every time that we mentioned these emotions, no one would be willing to speak of them. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
A reaction: Remembering the death of a loved one can trigger fresh grief, but remembering their dangerous illness from which they recovered no longer contains the feeling of fear. |
22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I can distinguish the scent of lilies from that of violets, even though there is no scent at all in my nostrils. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
A reaction: Augustine has a nice introspective account of how we experience memory, and identifies lots of puzzling features. I know I can identify the smell of vinegar, but I can't bring it to mind, the way I can the appearance of roses. |
22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: How can it be that my mind can be happy because of the joy that is in it, and yet my memory is not sad by reason of the sadness that is in it? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14) | |
A reaction: This seems to contradict his thought in Idea 22981, that memory and mind are the same. Recall seems to be a part of consciousness which is not fully wired up to the rest of the mind. |
6603 | Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon] |
Full Idea: The secrets of nature reveal themselves more readily under the vexations of art than when they go their own way. | |
From: Francis Bacon (Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal) [1620], Vol.4.95), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This is a splendid slogan for the dawn of the age of science, and pinpoints the reason why we have advanced so much further than the Greeks. You can, of course, overdo the 'vexations of art'. It also justifies the critical approach to philosophy. |
22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The memory is a vast immeasurable sanctuary. It is part of my nature, but I cannot understand all that I am. Hence the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely. Is the other part outside of itself, and not within it? How then can it be a part? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
A reaction: He seems to understand the mind as entirely consisting of consciousness. Nevertheless, this seems to be the first inklings of the modern externalist view of the mind. |
23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The distinction between reason and passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' psychology of the human soul. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.2) | |
A reaction: I like faculties, for philosophical purposes, as explanatory tools to account for our metaphysical and conceptual framework, but this point is well made. The danger is that we impose sharp divisions, where reality is more complex. |
22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I do not understand the power of memory that is in myself, although without it I could not even speak of myself. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.16) | |
A reaction: Even if the self is not identical with memory, this idea seems to establish that memory is an essential aspect of the self. This point is neglected by those who see the self as an entity (the 'soul pearl') which persists through all experience. |
5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: How do prophets see the future, if there is not a future to be seen? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.17) | |
A reaction: The answer, I suspect, is that prophets can't see the future. The prospect that the future already exists would seem to saboutage human freedom and responsibility, and point to Calvinist predestination, and even fatalism. |
23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: I shall be making the claim (sujectively) that the chemistry of the body and the sensations caused by that chemistry have nothing to do with the emotions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Surely an unexpected stabbing pain causes fear? Isn't pain supposed to trigger appropriate emotions? That is not to say that emotions are a feature of body chemistry. |
23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion is a basic judgement about our Selves and our place in the world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Solomon's main theory. What about the Frege-Geach problem - that I feel emotions (and judgements) about fictions and remote events, in which my personal concerns and involvement are zero? Presumably these emotions are parasitic on his primary type? |
23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Direction, scope and focus set the stage, but the specific object is what defines the emotion. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the main distinction between an emotion and a mood. He emphasises that the objects are subjective, rather than factual. |
23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The heart of every emotion is its value judgements, its appraisals of gain and loss, its indictment of offences and its praise of virtue, its often Manichean judgement of 'good' and 'evil'. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.6) | |
A reaction: He adds blame and excuse. Some of our strongest emotions can just be identifications, rather than judgements, as when we learn of someone else's triumph or disaster. On the whole I agree, though. This is important for Aristotelian virtue theory. |
23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions can be analysed by direction, scope/focus, object, criteria, status, evaluations, responsibility, intersubjectivity, distance, mythology, desire, power, strategy. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: These are the headings Solomon actually applies in his breakdown of most of the main emotions. See his book for explanations of each of them. If people say philosophy makes no progress, I'd at least point to helpful thinking of this kind. |
23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
Full Idea: 'Outer-directed' emotions (such as fear) are about particular situations, objects, or other people. …The 'inner-directed' emotions (such as vanity or regret) take one's Self as their focal point. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This is Solomon's own distinction. Some of the emotions he cites, such as vanity, seem to me more like long term virtues or vices, rather than emotions. He did say, though, that you can have emotions without feeling, such as long-term hate. |
23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The passions are uniquely subjective, although they sometimes pretend to have a certain objective status. They are not concerned with the world, but with my world. They are not concerned with 'the facts', but with what is important. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.5) | |
A reaction: Values pick out what is 'important'. This idea sums up Solomon's rather solipsistic view of emotions. I accept that emotions are responses, rather than objective judgements, but there is objectivity in their social dimension. Why care about politics? |
23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximise our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of Solomon's book. There doesn't seem to be much to admire in what he takes to be our chief motivation. I would put a much more social spin on it - that our underlying urge is not self-promotion, but to fit into a community. |
23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are three fundamental species passions - emotions, moods, and desires. …What all passions have in common is their ability to bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Moods are said to be 'generalised emotions', where emotions are about something, and desires add objectives. Solomon criticises rigid divisions between mental faculties and states, but it is hard to disagree with this distinction. |
23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The Myth of the Passions says emotions are irrational forces beyond our control, disruptive and stupid, unthinking and counterproductive, against our 'better interests', and often ridiculous. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The Myth is very unlikely to be correct, for evolutionary reasons. How could there be a selection for a mental feature which distorts truths and leads to dangerous misjudgements? Most emotions motivate us to act successfully. So why do some run wild? |
23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion depends on an estimation of our own power. If a lover is jealous they welcome confrontation, but if they are just envious they assume impotence from the start. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.12) | |
A reaction: This seems particularly true of politics, where the possibility (or not) of influencing events makes a huge difference. We can picture a huge variety of emotions when a fight breaks out in public. |
23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is our passions, and our passions alone, which provide our lives with meaning. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This presumably entails that the lives of plants have no meaning. It also seems to be rather egotistical, since it is not clear why anyone else's life should have meaning for me, if I don't directly experience their passions. Interesting, though. |
23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence. ...For example, what is the difference in feeling between embarrassment and shame? …We may also experience an emotion like subdued anger or envy with no feeling. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is very persuasive, and supports the idea that what matters in an emotion is its content, rather than its phenomenology. He adds later that we are often mistaken about our own emotions. |
23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are no 'basic' emotions, only those emotions which are prevalent in a particular society. This reduction to a small set makes it impossible to appreciate the richness of our emotional lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: He cites Descartes as a culprit, and John Watson's famous list of fear, dependency and rage. I think Solomon is probably right. He suggests that the lists are usually individualistic and negative. Individuals may have their private basics! |
23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is not the passions who require the controls and rationalisations of reason. Rather, it is reason that requires the anchorage and earthy wisdom of the passions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: I like the second half of this. We don't just follow the winds of arguments; we decide into which of the many conflicting winds we should steer the rational arguments, and that needs passions. Only a fool doesn't rationally control their passions. |
23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
Full Idea: To divide the soul into reason and passion …divides us against ourselves, forcing us each to be defensively half a person, instead of a harmonious whole. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the best aspect of Solomon's book. I'm not sure, though, how this works in practice. Should I allow the winds of emotion to alter the course of my reasoning, or stunt my feelings by always insisting that reason plays a part? That's too dualist! |
23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is often called the 'irrationality' of our emotions is rather the faulty timing or inept choice of their expressions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The irrationality can be pretty obvious when having a tantrum over trivia, or resenting some tiny slight, or falling in love with a dead film star. That said, his point is well made. |
22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
Full Idea: In memory everything is preserved separately, according to its category. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the first seeds of the idea that the mind functions by means of mental files. Our memories of cats are 'close to' or 'linked to' our memories of dogs. |
23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions are the life force of the soul, the source of most of our values (not all: there is always hunger, thirst, and fatigue). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to worry that Solomon's account is too individual and subjective. My personal values may derive from my emotions, but I think human and social values are based much more on objective observations and facts. We are social, not solipsists. |
23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is often said that love takes the interests of the lover as being more important than one's own; but here again we would rather say that love takes the lovers interests as its own. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.9) | |
A reaction: This is because he sees emotions as almost entirely self-centred, and almost never altruistic. To me the evolutionary picture suggest a more social view. Many people want the lives of their ex- to go well, without knowing their new interests. |
22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
Full Idea: Surely happiness is what everyone wants, so much so that there can be none who do not want it? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.20) | |
A reaction: His concept of happiness is, of course, religious. Occasionally you meet habitual grumblers about life who give the impression that they are only happy when they are discontented. So happiness is achieving desires, not feeling good? |
23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The 'absurdity of life' is nothing than our own unsatisfactory choices, typically of defensiveness and resentment, competition, and 'meaningless' routines. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: He seems to have Camus particularly in mind. He sees love and co-operation as the cure. I sort of agree, but somewhere in all of our minds there lurks an abyss, with the good life looking like a distraction from it. |
23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Mythologies become ideologies when we play a role in them, live in them, take action and take sides. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This may well be a sceptical American attitude to ideology, since 'mythology' implies a fiction. But I think for most of us there exists the possibility of a good ideology, which correctly points us towards a better life. Dangerous things, though! |
5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I begin to wonder whether time is an extension of the mind itself. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.26) | |
A reaction: The observation that the mind creates a 'specious present' (spreading experience out over a short fraction of second) reinforces this. Personally I like David Marshall's proposal that consciousness is entirely memory, which would deny this idea. |
22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Augustine answers that for us to be aware of time it must exist only in the mind, …and the difference between past and future is just the difference between memory and anticipation. | |
From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
A reaction: This is an extreme idealist view. Are we to say that the past consists only of what can be remembered, and the future only of what is anticipated? Absurd anti-realism, in my view. Where do his concepts come from, asks Le Poidevin. |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: A short time ago or a short time ahead we might put at ten days, but how can anything which does not exist be either long or short? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
A reaction: A nice question, which gets at the paradoxical nature of time very nicely. How can it be long, but non-existent? We could break the paradox by concluding '..and therefore time does exist', even though we can't see how. |
5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: Of the three divisions of time, how can two, the past and the future, be, when the past no longer is, and the future is not yet? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
A reaction: This is the oldest bewilderment about time, which naturally leads us to the thought that time cannot actually 'exist'. The remark implies that at least 'now' is safe, but that also succumbs to paradox pretty quickly. |
5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: We cannot say that the whole of the current year is present, and if the whole of it is not present, the year is not present. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.15) | |
A reaction: Another nice way of presenting the paradox of time. We are in a particular year, so it has to be real. |
5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I know well enough what time is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.14) | |
A reaction: A justly famous remark, even though it adds nothing to our knowledge of time. This sort of thought pushes us towards accepting many things as axiomatic, such as time, space, identity, persons, mind. |
5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
Full Idea: I once heard a learned man say that time is nothing but the movement of the sun and the moon and the stars, but I do not agree. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.22) | |
A reaction: It is tempting to say that you either take time or movement as axiomatic, and describe one in terms of the other, but you are stuck unable to give the initial statement of the axiom without mentioning the second property you were saving for later. |
5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
Full Idea: The fact that heaven and earth are there proclaims that they were created, for they are subject to change and variation; ..the meaning of change and variation is that something is there which was not there before. | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.04) | |
A reaction: It seems possible that the underlying matter is eternal (as in various conservation laws, such as that of energy), and that all change is in the form rather than the substance. |
22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: If nothing existed by God before creation, then what could have happened to, or within, God that led God to decide to create the universe at that particular moment? Why would an eternal or perfect being want or need to change? | |
From: report of Augustine (Confessions [c.398]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 1 'Augustine's' | |
A reaction: I suppose you could reply that change is superior to stasis, but then why did God delay the creation? |
5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
Full Idea: O Lord, since you are outside time in eternity, are you unaware of the things that I tell you? | |
From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XI.01) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the single most difficult and most elusive question about the nature of a supreme divine being. If the being is trapped in time, as we are, it is greatly diminished, and if it is outside, it is hard to see how it could be a participant. |